When former KGB General and President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev defined the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey as "one nation, two states", he had not foreseen that ties would sour as they have in recent days. The reasons behind the tension involve longstanding and problematic issues over another state, Armenia. Turkey's diplomatic policy shift towards normalization of relations with Armenia has not only rattled Baku, but made it outright furious. So much so that despite Aliyev's earlier announcement that he would be at the Alliance of Civilizations summit in Istanbul held in April, which was attended by U.S. President Barack Obama, he was not only absent but refrained from sending an envoy.
Turkey's latest moves concerning Armenia are not new, but are perhaps the boldest yet. Indications of attempts to warm relations were there for some time. President of Turkey Abdullah Gul went to Erivan for the qualifiers between the two states for the World Cup in September, but at the time, Azerbaijan's reaction was much milder to this more symbolic gesture of goodwill. It was when Turkey started to publicly talk about the possibility of opening its borders with Armenia, which was closed since the early-1990s owing to the Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani territory of Karabakh, did Azerbaijan's patience come to an end. Turkey closed its border with Armenia 16 years ago as a reaction to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani Karabakh, and as a matter of official national policy, re-opening the border has hinged on Armenian withdrawal from the territory. So the question is, what has changed?
According to some officials in Ankara, the recent move is designed to prevent the use of the 1915 events against Turkey in the international arena, such as during accession talks with the European Union on Turkey's bid for membership. Another reason is to mitigate the detrimental effect of the ‘Armenian Genocide draft bill' which is debated every April at the U.S. Congress, on relations between Washington and Ankara. That Ankara was planning on opening borders in April is likely not a coincidence.
Russia's Plan
While Turkey is virtually bypassing Moscow by opening the border with Armenia-which is protected by Russian troops-Moscow is now attempting to sideline Turkey by becoming more actively engaged via Azerbaijan. In June, Armenian President Sarkisyan will join the next round of the Medvedev-Aliyev meeting, held earlier in Moscow on April 17. The main legs of the plan, which will be proposed to Aliyev and Sarkisyan at the meeting at St. Petersburg and prepared under Moscow's auspices, are economic in nature:
1- Terms for Azerbaijan to procure tank, missile and fighter planes more easily to be put into effect.
2- Commitment to transfer money to Armenia from the $10 billion worth fund earmarked for it from the Eurasia Economic Community (EurAsEC).
For Erivan, the opening of the Turkish border is a much needed promise of greater economic opportunity and poverty alleviation in the country. According to Turkish officials, 20 thousand Armenians, most of them concentrated in Istanbul, are currently working illegally in Turkey. But it has a greater political meaning for the diaspora, which outnumbers the population in Armenia.
While the ashes of the 2008 Georgian war are still hot, South Caucasia has become the center of a new conflict. The warning signs were present for some time. A string of developments that many analysts could not make sense of are the missing pieces of today's puzzle.
The first signal was the assassination of Azerbaijan's Chief of Air Forces, Rail Rzayev in February. Rzayev was more than a force commander in Azerbaijan; he had been involved in efforts to shift Azerbaijan's alignment of its army modernization towards the U.S. Rzayev was in Turkey before his assassination and had signed an agreement for the sale of F-series fighter planes and the training of Azerbaijani pilots. If the agreement was put into force, an irreversible step would have been taken for the Azerbaijani Air Force's shift towards U.S. manufactured weapon systems. Rzayev was killed before he saw the enactment of the agreement.
Turkey's Plan
Around the time when Rzayev was assassinated, efforts were underway in Turkey to try to include Azerbaijan to the meetings it was conducting with Armenia. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan, met with Armenian President Serj Sarkisyan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Nalbantyan at the Munich Security Conference, and then went to Baku with the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs and relayed the situation to the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. According to Ankara, an agreement on principle had been reached. For the first time, the issues of the Armenian occupation and the Karabakh conflict had come this close to a resolution.
According to the agreement, Armenia would return towns around Karabakh, such as Fuzuli, Akdam, Cebrail, Kubatli, and Zengilan to Azerbaijan and Azeris who had fled the area would return to their lands. Upper Karabakh would be addressed by a provisional government until the final status was settled, at which time the town of Kelbecer would be left to Azerbaijan. In return, Azerbaijan would open its rail and motorways to Armenia. Ultimately, an alternative that involved Azerbaijan and Armenia would be established against the Russian monopoly on energy. Furthermore, by striking an agreement that included Armenia, the missing part in Europe's plan for an east-west route against Moscow's North-South transport corridor would at long-last be achieved.
By deploying an international peace force to the border between Upper Karabakh and Armenia, which exclude troops from neighboring states that are party and have a stake in the issue-meaning Turkey and Russia-the plan was that Russia would lose its stronghold over Armenia, where its military bases in Caucasia are located.
"Grey Cardinal"
There is an influential group within Azerbaijan that opposes the Western plan that Turkey espouses. General Secretary of the Presidency Ramiz Mehdiyev, who is known for his close relationship with Aliyev, stands out as the leader of this group. It is known that Mehdiyev, also known as the "Grey Cardinal" is the man in control behind the curtains. Not only are all the governors in Azerbaijan connected to Mehdiyev, a former Soviet bureaucrat, he is also responsible for managing relations with the Kremlin.
The Azerbaijani Border Minister Kemalettin Haydarov and Minister of Economy and Development Haydar Babayev are powerful figures who seek improved relations with Russia. Without a doubt, this group had powerful sway in fueling Azerbaijan's recent harsh reaction to Turkey's overtures to Armenia. Armenia, which needs Russian support in resolving the Karabakh dispute, approved joint air defense with Russia as well as membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Security Council. Azerbaijan and Georgia, which oppose the settlement of Russian military bases on their territory, have not joined the Joint Security Council, which is essentially the military wing of CIS. On the contrary, both states are among the founders of the regional organization GUAM, which was founded a little over a decade ago to resist Russian military dominance by 4 former Soviet republics-Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In 2006, GUAM renamed itself GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM ODED). Twenty percent of both Georgian and Azerbaijani territory is under the control of separatists, and both see military cooperation with Turkey as significant as their alignment with NATO.
From where Moscow stands these days, it looks like Baku's calculations are changing. For Turkey, once its commitments related to the modernization of the Azerbaijani army and military training are completed, initiation of a new round of cooperation seems a distant possibility. Turkey's influence in the region where the Baku-Ceyhan and Trans-Caspian pipeline passes and the region that is home to the route of the transportation corridor of Central Asia may become limited. While Russia insidiously commands more control over the region, Turkey is stuck between Washington and Baku. If the situation continues as it is now, Azerbaijan could hand over the promised gas for the NABUCCO project to Russia. Russia offered close to $300 per one thousand cubic meters of gas at the April Aliyev-Medvedev meeting. This offer means greater profit for Azerbaijan and may be hard for it to turn down.
The direction of developments points to a new war brewing between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Ilham Aliyev's postponement of his visit to Istanbul and his tough remarks against Armenia after the convening of the National Security Council are not comparable to his previous reactions. Baku's latest moves could signify a longer term change in its orientation and policy.
During the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, Azerbaijan was weighing its options regarding a counter-terrorism operation in Karabakh. However, Azerbaijani officials stepped back from this idea following the intervention of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan.
Over the last four years, Azerbaijan has increased its share of strategic investments to its defense industry and achieved notable progress. As a result, the Azerbaijani defense industry will be capable of producing 400 types of weapons systems in the coming years; and much of it is already underway. Azerbaijan is catching up to Israel and Russia in the field of defense technologies.
Another significant development is that the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense shifted from a defensive doctrine, which was in effect for quite some time, to an offensive doctrine. There are signs that troops are being moved towards the war region. Azerbaijan may be preparing for a military offensive to reclaim its territory from occupation. That the Russian army will confront the advancing Azerbaijani forces seems clear. If Moscow cannot persuade Aliyev and Sarkisyan in the upcoming June discussions on a diplomatic resolution, it will flash a green a light to a limited and controlled Azerbaijani operation. In case of a military operation where Moscow avoids direct involvement and stands back as an arbitrator, the odds are against an Armenian victory. There are serious gaps in the military strengths of the two states. Azerbaijan's population is approximately three times that of Armenia (8.2 million to 2.9 million). In case of mass mobilization, the numbers also favor Azerbaijan, which has 66,940 active and 300,000 reserve troops to Armenia's 42,080 active and reserves numbering 210,000. Every year 90 thousand Azerbaijani youth are qualified for military service. Furthermore, this time the Azerbaijan Army is better prepared for war, more so than was the case in the early-1990s. Since both states use predominantly Russian equipment, the level and caliber of training is the defining factor, beyond just troop levels or recruits. During the war in Karabakh, commanders of the Azerbaijani Army fell short and lacked experience in the modern art of war since in the Soviet Army, Azerbaijanis worked mainly in logistics divisions. On the other hand, Armenian commanders were employed in fighting divisions and special ops, and thus had a good grasp of the Soviet mode of fighting. However, today the situation is much different. Today, Azerbaijan's Army is more professionally trained, thanks to the Turkish Armed Forces. Furthermore, high oil revenues and aid from Turkey has allowed Azerbaijan to modernize its army and increase its capacity considerably.
Another possibility being talked about behind the scenes in Moscow is that Russia may turn a blind eye to an Azerbaijani operation temporarily at least, only to then move to tie South Ossetia to Armenia, thus securing itself a border with Armenia. Territorial claims aired lately by Armenians give credence to this scenario.
A military operation undertaken by Azerbaijan is in no ones interest at the moment. Neither the U.S., EU, nor Turkey would support such a war. Russia's biggest fear is that the war could spread to North Caucasia.
If Turkey's diplomatic attempts yields results, Russia would lose its influence in South Caucasia and the security of the Caspian Sea would be endangered, along with the Aliyev government. The pro-Western nationalist Azerbaijani opposition, bolstered by the support of religious radicals, could depose Aliyev. The waves of unrest that rise from the west of the Caspian Sea could then reach to other shores in no time and trigger colored revolutions in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
If Russia's plan succeeds, the NABUCCO pipeline would be put away on a dusty shelf, possibly for good. Furthermore, Aliyev's rule would be strengthened. The only obstacle in front of the Russian domination of South Caucasia, that is, Saakashvili's rule in Georgia, would come to a sudden end. The increased influence of Russia over Iran's neighbors would enable Moscow to resolve disagreements in the Caspian Sea over demarcation conflicts in its favor. In such a situation, any future armed conflict between Iran and the U.S. would become nearly impossible. Any declaration of war on Iran by Israel and the U.S. would mean a direct intervention to Russia's space.
Aliyev declared that if Turkey opens its border with Armenia, he would shut down the natural gas supply for the Baku-Erzurum route. Furthermore, Azerbaijani reaction would not be limited to this, but other projects would be put in danger as well. Azerbaijan is a critical supplier for the NABUCCO project, envisioned to be the alternative for Russian monopoly over energy, and is the only bridge between the Caspian and the West. If the situation should continue along the current trajectory, the already damaged bridge could collapse entirely. If that should be the case, the tenuous progress made on issues like securing alternative energy supply routes and Georgia's NATO membership could be damaged beyond repair.