With the approval by the three-member Iraqi presidency council of the security of forces agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Iraq on 4 December, 2008, the final step required for the official adoption of the pact was taken. SOFA, which calls for the withdrawal of all American troops by the end of 2011, was accompanied by a last-minute political reform package led by Sunni demands, that include a long-term strategic framework agreement which is set to govern key areas of U.S.-Iraqi relations as well as the holding of a nationwide referendum on the pact scheduled to take place in 2009.
The much-awaited approval comes after nearly a year of painstakingly difficult negotiations for Washington; also riddled with intense domestic debate on the Iraqi side. But that is not to understate the importance of the pact and that it indeed represents a historical moment for Iraq. By determining a timetable for the drawdown of the US military presence and complete troop withdrawal by December 31, 2011, SOFA essentially signals the dawn of a new Iraq-one that will exercise increasing sovereignty and responsibility for its own security and stability. But as most Iraqis welcomed the pact with a sense of relief that the end of the U.S. occupation is now in sight, Iraq now faces the daunting task of having to prove-both to its neighbors in the region as well as its own people-that it is prepared to take on this responsibility without backsliding into a dangerous cycle of violence that has become all too familiar.
The debate over SOFA was fierce, with the various Iraqi factions on opposite ends as to the adequacy of the terms of the pact, with those loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shia cleric, vehemently opposed to any Iraqi agreement with the U.S., less of immediate withdrawal. But no matter where the sparring groups stood in the lead-up to SOFA, there is no doubt that the pact will have important repercussions for Iraqi domestic politics, and will likely serve as the defining issue in the upcoming provincial elections scheduled to take place at the end of January. The process towards approval of SOFA in Iraq's factitious parliament was defined by jockeying for self-interest and assertion of sectarian based bloc politics among the Shia and Sunni Arabs and the Kurds. But despite the acrimonious negotiations leading up to the SOFA, it is still the harbinger of an Iraqi future that will increasingly be in the control of Iraqis; and 2009 will be a landmark year in testing how prepared and willing Iraq is to take on this role.
For the various segments of Iraqi politics, the political wrangling and deliberation on the SOFA represented an opportunity to assert their vision for a new Iraq. Overall, 2009 will be a pivotal year in Iraq, laying down the rules that will govern an Iraqi-led process of stabilization and democratization on Iraqi terms and testing the staying power of the overall sense of improved security and stability in the country. Both the provincial elections scheduled for end-January and the general elections to take place later towards the end of the year, as well as the withdrawal of combat troops by June 30, will serve as milestone tests for the ability of Iraqi security forces to either ensure stability across its regions and respond effectively to any attempts to destabilize the country or falter given the reality of Iraq's multiple and often bloody fault-lines. Provincial election results will likely consolidate regional ethno-sectarian based power structures, and the rise of violence in the immediate aftermath of SOFA warns of what may come in the wake of the elections. The response of the Iraqi security forces will be pivotal in shaping public trust and displaying the necessary competency to take-over security responsibilities from the U.S.
What SOFA means for Iraq: A move closer to full sovereignty
Inserting a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops-currently numbered at about 146,000-is seen as a clear victory for the Iraqis, especially since Washington negotiators were initially opposed to conceding on an open-ended schedule for withdrawal. No doubt Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki will use the pact as a valuable leveraging tool to strengthen his grip on Iraqi politics; as he will not only be in a position to retain the option of relying on U.S. security support as needed, but can simultaneously take credit for ensuring the full withdrawal of the U.S. occupying force from Iraqi territory. The government would like to see full handover sooner than the deadline stipulated in the pact; and government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh confirmed this sentiment when he stated earlier, "The withdrawal, theoretically, is completed at the end of December 2011, but we are expectant and hopeful that we could achieve that earlier." But nonetheless, the 3 year period of continued U.S. presence that lies ahead, albeit with the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from cities, villages and localities by June 30, 2009, is still a significant amount of time-especially given the volatile and unpredictable conditions that the country is prone to.
The lead-up to SOFA's approval provided a snapshot of the opposing and at times converging interests of the various Iraqi political blocs-providing important indications on the likely trajectory of events on the Iraqi political landscape in 2009. The fierce wrangling in the Iraqi parliament made it clear that the pact is seen by many lawmakers as the cornerstone issue in their campaigns for the upcoming provincial elections; proclaiming a strong ‘no' in the hopes of currying favor with their tribal or regional voters when it comes time to cast their ballots. Where the politicians stood on the SOFA will have a lot to do with where they hope to stand following the January election.
The most intense competition in the provincial elections will be between the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds, with the likely result of empowering the Sunni bloc and reducing the influence of the Kurds in provincial councils, which had won a disproportionate representation when the Sunnis had foolishly boycotted the 2005 elections. The Kurds are likely to sway towards minority groups like the Christians and Yazidis to minimize their losses in provincial governments. Grown tired of the political sideline, the Sunni Arabs saw in SOFA an opportunity to secure certain concessions unrelated to the immediate issue of the security pact and linked their approval to a public referendum and package of political reform measures aimed at curbing the authority of Maliki; regarded by many Sunnis as coming uncomfortably close to an unchecked hold on power in the central government. The reforms include measures to speed up the release of Sunni detainees captured by the U.S. Although Maliki was able to secure support from the Shia-led coalition and the Kurdish bloc to pass the agreement with a simple majority, the demand by Iraq's most influential Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, to patch-up a national consensus on the pact by brokering a Sunni assent forced their hand to return to the negotiations. This was widely recognized as Sistani's concerted effort to contain any Shia - Sunni violence stemming from disagreement over the pact to parliament and prevent bloodshed from spilling to the streets. Despite this, the day of SOFA's approval was marked by a hike in violence with bombings in several cities and a death toll as high as 22.
Changing of the Guard
SOFA represents major wins for the Iraqis on several key issues. Iraq will exercise jurisdiction over U.S. forces and its civilian components for felonies conducted outside agreed facilities and areas; as well as U.S. contractors and their employees. All U.S. military operations will be carried out with the agreement and coordination of Iraqi authorities. The transfer of Iraqi airspace control to Iraqi authorities will be effective as of January 1, 2009. All U.S. detentions and arrests (except for those of members of the U.S. forces and of its relevant civilian component) will be authorized by Iraqi officials and pursuant Iraqi law. And Iraqi land, sea, and air shall not be used as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries. The latter is seen as a flashpoint issue in winning the support of pro-Iranian Shia groups; while critics argue that a unilateral US withdrawal or a negotiated one on bilateral terms will weaken the hand of the U.S. when dealing with Iran
But the crux of the agreement lies in Article 27 on the ‘deterrence of security threats'. Essentially, this is the part of the pact with the most wiggle room. Language here points to a de facto continued and legitimate U.S. right to military or other means of intervention in the event of any external or internal threat against Iraq; thereby authorizing action to deter such a threat upon the request of the Iraqi government. Furthermore, the pact is subject to change, by mutual agreement. And it remains to be seen whether and how military planners under President-elects Obama's administration will design the so-called ‘residual force' that Obama has made repeated referrals to. Some U.S. military analysts have projected levels of this residual force to number between 30,000 to 55,000 troops. The debate on this will no doubt continue well into 2009.
Why is this significant? Because it signals the influence that the U.S. will have over Iraq even after the withdrawal of its troops at end-2011. Perhaps the likelihood that any administration in Bagdad will call on the U.S. for intervention will lessen as Iraqi national competencies in governance and security are improved; but nonetheless, the U.S. option will remain viable for any Iraqi administration. Even after full U.S. military withdrawal, it will continue to have a considerable influence in the future of the country-it has invested too much and has too much at stake not to do so. There are certainly scenarios that could alter the current trajectory of events and make it strategically unthinkable for the U.S. to stay faithful to its SOFA commitments or President-elect Obama's drawdown plans: if revived sectarian violence should take hold over Iraq and thwart claims that Iraqi security forces are gaining ground; or if Iran should demonstrate a dangerous stranglehold in its control over loyal Shia groups, coupled with stalled progress on handling Iran's nuclear program; the U.S. would find itself a legitimate cause for resuming unilateral military action in Iraq.
Iraq Moving Forward
The results of the January provincial elections will demonstrate exactly how rigid ethno-sectarian divisions are in Iraq, as well as signal who the people of Iraq want running them. The election will no doubt test how fragile the current security situation is should the results trigger an escalation of regional violence among disenfranchised groups. Likewise, in the wake of U.S. combat troops withdrawing from Iraqi cities and towns towards mid-2009, it is yet to be seen whether certain Iraqi groups will resort to violence in competing to fill the vacuum left behind and whether Iraqi security forces will be able to respond effectively and in time.
As Iraq looks ahead to its future this coming year, it will find itself facing some difficult decisions regarding national reconciliation and the implementation of a decentralized structure. The way forward must come through a representative parliamentary process, not through backsliding to sectarian violence. The events that will take place in the next 3 years and the decisions that are made will define, in large part, what lies ahead for the Iraqi people in the longer term. Iraq's neighbors have a critical stake in the emergence of a stable and democratic Iraqi state, and must do their part to support this process and avoid any missteps that may risk undermining it. As the U.S. steps out of Iraq, the strategic U.S.-Turkey-Iraq relationship will gain in importance. Turkey will be an important partner throughout this process-building upon already strengthening ties with Iraq to become a key economic partner to help Iraq rebuild in key areas affecting human livelihoods, such as infrastructure, sanitation, and healthcare across the country, wherever support and partnership can wield positive developmental results for the Iraqi people. Implementing sustainable measures to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people will be important steps towards consolidating a stable and forward-moving Iraq. As Iraq views Turkey as a neighbor that stands at equal proximity to all segments of the Iraqi people, it is well positioned and trusted to take on this role.
What kind of Iraq will emerge beyond 2011 will depend in large part on several broader issues: the central - periphery discourse, meaning the relationship between Baghdad and the provincial governments, especially with an increasing number of Sunni and Shia Arabs weary that the Kurds in the north have out stepped their boundaries lately; whether the 3-way split in Iraq will become a permanent fixture of Iraqi politics; and the extent of Iraq's ability and willingness to fashion a stronger sense of nationhood, curbing the divisive impact of ethno-sectarian politics. Regardless of what its critics contend, SOFA is a sign of progress for Iraq and a momentous turning-point. Iraq must now do whatever it takes to move forward towards a more secure, pluralistic and democratic vision for Iraq; and the U.S. must make good of its commitments to help Iraq come closer to achieving full sovereignty, without risking the progress that has been made so far. Talk that the U.S. must now ‘move beyond' Iraq in its Middle East policy must be taken with a grain of salt. Iraq will continue to be the dominant issue in U.S. foreign policy in the region; a reckless withdrawal will jeopardize Iraq's chances for stability, just as an open-ended occupation would. Essentially, the answer to ‘what happens after they leave?' must be sustained security and a federal, pluralistic democracy for the Iraqi people.