"We left our lands to obey Allah's calling from thousands of kilometers away and came to Afghanistan to achieve jihad, fight until the end and deliver jihad to other places."
These are the words of Abdullah Azam, who joined the jihadists in the fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan. The ambition "[To] deliver jihad to other places" is significant. During the Soviet occupation, Arab-origin jihadists were dominant in Afghanistan. Today, recruits from various parts of the world are paying heed to the call for jihad and infiltrating into Afghanistan. Long aware of this inflow of fresh jihadists into Afghan territory, allies have been pressuring Pakistan to take tougher measures against cross-border movements. The pressure has paid off on some areas of Pakistan's policy, such as efforts to be more selective in visa application processes in a move to institute more stringent screening procedures. Visa issuance at Pakistan's airport has become more difficult and subject to longer approval times. Pervez Musharraf had ordered police to come down hard on young people trying to pass through checkpoints on the way to Afghanistan. Abdullah Azam insists that the next generations of jihadist youth are forced to find ways to bypass the thuggish police forces via the rough mountain terrain, often by foot.
Without a doubt, the new U.S. administration will be judged by the degree of sustainable success it is able to achieve in Afghanistan; so much so that it has already been dubbed ‘Obama's war.' Clearly, Afghanistan is a priority on President Obama's agenda and the decision to deploy an additional 17,000 U.S. troops there is an important indication. Whether or not the U.S. decision to withdraw its combat troops from Iraq on a pull-out schedule will alter the conditions on the ground in ‘jihad territory' is less clear. It may be that the Muslim world is pursuing a wait and see approach until more concrete results from long-term U.S. policy in the region becomes clear. Despite a series of new measures announced by Washington, including recent plans to deploy more than 300 American civilian diplomats, civilian specialists, and reconstruction advisors to Afghanistan, neither the number of jihadists nor the spread of their extremist influence are showing signs of decline in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan). On the contrary, the ‘Afghan Jihad' has transformed into its own distinct brand. In order to understand the dynamics behind this, we need to look at the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Sunni fighters were dominant in Afghanistan during that time. Almost all mujahedeen gathered around Cemiyeti Islami, a movement founded by Muhammed Gulam Niyazi, who was undisputedly influential in stirring an Islamic awareness in Afghanistan against the Soviets. The first organized activities aimed at establishing an Islamic republic in Afghanistan began at Kabul University. Educated at Ezher University in Egypt, Gulum Niyazi came under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and was keen to foment these ideas in Afghanistan. During his time as the dean of Kabul University's Sharia Faculty, he started to mobilize political Islamic activities. Buhaneddin Rabbani became the new leader of the Cemiyeti Islami in 1972 and the group was a forerunner in the jihad against Soviet occupation and the encroaching communist regime. Needless to say, they were able to do so thanks to the help of petro-dollars.
By 1985, Ittihad-i Islami, a group headed by Abdurabbirresul Seyyaf and Hizb-i Islamiyi Halis, under Mevlevi Yunus Halis, had appeared on the scene. In addition to these two powerful Sunni groups, in 1990, the Shiite Hizb-i Vahdeti Islami initiated its struggle of survival by pulling eight Shiite groups under its umbrella. In 1995, Taliban supporters killed the leader of this movement, Abdulali Mezari. Aldulkerim Halili succeeded Mezari but the movement lost its momentum. The Shiite Islamic Movement was founded by various Shiite groups under the leadership of Asif Muhsini in the 1980s. The movement had some disagreements with Ayatollah Khomeini and was known to be distant from Iran. Although a predominantly Shiite movement, it supported the Cemiyeti Islami.
Today, in addition to Sunni iihadists, Shiite fighters are trying to shore up their influence and penetrate Afghanistan to attack and undermine NATO forces stationed there. The forerunner in this struggle is Jaish Al Mahdi (JAM)-also known as the Mahdi Army-a paramilitary group loyal to Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr. Established during the early stages of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, the group was first heard of when it launched major armed attacks against coalition forces and Iraqi Sunnis. The Mahdi fighters consist of Shiite Arabs as well as Turkmens and Kurds of the same sect. Although JAM was deemed a marginal group with limited power initially, it has increased its influence and range over time. It has drawn recruits from among foreign fighters, including some Sunnis. Today it has between 3,000-4.000 fighters in Iraq and has been known to infiltrate the police and military to obtain training and equipment. The majority of its militants are under 18, young enough to be children. They control Najaf, Karbala and certain neighborhoods in Baghdad, armed with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).
Concerned with the rise of JAM, the U.S. and Iraqi governments initiated a counter insurgency operation against the militants at the end of March 2008. However, large portions of the group went underground. Those who left Baghdad went into hiding in the Iraq-Syria border region close to Mosul and some militants are thought to have escaped to Iran and Turkey.
Lately, Jaish Al Mahdi has increased its cooperation with jihadist groups outside Iraq. Most notably, a network spanning Germany-Turkey-Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan was established with the cooperation of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and JAM. JAM has started to coordinate its efforts with the Lashkaral Zil army, which is connected to the Taliban. Militant camps run by the Baitullah Mesud group located at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are some of the main gathering points of the Shiite jihadists. JAM also has connections with jihadist groups in Central Asia, among the Chechens, Bosnians and the Sichuan region of China. In establishing these connections, JAM joined up with the Uzbekistan Islamic Party. In addition, it cooperates with the Faqir Muhammed, Ilyas Keshmiri and Siraj Haqqani groups for militant training. Although there are differences in their radical interpretations of Islam, Sunni and Shiite jihadists receive joint training in about 150-200 camps on the Pakistan-Afghan border.
JAM's leader in Afghanistan is Abu Halis, an Arab Shiite commander who was previously among the ranks of the Afghan mujahedeen and fought in the jihad movement against the Soviet invasion. JAM has started to increase its influence in the Afghan southern province of Helmand, a nest of hardcore Taliban fighters that extends to the Pakistan border. JAM's headquarters is located in the Paktia region on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan are predominantly Arab and Afghan.
In Pakistan, JAM is influential in the provinces of Waziristan Bajaur, and Khyber of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the Swat district in the North-West Frontier Province Its spheres of influence in Afghanistan consist of the provinces of Kunar, Nuristan, Nangahar, Kabul, Logar, Wardak, Khost, Ghazni and Kandahar.
Former Chechen fighters and other jihadists are also being transferred from Dagestan, Azerbaijan, Iran and Afghanistan. Armed clashes in Dagestan on March 18-21, which resulted in 20 reported casualties, should be viewed from this perspective.
As far as the international front behind JAM is concerned, Germany is the money vault and militant center in Europe for Shiites as well as Sunni jihadists. Funding and militants moved from Europe reach the militia networks through Iran via Turkey.
Despite considerable cross-militant cooperation between the Shiite and Sunni extremists, the centuries old struggle for hegemony between Iranian and Iraqi Shiites has not abated. The fortress of Iranian Shi'ism are the seminaries of the City of Qum, the heart and brainchild of the Islamic revolution. The holy city of Karbala in Iraq is considered a holy site and the scene of the Battle of Karbala, where the grandson of the Prophet Muhammed and son of Ali, the founder of the Shi'ia sect Huseyin, was murdered by opposing Islamic groups. JAM claims control over Karbala. Shiite ideological disputes between Qum and Karbala seem to have been put aside where jihad is concerned.
The presence of influential Shiite groups which exported jihad from Iraq to Afghanistan is increasing. Upon the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq a majority of Shiite jihadist fighters in Iraq will likely transfer to the front in Afghanistan. However, covert meetings between the West and the Taliban , which intensified in late 2008, may have some impact on splitting Islamic groups operating in Afghanistan.
For the last six months, a flurry of secret talks have been held mainly in Dubai, London, Ankara and Kabul. With the aim of conquering the Taliban from within, meetings were held with groups that are in some way linked to the Taliban but have held differing positions from them in the past. According to a Turkish official, one such meeting was held during Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit to Turkey. Karzai and representatives of the former Afghan Prime Minister, Gulbeddin Hikmetyar-in hiding for seven years, mostly in Tehran-met in Ankara in late December, 2008. One of the issues at the meeting concerned Hikmetyar's return to Afghanistan and greater cooperation with NATO.
Turkey had also tried to mediate between Karzai and Pakistan's overthrown President Pervez Musharraf. However, that's all water under the bridge now. Today, Musharraf is gone. Moreover, the new government in Pakistan recently granted radical Islamic groups in the north of the country the right to administer Sharia law in the region.
U.S. forces in Afghanistan classify Hikmetyar's group of fundamentalist Sunni Muslim Pashtuns, the Hizb-i Islami, as a terrorist organization because of its close cooperation with the Taliban. The return of Hikmetyar to Kabul would lead to the inclusion of some groups close to the Taliban into the political process. The Taliban itself, on the other hand, is ready to share control of the Afghan government with Karzai. But including some and leaving others outside of the political game will not end the war.
Hikmetyar's emergence in Afghan politics would means that he would have considerable influence in the reconfigured Afghan government. Even if indirectly, this would translate into a role in the administration for the Taliban, which now seeks to work with all actors in the country. The Taliban's only precondition is the withdrawal of all foreign powers from Afghan territory. Secret meetings between Karzai and the Taliban are being held with Washington's approval. An American consultant to Karzai is personally involved in the peace talks.
Obama cannot and will not ignore Afghanistan, a critical national security priority that will make or break his foreign policy team. His strategy is based on withdrawing troops from Iraq and sending additional troops to the embattled Afghanistan. He must do this at a time when NATO allies are shying away from sending troops of their own amidst deteriorating security conditions and are not likely to step forward anytime soon. This makes the surge of American troops to Afghanistan the only option. Washington's decision to pull troops out of Iraq presented the timely opportunity to release more forces to Afghanistan. However, with this move, the U.S. will unintentionally be attracting more jihadists to Afghanistan. The jihadist threat will not have been dismantled, but shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan. The increase in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan will be met by a sizeable jihad resistance there.
We should not forget that "success in Afghanistan" depends on winning and sustaining the trust of the local population. The only way to do this is by providing and maintaining security for the Afghan people. And this means that coalition forces need more troops. For now, the formula looks like more jihadists against more troops and vice versa. If the resolution of this dilemma means including the Taliban and its affiliated group of extremist Islam adherents into the folds of the Afghan government, this would mean that whatever hard earned progress the U.S. led coalition achieved over the past eight years would be multiplied by zero. It would mean a shameful and embarrassing set back for democracy. If this should indeed happen, wouldn't we need to ask: How is the American occupation different from the Soviet one?

i Al Jazeera, February 26, 2009