Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin swept through Ankara last month. During Putin's one day visit on August 6, a total of twenty agreements, eight of which were between the private sector, were signed. Putin and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also inked bilateral protocols on natural gas and oil cooperation. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yıldız signed an arrangement on nuclear cooperation.

The most critical protocol, and of potentially greatest consequence, involves the South Stream Natural Gas Project, which would transport Russian gas to international markets and pass through Turkish territorial waters in the Black Sea. Moscow conceived South Stream as a new energy route to carry natural gas supplies to European markets. More importantly, it sees progress on the pipeline project as a means to politically undermine construction of Nabucco, the alternative and rival route to the Russian backed South Stream. Along with four member states of the European Union Turkey signed the much anticipated Nabucco pipeline agreement in July, which is planned to carry gas supplies from Central Asia, the Caspian and Middle East to Europe and in which Moscow chose not to participate. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi joined the talks in a show of support for the South Stream project, conceived by Russia and Eni, the Italian energy giant partner to the project. Speaking after the signing ceremony to the press, Erdoğan noted that "We signed protocols to improve cooperation among our two countries under three distinct headings. The signed natural gas protocol foresees the extension of the procurement contract on gas purchases from Russia that will expire in 2011." Erdoğan announced that within the framework of the same protocol, agreement had been reached to launch a feasibility study for the transit of the South Stream pipeline from Turkish territorial waters. He emphasized that South Stream should not be construed as an alternative to Nabucco. Putin echoed this sentiment, defending the position that construction of South Stream would not prevent plans for Nabucco and that both projects could materialize in the future depending on market needs and consumer demand.

Another significant agreement reached between Turkey and Russia foresees Moscow's provision of energy for the Samsun-Ceyhan Crude oil pipeline project. Other important agreements signed by Erdoğan and Putin relate to furthering cooperation between the two states on construction of a nuclear energy power plant. It was reported that these cooperation arrangements between Turkey's Atom Energy Institution and RUSATOM pertain to the issues of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, early warning on nuclear accidents and nuclear facilities. A Russian-Turkish partnership competed for the nuclear power plant bid that is planned to be built in Akkuyu, Turkey. The Russian Federation has come close to the unit price of energy of the Hydroelectric Power Plants. However, meetings are ongoing still. According to the conditions of the procurement bid, the state will guarantee electricity procurement for 15 years from the firm that will construct the nuclear power plant. When the production cost is high, this reflects upon the customer.

During the meetings certain problems concerning customs were also taken up, as well as cooperation in the agriculture sector. Minister of Energy Yıldız, who also serves as the co-head of the Joint Economic Commission, expressed that their goal is to expand trading volume between the two states to 100 billion dollars in four years. Bilateral trade has increased from 4.5 billion dollars in 2000 to 38 billion dollars in 2008. Furthermore, Erdoğan proposed establishment of a Turkish-Russian College and University, which was received positively by Putin. Erdoğan also expressed that from 2010 onwards the leaders of the two states would be convening once a year to enable continuation of intergovernmental relations.

Although the Russian Federation has vast amounts of natural gas supply, they have little choice but to rely on the Ukraine route to sell to Europe. Constructing a pipeline under the Black Sea is an expensive project. The rapprochement between Bulgaria and the United States renders the use of the Black Sea-Bulgaria route for the South Stream project illogical for the Russian Federation. As a result, the Russian Federation could supply natural gas to Nabucco through the South Stream 2 project and in this way, Nabucco could be utilized as a complementary part of the Russian Federation. This seems to be a more logical way forward. Russian officials do not often visit Turkey. Putin's Ankara visit signals the turn of a new page in energy relations, including nuclear energy, between the two states.

Since the 1990s, the volume of foreign trade between Turkey and the Russian Federation has increased steadily and reached 20.7 billion dollars in 2006. The target of 25 billion dollars for 2008, which was set in 2007, has been passed, with trade approaching 28 billion dollars. In 2008, the Russian Federation became Turkey's primary trade partner with 38 billion dollars (6.5 billion in import, 31,3 in export) worth bilateral trade relations. Turkey, on the other hand, became the seventh biggest trade partner of the Russian Federation (fourth biggest in import market). However, Turkey's bilateral foreign trade deficit has exceeded 24 billion dollars in 2008 (34% of Turkey's overall foreign trade deficit). Turkish direct investment in Russia has topped 6 billion dollars. It is estimated that Russian direct investment in Turkey is about 4 billion dollars. The net worth of the projects completed by Turkish contractors in the Russian Federation has reached 30 billion dollars. The new contracts that Turkish contractors won in Russia in 2007 amount to approximately 6 billion dollars and this is a record high when compared to previous years. From a broader perspective, when the foreign trade volume between the two states is examined, it is apparent that the balance is shifting in favor of the Russian Federation year by year.

Turkey is the most favored destination for Russian tourists, with 3 million Russian tourists visiting the country in 2008. The Russian Federation ranks second, following Germany, in terms of the number of tourists Turkey receives annually. But the number of tourists arriving from the Russian Federation to Turkey decreased in May 2009, when compared to the same month last year, by 11.82%. During the period of January-May 2009, the total number of tourists in Turkey was 7,327,542, which denotes a decrease of 0.72% when compared with the same period last year. The percentage of Russian tourists visiting Turkey during January-May of this year to the total number of tourists in Turkey is 7.12%. The same time last year, it was 8.80%, thus the market share of the Russian Federation in the Turkish tourism market decreased by 1.68%.

Turkey acquires 62% of its natural gas imports and 32% of oil imports from the Russian Federation, making Russia Turkey's largest energy partner. As of end 2008, Turkey has imported 23.8 billion cubic-meters of natural gas (10.1 billion cubic-meters from Blue Stream and the rest from the Balkans) from the Russian Federation. After Germany, Turkey is the second largest natural gas importing state from the Russian Federation in Europe. Turkey's annual oil import from Russia is about 7-9 million tonnes (9.3 million tonnes in 2007, about 7 million tonnes in 2008).

Turkey and the Russian Federation have similar approaches on regional and international issues. Regional platforms of co-operation in the Black Sea, like the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony Operation, are models of participation and examples of converging outlooks.

Unless the tone of relations and course of events characterizing relations between Turkey and Russia take an unexpected turn for the worse, the possibility of serious disagreement spoiling bilateral relations in the future seems unlikely. However, despite the general warming of relations over the years from the perspective of the Turkish side, the same cannot be said with the same certainty for the Russians. Although the Cold War has ended for Ankara, it still continues for Moscow. The Turks are still depicted with a negative image in Russian textbooks. For Turkish nationals, receiving visas for Russia and passing through customs without problems remains a difficult task. In ways reminiscent of the days of the Cold War, where being branded as an ‘agent' could happen in a matter of moments, the situation is only worse for Turkish intellectuals, journalists and scholars attempting to enter Russia today.

On the foreign policy front as it pertains to Turkey, the Russian Federation has not changed its stance on the Cyprus dispute. Despite Putin's rhetoric on the unfairness of the isolation imposed on the Turkish-Cypriots, the need to end the economic restrictions on one side of the island, and that the Greek-Cypriots should be encouraged to take steps towards a resolution, there has been no substantive change in the Russian Federation's policy position on the issue. The PKK/Kongra-Gel has not been put on Russia's terrorist organizations list. Issues relating to terrorism have been derogated as low priority points on Russia's agenda when it approaches Turkey. It should not be overlooked that developments at the regional and international levels and disagreements between the Russian Federation and the Europe-Atlantic world and NATO (such as over the CFE and CFE II treaties, US deployment of missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems in Eastern Europe, NATO expansion and membership bids of Ukraine and Georgia) have the potential to disrupt relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation in the future.

The improvements in bilateral relations that are construed as positive steps by Turkey should be reflected as favorable outcomes from Russia's perspective as well. It is time for the Russian Federation to take some steps in improving Russo-Turkish relations.

i Other documents that were signed between Turkey and Russia in August are as follows: Republic of Turkey and The Russian Federation 9th Term Black Sea Economic Cooperation Meeting Protocol; Government of Republic of Turkey and Government of the Russian Federation Co-operation Agreement on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy; Government of Republic of Turkey and Government of the Russian Federation Agreement on Early Warning of Nuclear Accidents and Information Sharing on Nuclear Tests; Republic of Turkey Turkish Standards Institutions and the Russian Federation Federal Technical Regulation and Metrology Service Memorandum of Co-operation on Standardization and Compatibility Evaluation; the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and Russian Federal Space Agency (ROSCOSMOS) Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation on Outer Space Exploration and Peaceful Use; Program for Co-operation in Education, Science, Culture, Youth and Sports (Cultural Exchange Program- (CEP)); Republic of Turkey Ministry of Agriculture and the Russian Federation Federal Plant Quarantine and Veterinarian Service Memorandum on Co-operation on the Food Security of Imported and Exported Fishery Products; Republic of Turkey Undersecretariat of Customs and the Russian Federation Federal Customs Service Memorandum of Understanding on Management of Customs; and Capital Markets Board of Turkey and Russian Federal Authority of Financial Market Agreement on Information Sharing.