Almost everyone acquainted with Afghan issues is asking the question of what will happen now in Afghanistan? While it has taken long, rather too long, already for the winner of the country's presidential election to be announced, this analysis attempts to shed some insight on a few possible scenarios regarding what could happen next in this nation that has been in almost perpetual trouble for the past thirty years.

After the calculations and the math are done and when we can formally enter the post-election stage in this south-central Asian country, the greatest question of all will be raised: What is next in Afghanistan?

In normal post-election phase, usually people look forward to an inauguration and a reaffirmation of the promised dedication of the winner or winners as the case may be to the cause of the nation and the constituency. In the case of Afghanistan, where nothing is normal, a blank post-election phase can be filled with any and all possibilities of good and bad.

To be able to appreciate the situations that exist in the country, it is necessary to have a quick look at the other two phases, namely pre-election and election time.

The Pre-election Run-up

People let their hopes rise for a successful and sound election that will lead to a new government, hopefully one that would be different and perform well. Although none of the choices for president were attractive, people still hoped that a new president, even if he were the incumbent, would wake up to the reality that the country is deeply in trouble and drowned in corruption, lethargy of the development machinery, lack of planning and maltreatment at the hands of the warlords and selfish leaders. But even these legitimate hopes were not strong enough to create an enthusiasm for voting and in numbers matching the previous presidential election. The election commission and the international agencies that were to help convene the elections knew the enormity of the task and were hopeful that a greater percentage of the seventeen million eligible voters in the country would take part in the elections.

There were an unprecedented number of candidates who thought they would prove capable of performing miracles and cure all the ills of the failing state. Who were they kidding? During a rather short period of campaigning billions of Afghanis were spent, dirty tricks were used, evil cards were played to convince the people that each candidate was there only to serve the nation. Apparently not every candidate succeeded to do so. Many of the methods used were divisive and directly or indirectly relied on ethnicity, language and religion rather than an honest and true understanding of the real needs of the people.

During the Elections

Elections in a big country like Afghanistan require logistical readiness, security, election commission supervision and international observers. There were deficiencies in all of the above. However, because of the great stake the international community had in the Afghan elections, it exerted all efforts to at least ensure maximum logistical assistance to the process. It is both important and interesting to recall that in this regard, three thousand donkeys hired by the United Nations for transportation of supplies, ballots and ballot boxes did their best to ensure, as best they could, that elections would succeed. A big thank you to the donkeys!

Intimidation, ballot stuffing, and voting intervention were reported. To a certain extent some of this taking place in Afghan situations was expected and as long as it did not interfere with the overall outcome of the elections could be called minor. But eventually it was found out that fraud was committed by all sides at a large scale that may have ultimately affected the results.

Another rather important issue was the polling places which could not be opened in some districts under the direct threat of the insurgents and the Taliban. Therefore residents of some districts were not able to vote.

Finally, it was found out that only a fraction of the eligible voters took part in the election. This may be linked to two main reasons: Firstly, the public disapproval of the way the government of President Karzai ruled the country. Their dissatisfaction mostly stems from widespread corruption, insecurity and the slow pace of economic development plus the increasing role assigned by him to the warlords that by now the majority of the people not only dislike, but hate. Second is the fact that the long list of other candidates that numbered over forty did not include anyone that the nation could trust unconditionally. During the previous elections, the Afghans went to the polls with dancing and music showing their enthusiasm for the process of democracy. This time, however, there was no music and the level of interest was considerably subdued.

It is also usual that all sides and especially the losing parties in third world country elections blame the administration of rigging the elections. Some of these claims may be legitimate, but most of them are only measures to save face by the losing camp or camps.

The Aftermath

When the math will fully be done -it has been a very difficult math and the preliminary counts that put Karzai on top were heavily contested by many sources-we will officially enter the aftermath period of Afghanistan's elections, and many factors will be in play. It is to be understood that eventually a winner will have to be announced. That winner most probably will be the incumbent notwithstanding the many issues surrounding his campaign and election. However since that determination has not been made at this moment let us consider the two possible scenarios that may prevail.

First Scenario: It may be that either with or without a runoff, the incumbent prevails. In this case there would probably be very little change in the government. A major change in the structure of the government would be the replacement of Ahmad Shah Masood's brother with another of his protégés namely Marshall Fahim as the first vice president. In his campaign appearances, Karzai has not referred to any reparation to his cabinet. This would mean that most of the ministers would continue with business as usual in their ministries. Some deals were made by Karzai with some contenders who agreed not to run against him. One of these people is Karzai's former minister of finance, Mr. Ahadi. It is to be seen how he would be accommodated as a member of Karzai's government.

But as to the major changes in policy, not much is expected to happen. Karzai may adjust his stance regarding his Western supporters and especially the United States that he has accused of wanting him to play in their hands. He has said that this time he would not allow that to happen. But in reality many observers ask the question: "Who is he kidding?" Could any leader in Afghanistan at this period in history stand up to the big brother, the United States, and realistically claim that "I am my own man and will do as I wish." The reality is there are around one hundred thousand foreign troops in Afghanistan, more than sixty thousand of whom are from the United States. Other troops belong to close allies of the United States. The United Nations is deeply involved in the military operations in the country and Europe through NATO too is committed to fight the war on terror alongside the United States. The Afghan army and police have not reached the numbers or training and quality required for self sufficiency. Both rely heavily on financial and technical support from the United States. The US is a reality that cannot be ignored by any government in Afghanistan. So Mr. Karzai will likely still remain waiting to hear from Washington before he takes any major action on his own. However, the relationship will not be the same as that which prevailed during the administration of former President Bush. This time these relations will be mutually cautious and to a certain degree restrained.

Karzai may talk of national reconciliation and upholding of national interests, but he would still not have a clear priority based plan to achieve either. The warlords surrounding him still would continue to safeguard their own interests and enlarge and increase their holdings and property. The judiciary shall still be handicapped in trying or punishing major criminals with links with warlords. There will be some efforts to befriend what is called the moderate Taleban. This will still be either unsuccessful or inconsequential as the major Taleban players would remain defiant and at large, especially in Pakistan.

Therefore and unless Mr. Karzai considers a serious and daring program there would be very little change, if any. Unemployment, poverty and unmet social and economic needs would continue to affect the majority of the population and insecurity would continue to endanger the lives of innocent civilians. Shameful acts of violence and terror would continue to be carried out by Taleban and extremists.

Second Scenario: If for example a runoff is lost by Mr. Karzai and the less likely scenario of Abdullah becoming the president holds, then major changes, and not necessarily positive ones, would be expected. These changes would include a complete change of cabinet ministers, with very heavy reliance on the so called mujahideen elements. The mujahideen way of thinking would prevail. However, the man on the street who is fed up with mujahideen arrogance would still remain angry. He would not be able to do anything about it as the warlords, especially those belonging to the former Nizar Council and what is known as the northern alliance, would be further armed and play a role not unlike the revolutionary guards in the Iranian regime. Iran and Russian ties would be further strengthened and Afghanistan would open up to greater involvement by these two countries. Regional politics would be played in a different way and ties with Pakistan and India would be readjusted in a way to augment the strength of the new government in Afghanistan. However, there would still be the need to formulate a national strategy to overcome the immediate problems of the country. These problems will continue for lack of an agreed upon strategy to deal with them. The Taleban would double their opposition and would close all avenues for peace. Insecurity would therefore increase at least two fold. The Taleban and their Pakistani and Arab supporters including some extremist movements in Pakistan would become more active.

The nation would sink deeper into all sorts of crises: economic, security and otherwise. Government media would become even more active in brain washing the audiences as to the good intentions of the new regime. The atmosphere in the legislature would become tense and cooperation with the executive strongly strained.

Is there a ray of hope?

There indeed are rays of hope even during these darkest times in Afghan history. But the hope is conditional. It is conditioned on the wisdom of the leaders and on the prudence of the international community. A wise leader would be an active leader who would roll up his sleeves, go to the drawing board and draft a path for overcoming the problems based on the priorities of the nation. He would then have to give this to technical experts to hammer out and change it to a clear and clean plan that would address, chapter by chapter, the ills of the government such as corruption, insecurity, economic and social development. A wise leader would be a person who would reassess his country's relations with its neighbors, regional powers and the international community at large. He would have to reassess the country's relationship with the foreign military that is fighting a war on terror on its territory, on its turf. It requires diplomacy and wisdom to refine these relations and affairs and regulate them in international agreements mutually agreed upon. It would require making it clear to everybody concerned that war alone is not the solution to the problems in Afghanistan. Non-military solutions would work much better and would give more positive results. The leader of the government should preside over a team that is conversant in peaceful remedies to threatening issues in the life of the nation. The leader should choose a cabinet that works for the country and not for the person of the president. A wise leader would find ways to free himself from the strong net that has been woven around him by the warlords and gun toting personalities and movements.

Yes, there is a ray of hope. It would shine through talks and negotiations with friends and foes and with the international communities and with the United States, in order to convince all parties concerned that Afghans yield to kindness better than to war, that their wounds would heal better with kind dressings and kind words rather than more aggression. The fruits of peace are sweeter and more nutritious.

Yes, there is a ray of hope, but a sound leadership would have to find it and pave the way for it to shine.