After a brief decline five years ago, the world arms market surged again in the period 2005 to 2007, the latest for which comprehensive data are available. By 2007, international weapons deals totalled some $60 billion, a 10-percent increase over 2006. (The global recession in 2008 and 2009 could slow sales growth, but no one expects a major decline.) It's an increasingly globalized market that has welcomed new players among recently industrialized countries, especially in Asia. Major weapons importers such as India, China and South Korea are working hard to develop their own arms industries, with an eye to both domestic and foreign markets.

But for all the change on the fringes, the core global arms market is remarkable for its stability. The major exporters 10 years ago remain the major exporters today; import markets, too, have been fairly static. U.S., Russian, British and French dominance of particular markets has proved resilient even in the face of Asia's rapid industrialization.

The top exporters' tight hold on their markets have not discouraged emerging exporters from developing their own industries. But it does highlight the difficulty aspiring arms-dealing nations face in winning major market share.

The Big Four

For a decade, the U.S., Russian, Great Britain and France together have accounted for around 80 percent, by dollar value, of all the arms agreements signed worldwide in a given year, according to a 2008 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, from which many of the figures in this article were taken. Among these leaders, the United States is the "pre-eminent conventional arms seller," in the words of the non-profit Arms Control Association.

In 2007, American companies won around 42 percent of all arms deals, for a total value of $25 billion. The same year, Russia's arms deals were valued at just over $10 billion, or 15 percent of the total. The U.K. also won around $10 billion. It was a lean year for French firms, at just $2 billion, but in previous years France averaged closer to $5 billion.

For the period 2000 to 2007, the U.S. had 38 percent of all deals; Russia, 19 percent; France, 10 percent; and the U.K., 8 percent. China is the only recently industrialized country to even briefly break the big four's near-monopoly. In 2007, Chinese arms deals were worth nearly $4 billion, placing China fourth, ahead of France. But for the eight-year period from 2000 to 2007, China's rank drops to fifth, with agreements worth just $9 billion total.

China is unique among arms exporters in also being a major import market, with weapons purchases -- mostly from Russia -- totaling $17 billion between 2000 and 2007.

The other emerging Asian industrial powers, such as South Korea and India, are still overwhelmingly arms importers, rather than exporters. But China, South Korea and India could begin to challenge the traditional arms dealers in coming years. All three nations are investing in select weapons developments that might fill lucrative niches in the global marketplace.

Specializing is Key

The big four arms exporters have each tended to target particular segments of the marketplace, both in terms of the weapons they market, and the regions of the world they sell to. The result is that all four major dealers have carved out fortified niches where they enjoy big advantages over any potential market rivals.

Being isolated from potential ground threats has resulted in America emphasizing air power over land power. This has translated into healthy exports of fighter and transport aircraft and air-defense missile systems. In 2008, for instance, Israel proposed to buy from U.S. manufacturers up to 75 F-35 stealth fighters, nine C-130J transports and upgrades to three medium-range Patriot surface-to-air missile launchers, these purchases accounting for the bulk of a $21 billion arms package that, if it goes forward, will spread purchases over several years.

The same year, a $9-billion proposed package from the United Arab Emirates included three long-range Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense missile launchers (the first ever sold overseas), several dozen Patriot missiles and 75 short-range Avenger missile launchers. Meanwhile, Romania requested 24 F-16 fighters worth nearly $5 billion.

To maintain their strong positions in the aircraft and missile markets, American defense firms are strongly promoting the F-35, C-130J, THAAD and Patriot. These four systems could comprise the backbone of major U.S. arms exports for years to come, exceeding even strong sales of Russian- and European-made fighters and Russian missiles.

By contrast, U.S.-built warships don't enjoy the same export success that the aerospace products do. Rather, the world's export market for warships is dominated by European manufacturers, with Russia occupying the second-place position. Similarly, China commands the markets for small arms and surface-to-surface missiles, both systems favored by historically poor nations -- like China itself -- that want to equip large land armies while also deterring Western forces.

In addition to specializing in certain products, often for strong historical reasons, each of the major arms exporters also targets particular regions of the world. Due to deep allience-building during and after World War II and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. sells widely to customers in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. Russia enjoys the most favor with China, India and other non-aligned developing countries, including many that the West consider off-limits for political reasons, such as Iran and Sudan.

"Western governments have criticized Russia for not being discriminating enough in its arms transactions," the Arms Control Association reported. But in fact, Moscow is highly discriminating, inasmuch as the government deliberately markets arms to many countries with ambivalent attitudes towards the West, and with few other options for their weapons needs. These "rogue" states' comprise a reliable backbone for Russian exports, ensuring a certain revenue stability, even in the face of vigorous Western marketing to regions where Russia and the West compete.

Contrast this with the the U.K. and France, whose arms revenues over the last decade have fluctuated the most. The U.K. exports mostly to Middle-East customers with former colonial-era ties, but does so in direct competition with the U.S. juggernaut, while France historically mines outlying markets in Latin America and North Africa (where Paris has its own ex-colonial relationships) that have proved unreliable.

For political reasons, China is limited to essentially the same export market as Russia, with Pakistan and many African states among Beijing's major clients. Political realities mean Beijing only ever competes only with Moscow for arms deals, instead of challenging the combined might of the U.S. and Europe. This is a strength and a weakness for China: competition is limited, but with so much of the world politically off-limits, so is the scale of Beijing's exports.

For rising arms exporters, success means finding, securing and defending market segments -- in terms of products and regions -- in the same way that the established exporters already have. China is already doing so, and there are signs that South Korea might, too. It's less clear if India will adopt the same strategy.

Silver Bullets

The key to export success is offering the right product, at the right time, to the right customer, like a well-aimed bullet. For Washington, the F-35 fighter is becoming available at the exact moment that most of the world's Western-aligned air forces are looking to replace older fighter models. Similarly, new American-made air-defense systems meet the needs of a widening customer base seeking to defend against ballistic missiles from North Korea, China and Iran. Russia, meanwhile, offers new and upgraded diesel submarines to feed the growing appetite for sea-control capability as maritime trade expands.

South Korea's arms industry seems to appreciate the importance of timing. Korean firms are developing a portfolio of weapons systems that could help the country win a slice of the global arms market -- most notably, the T-50 supersonic light jet, co-developed by Korean Aerospace and U.S. manufacturer Lockheed. The T-50 is the only new supersonic trainer and light fighter on the market, filling the same niche as the successful U.S.-made T-38 that entered service four decades ago. Every major air force flying supersonic fighters -- those eyeing the F-35, for instance -- is a potential customer for the T-50. Production could reach into the hundreds of units, generating revenue in the billions of dollars.

Similarly, South Korea is the only Western-allied nation, besides the United States, developing a new armored vehicle for beach assault. But the American Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle has suffered uge cost-overruns, technical failures and delays, placing its viability in doubt. For the small club nations using older models of assault craft dating from the 1970s, the Agency for Defense Development's K21 vehicle could become the only available replacement.

By the same token, South Korea's large shipbuilding industry is moving from strength to strength while U.S., Russian and European shipyards struggle to keep down costs and meet customers' schedules. "Naval power represents a nation's power," said Park Chang-kwon of the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, and with the emerging maritime era, this has never been more true. Even so, many nations seem unable to build ships efficiently. To the nation that can, goes the prize of enormously lucrative warship exports.

South Korea has embarked on an ambitious naval re-equipment program, rapidly fielding world-class, domestically built destroyers, amphibious ships and submarines. On this firm foundation, Seoul has begun exploring the naval export market. The British Royal Navy, for one, is considering sourcing its new replenishment tankers from a South Korean shipyard, a remarkable move for a navy that only recently bought all its vessels from domestic builders.

Today, Beijing's major weapons exports comprise small arms and a few surface-to-surface missiles. But Beijing is aspiring to sell more sophisticated systems, especially fighter aircraft. Barring the unlikely appearance of a new "stealth" fighter design, the hope for Beijing's aerospace future is the J-10 series of fighter based on Israel's defunct Lavi prototype. Fitted with a Russian-made engine, the J-10 reportedly achieves the performance levels of current Western fighters, but at a fraction of the cost. The challenge for Beijing will be in opening up markets for relatively high-end Chinese aircraft, for China's habitual export market has only a limited appetite for fighters. Indeed, the majority of nations looking to purchase large numbers of fighters are firm U.S. allies that have already voiced their preference for the F-35.

Beijing is likely to have better luck with so-called "anti-access" systems -- anti-ship missiles, especially -- that it is developing for its own forces, in order to defend against perceived Western encroachment. The slowly growing club of "rogue" states, including Iran, Sudan and Venezuela, are potential customers for such weapons, for the same reasons that Chinese forces are.

India Behind the Curve

China faces a difficult battle securing customers for high-end military systems. But Beijing's chances are considerably better than India's. For despite a rapidly expanding economy with a strong high-tech sector, India has proved largely incapable of designing and building its own weapons, for use at home or for sale abroad. It's not for no reason that New Delhi "was the leading developing world arms-purchaser from 2000 to 2007," according to CRS, with deals totaling $32 billion. Indian forces have a huge appetite for gear, that Indian industry just can't satisfy. That bodes poorly for New Delhi's arms export prospects.

But that's not to say Indian firms aren't trying. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is working on advanced products with an eye to the foreign market. But HAL's Dhruv helicopter and Tejas light-attack plane have both hit major development snags.

It's also unclear to whom India might sell its aerospace products. Whereas South Korea wisely invested in aircraft types with few serious competitors, India's export-ready designs occupy crowded niches. The Dhruv face stiff competition from Bell and Boeing helicopter designs from America, and a wide range of Eurocopter types from Europe. And the Tejas will go head-to-head with designs from Italy, Switzerland and the U.K.

In the balance, South Korea perhaps has the brightest future among emerging Asian arms exporters, for Seoul is investing in the right systems, at the right time, for the right markets. China is hamstrung by political realities that bar many nations from seriously considering Chinese products. And India, even if it can reform its under-performing arms industry, might discover that its most advanced products are redundant in a crowded marketplace.

But expect all three nations to pursue export deals, despite the challenges. With global arms market continuing to expand, the potential payoff is too big for industrialized nations to ignore.