"Эй, ухнем!
Эй, ухнем!
Ещё разик, ещё да раз!"

All together!
All together!
Once more, once again, still once more

The famous "Ei Ukhnyem", or "The Song of the Volga Boatmen" starts with a deep, slow and heavy chorus, slowly increasing in tone. It is a motivational song, helping the exhausted Burlaks endure the burden, struggle more, once again, once more. Just like the well known painting with the same name, "Ei Ukhnyem" is the symbol of doggedness, struggle and slow-but-strong steps forward. The struggle for Volga, for keeping the boats afloat in Volga and for pride.

As is the case with Черноморский Флот, the Black Sea Fleet.

Formed in late 18th Century, Black Sea Fleet is responsible from the naval operations in Black Sea Region and Mediterranean Sea, especially Eastern Mediterranean. The strength, both in terms of manpower and equipment, decreased dramatically right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by disputes between Russian Federation and Ukraine on the ownership and status of the primary base of the fleet at Sevastopol. However, the rising geopolitical importance of the Black Sea as a gateway between Europe and Caucasus & Central Asia, forced Russia to focus much of its military modernization efforts on its forces in the region. Thus, to secure vital interests on energy transfer, regional influence and hegemony on the hinterland of former Soviet states, Russian Federation is now on the process of resurrecting the once venerable Black Sea Fleet.

The Black Sea Fleet - Background

The Black Sea Fleet's history starts with the efforts of Prince Potemkin, who founded the naval base at Sevastopol, a city in the Southwestern tip of Crimean Peninsula. The fleet symolized Russian aspirations for control over Black Sea and reaching to the Mediterranean. The fleet inflicted heavy losses to the Ottoman naval presence in the region, by both sinking a considerable number of warships and by damaging important harbors and ports. Until the Crimean War, Russian navy enjoyed tactical and strategic advantage over Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea, thus securing its presence and dictating political pressure. But after the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia was forced to accept humiliating conditions in the Treaty of Paris in March 1856. The treaty demilitarized the Black Sea and limited Russia's access to the sea to a relatively small portion of land. However, in 1870 Russia denounced the treaty and resumed building a fleet.

It was the Montreaux Convention that stabilised the region. Signed by Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Australia and Japan in 20 July 1936, the convention secured safe passage for commercial traffic at all times except during the war. It allowed Russian naval vessels to safely transit to the Mediterranean and also did not prevent other countries' naval vessels from entering the Black Sea. Exercising this feature of the convention, Soviet Navy displayed naval presence in the Mediterranean and NATO / US Navy projected naval power into the Black Sea, within the limitations and conditions defined. Soviet military had the worry of a NATO blockade of the Turkish Straits in the of a crisis. That's why the Black Sea Fleet had remained relatively smaller than the Northern Fleet or the Pacific Fleet. Nevertheless, it was a substantial force, with around 18 submarines, two cruisers, 30 destroyers and frigates, around 100 smaller combatant ships plus more than 100 amphibious and auxiliary support ships in the early 1990's. The fleet also had its own air arm with some 120 fixed wing combat and reconnaissance aircraft and around 80 helicopters. Total manpower was calculated as much as 70,000 personnel, including marines.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the following chaos made it almost impossible to asses the true strength of the fleet. But this was perhaps the least of the problems that surround it.

The Sevastopol Question

Sevastopol's geostrategic importance made it the natural headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet right from its foundation in late 18th Century. The base became the jumping point of Russian naval force projection to the Black Sea and Mediterranean; enabling constant pressure on Turkey, and especially during Cold War era, an amphibious threat to the Straits.

After Sevastopol, the second largest naval base of the fleet was in Odessa. Together these home ports helped Russia (and later Soviet Union and later again, Russia) secure the gateway to the Caucasus from mainland Europe. The legendary Sevastopol Siege during World War II can be considered as a symbolic example to the gigantic struggle to protect this strategic gateway.

But this effort collapsed, together with the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

After the World War II, Crimean autonomous region was abolished and became a province of Kremlin. However, in 1954, Russia re-transferred the peninsula to Ukraine, another Soviet State of the Union. It is ironic that this transfer has direct consequences on the Russian presence on the Black Sea region.

After Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the legal status of the Black Sea Fleet together with the ports became an important issue. The ships were tied alongside ports on Ukraine soil, the bases too, were on the soil of another state. This situation became more complex with the ethnic and demographic composition of the personnel and their decision on which flag they were going to choose to carry on their uniforms.

Lengthy and tense negotiations continued until 1997, when the two countries aggreed on the status of the fleet, personnel and bases. An agreement was signed on May 28, 1997 by the prime ministers of both sides. According to the agreement, three harbors of Sevastopol was leased by Russia for a period of twenty years with a USD 100 million annual payment. The lease had an option of renewal in 2017. Russia also leased the Saki naval aviation base and carrier flight operations training facilities in the Western Crimea. According to the treaty, the maximum number of military personnel stationed in the leased bases was determined as 25,000.

The status of the Sevastopol Base was again brought to the agenda of both countries in April 2010, when after an extremely heated debate in Ukrainian parliament a resolution for the extension of the lease agreement for 25 years passed. In exchange for allowing the Russian Black Sea Fleet to remain at Sevastopol, Ukraine will receive a 30 per cent discount on the cost of its natural gas supplies from Russia.

Struggling to Survive

The 1997 treaty was an interim solution for Russia's naval presence in the Black Sea. However, this very presence was seriously degraded in the 90's, because of the economic downturn of the country during it's transition to liberal economy. A considerable number of ships were left to their fates, slowly covered with rust and sometimes falling victim to scrap metal smugglers. Combat readiness of the warships as well as naval aviation units fell down below critical levels. Salaries and morale of the personnel followed. Of more than 10 submarines present during the breakup of the Union, only one, the Kilo class Alrosa remained partly active, until a machinery accident in November 2009 put her out of service.

Immediately after the 1997 treaty, Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Viktor Kravchenko stated that Russian Black Sea Fleet would eventually consist of around 100 warships and patrol craft and 150 auxiliary vessels and tenders and new ships were to be commissioned in 1998. At the time of this statement, more than 60 per cent of the fleet was more than 15 years old with very low serviceability. No major commissioning took place in 1998 and the following years and in more than 10 years, total number of warships and patrol craft of the fleet fell down to around 40, including those in refit.

According to an article by Rear Admiral Valery Aleksin, the Russian Naval Forces lost half of its power in the period of 1991 - 1997. Until 1997, only one nuclear attack submarine and one nuclear ballistic missile submarine were laid down, with no commissioning or modernization work completed. It was evaluated that until no urgent measures taken, the Russian Naval Forces would consist of 2 or 3 guided missile cruisers, 7 - 10 guided missile destroyers and around 30 - 40 patrol craft, all to be divided between 5 independent fleets, some responsible from operations in open seas and oceans. This state was seen as a threat to the capability to protect economic and political interests of Russia.

This alarming state of the Black Sea Fleet was clearly exposed in August 2002, when a pre-planned deployment to the Mediterranean was cancelled on the direct orders of the Russian Federation Navy's Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov. The fleet's flagship, a Project 1164 Slava class cruiser Moskva, together with the Project 1135M Krivak II frigate Pytlivy and the Project 1559V replenishment ship Ivan Bubnov, were scheduled to sail into the Mediterranean in late 2002. The task force was to conduct a joint exercise with the French Navy and make port visits in both France and Italy. The reason for the cancellation was given as "economic circumstances", specifically the critical shortage of fuel.

The then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stressed in 1999 that the state of naval forces was in the top of the priority list of Russian defence decision makers. A large scale modernization programme was activated, concentrating on preserving a blue-water naval capability by effectively decreasing in size while modernizing large surface and submarine ships, like the Admiral Ushakov, a Project 1144 Kirov class nuclear powered battle cruiser.

Modernization Efforts

One of the fruits of the naval modernization program is the Project 20380 Steregushchy class multipurpose corvette, designed to replace the Project 1124 Grisha class light frigates. These ships represent Russian Navy's efforts for building up a modern, cost-effective fleet, equipped with interoperable and state-of-the-art weapon and communication systems. Designed to conduct anti surface and anti submarine warfare, patrol, search and rescue and show of flag missions, Steregushchy class is the first modern warship design to be realized after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The first ship of the class, the Steregushchy was laid down in December 2001 and launched in May 2006. Commissioning under the banner of the Baltic Fleet took place in November 2007, while 4 more ships were laid down between May 2003 and November 2006.

A total of 20 corvettes of the class is planned, however the project is plagued with finance problems, which is the reason of the cost rise and delays of the first ship ( a planned 1.8 Billion Rubles versus a realized cost of 7 Billion Rubles). They are to be divided between the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.

Currently, the Ochakov, a Project 1134B Kara class destroyer and the B380, a Project 641B Tango class diesel submarine which has been unoperational for nearly a decade are the first two ships in the retirement list. Following are the Kerch, another Kara and a number of Grisha class obsolote frigates. These surface and submarine ships are planned to be replaced with Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov guided missile frigates and Project 677 Lada class diesel electric submarines.

Modernization plans oversee the procurement of up to four Project 22350 frigates and four Project 677 submarines until 2015. These fresh arrivals will at least partially replace some of the main combattant fleet in which the average age of ships is around 30 years. The new ships are badly needed not only for power projection and flag display in the Black Sea, but also for participation in international operations such as BlackSeaFor, Black Sea Harmony and Active Endeavor, which the Russian government puts special emphasis.

Defence circles were widely surprised when the chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Nikolai Makarov said in August 2009 that, Russia intends to purchase a Mistral class helicopter landing ship from France and jointly produce three or four more. General Makarov went on saying that he was expecting to obtain contract agreements with DCNS, the French shipyard that builds Mistral, allowing the construction and purchase of the ship. In a public relations move, the Mistral of the French Navy visited St Petersburg in November 2009, allowing Russian military decision makers and senior officers to closely inspect the ship, its capabilities, as well as conduct a number of joint exercises including Russian attack helicopters operating from the ship.

The Mistral project would be the biggest foreign military purchase for Russia, which for many years has relied on the Soviet-era principle of producing every piece of military equipment - from a pistol cartridge to a ballistic missile - domestically. It is speculated the total cost could be around $1 billion.

Critics of the project have underlined expediency of such a costly purchase in the name of Russian national security. According to the comments, any military conflicts likely to involve Russia would be with its neighbors, which would require land troops and equipment rather than a sea vessel, they say. However, on the other side, Russian Navy seems rather enthusiast about the purchase, as underlined by the words of the commander of Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy. Vysotskiy said that "a ship like that would have allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours, which is how long it took us", referring to the performance of Russian Black Sea Fleet during the armed conflict with Georgia in August 2008.

Trial By Fire: South Ossetia War in 2008

South Ossetia War in 2008 was the first battle experience of Russian Navy since the Second World War. Ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet left Sevastopol base on the evening of 8 August when hostilities began with Georgian troops and separatist South Ossetian and Abkhazian militia. On 10 August, the Black Sea Fleet flagship, the missile cruiser Moskva, destroyer Smetlivyy and auxiliary vessels began operating in Georgian waters and dictated a naval blockade. The ships were supported by three amphibious landing ships, which were deployed to the area earlier from Sevastopol and Novorossiysk. On the evening of 10 August a naval skirmish between Russian and Georgian forces took place. The Russian Nanuchka III class corvette Mirazh engaged and sank a Georgian coast guard patrol boat and sank another with two P-120 Malakhit (NATO reporting name SS-N-9 Siren) anti-ship missiles. Following the clash, remaining vessels of the Georgian navy returned to their ports and remained moored. The Black Sea Fleet ships at the coast later supported Russian ground troops entering Poti harbor and assisted the sinking of several Georgian naval and coast guard boats, as well as destroying military equipment and infrastructure.

A New Home

The 1997 treaty was only a temporary solution for Russia. The Black Sea Fleet needed a new strategic base for its operations. The ideal place for this new base was Novorossiisk, because of its location and presence of some primary infrastructure of naval installations. The then President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in 2003 setting up an alternative naval base for the Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiisk after Ukraine demanded the base in Sevastopol be withdrawn by 2017.

The plan to construct a new base at Novorossiisk was first announced by the then commander-in-chief of Russian Naval Forces Admiral Vladimir Masorin in 2007. A budget of 12.3 billion rubles was allocated for a period of 5 years, with the planned completion in 2012. However, latest reports indicate that the relocation may take place much later than planned, mainly due to financial reasons. According a special report by Nikolay Abroskin, the head of Russia's Federal Agency for Special Construction, the deadline for the construction programme at Novorossiysk was revised as 2020.

Shortly after the extension of the lease agreement by Ukrainian parliament, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in May said that, Russia will complete the construction of the Novorossiisk base by 2020, with a cost of 92 billion Rubles, a price much higher than the original budget.

Conclusion

The Black Sea Fleet has been a symbol of the downfall of the Russian military power after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The state of the equipment, morale and infrastructure of the Fleet has had negative effects on the Russian influence in the Black Sea region, which is controls the passage to Caucasus and Central Asia, or in other words, the security of energy transit lines. Atlantic Bloc's increasing dominance in the region with the NATO membership of Bulgaria and Romania and Ukraine and Georgia's aspirations, as well as military and economic cooperation with US and European Union is perceived in Russia as direct threat to national security. The high tension in the Caucasus with Georgia and increasing US naval presence with accordance of Montreaux Convention dictate a modern naval fleet with rapid response capability. Keeping the balance between a modern deterrent naval force and cost - effectiveness among budgetary problems is a challange for Russian government and military decision makers.