An important feature of the post-Cold War era has been the rising geopolitical significance of the Caucasus and the power struggles that have dominated the region. The faith of the North Caucasus, which is within the Russian Federation (RF), followed a different path than that of the South Caucasus, where three independent republics became an arena for the power struggles. The struggle in this region had been balanced, although RF maintained its dominance in the region overall. However, two developments have altered this situation; (1) the 9/11 attacks and (2) the Russian intervention in Georgia. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United State's position in the Caucasus has changed in tangent with its broadly increased effectiveness in global affairs. Mention of the South Caucasus within the scope of the "Greater Middle East Project", once a popular issue, is an example of the importance attached to the region by the US, part of efforts interpreted by some as a pursuit of re-shaping the world. Lately, increasing tensions between the US and Russia, being played out most prominently in Eastern Europe and Georgia, has stirred up fears of a "new Cold War" and has turned into the biggest threat to peace and stability in the Caucasus. While the US tries to re-shape the world and project greater influence in the South Caucasus, other powers are simultaneously vying for influence in the region driven by their own national agendas and with a view to prevent greater degree of US involvement in the region. This paper will address the trajectory of the power struggles in the South Caucasus in the post-Cold War environment and the US bid for increasing its influence in the region.

The end of the Bi-polar World Order and New Areas of Struggle

The dissolution of the Soviet Union shattered the bipolar system, resulting in power gaps in some regions, and ensuing struggles for influence, as well as explosive ethnic conflicts between and within the newly independent states. In the post-Cold War environment, states that seemed to be in the same block or former allies became competing rivals. For example, the European Union, led largely by Germany and France, as well as Japan rose as rival centers of power against established US dominance. No doubt the rise of China and the resurgence of the Russian Federation as powerful rivals to the United States are notable. States that are aspiring to become world powers (Russia, China and EU) and states that are seeking to strengthen their position as regional powers with burgeoning ambition to become global powers in the future (Turkey and Iran) and the United States still holding onto its position are strategizing to reach their goals in Eurasia. Consequently, the newly independent states of Eurasia lie at the center of these strategies. The US is pushing forward to not only maintain but strengthen alliances with various states in the region, where many regional powers-those with an established claim to political influence and those still aspiring--struggle for the lion's share of strategic political influence. Three states which appeared on the international arena after the dissolution of the Soviet Union Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, are at the center of much of this struggle. With a view towards promoting their national interests in the region, major powers have often been motivated to take advantage of destabilizing conflicts between these states and alternatively have attempted follow a path of reconciliation or proposing cooperation, fluctuating between these options based on a calculation of which would best fit their own broader agenda and vision for the region.

Why the South Caucasus?

The Caucasus encompasses a wide area that includes Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in the South Caucasus and Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and other regions in the North Caucasus.. The South Caucasus have a significant strategic value for the US and Western Europe, Russia, Turkey and Iran. There are several reasons for why the South
Caucasus represents a significant geopolitical regional interest for the US:

1)Means to contain Russia;
2)Means to contain Iran;
3)To control natural resources in the region
4)To secure safe transportation of the region's natural resources to the global market (thus, the US can control alternative energy resources and create resource diversity for states in the region);
5)To use as an alternative market;
6)To acquire bases in its "war against terrorism" and other global policies; and to use the region to project its power to Turkistan (Central Asia). (Turkistan region is important for encircling Russia from the south, Iran from the east and China from the northwest)

The United States and the South Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of the South Caucasus underwent the same line of political transformative processes. All three states witnessed a surge in anti-communist political movements which resulted in people, who are more or less opposed to Russia, coming to power. In all three states, presidents were removed from office amidst political turbulence. In 1991, Levon Ter-Petrosyan came to power in Armenia; Zviad Gamsahurdia in Georgia and a year later in 1992 Ebulfez Elcibey in Azerbaijan. In a inconspicuous show of the persistent struggle for political influence in the Caucasus, Gamsahurdia and Elcibey were ousted from the presidency by coup d'états, both in less than a year after coming into office. The Ter-Petrosyan presidency lasted longer than the neighboring examples until February 1998, when a civil coup forced his exit. All three ousted presidents opposed Russia. It was not until 2003 that Georgia returned to an anti-Russian stance with the incoming president Mihail Saakashvili, putting a severe strain on bilateral relations. Armenia remained pro-Russian and Azerbaijan continues to follow a delicate act of balance politics
During and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US tried to forge constructive relations with the states in the region in order to realize the above-mentioned objectives. However, since early-1993, due to the strengthening of the Russian Federation coupled with the failure of anti-Russian foreign policy attempts by states in the region the US was forced to give concessions to Russia. Fearing that the "wounded giant" would flex its military muscle and respond aggressively to the loss of its former republics to its adversaries, the US adopted a "Russia First" approach and conceded to viewing the region as Russia's backyard due largely to the influence of bureaucrats headed by Strobe Talbott, who was appointed as Deputy Secretary of State in 1994. However, almost three years later, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University on 21 July 1997 Talbott would emphasize that "the United States would no longer condone Moscow's hegemonic policies in the region. This change in US policy towards the region was the result of Madeline Albright's insistence that measures should be taken to prevent a Russian resurgence in the region to fill the power gap. In line with this new line of thinking, the National Security Strategy Paper of October 1998, underlined the significance of the region and established the framework of US policies towards the region. Moreover, the Silk Road Project, which was seen as the way to connect the region to international markets, and the ensuing legislation of the "Silk Road Project Act", was passed by the US Congress in 1999, presents the main points defining US policy towards Central Asia and the Caucasus. Furthermore, National Security Strategy Paper of December 1999 argued that the US should adopt a more pro-active policy towards the region.
The shifts in US foreign policy that took place in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks provided the first signals of the possible changes that would emerge in the relations between the US and the South Caucasus. Immediately after the attacks, US officials declared that the US would take all measures necessary to punish the aggressors and would intervene in various regions of the world under the framework of pre-emptive strike strategy. Simultaneously underlying this nascent approach were indications of a US readiness to use the present circumstances as an opportunity to more easily enter and seat itself in various regions that had up until then had been denied by certain "obstacles". It was obvious that in the post 9/11 environment the "obstacles" would find it more difficult to object to an aggrieved US intervention in the region.
The lifting of the longstanding Amendment 907 which outlined sanctions against Azerbaijan; encouraging realization of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline; and using South Caucasian airspace for its operations in Afghanistan all signaled a new chapter of increasing US intervention in the region. US attempts to establish a stronger presence in Georgia date back to the late 1990s. Russian weariness of escalating US military intervention in Georgia grew stronger when after the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Russian military bases in Georgia were shut down in conjunction with the launch of a modernization process for the Georgian army. After the 9/11 attacks, the US markedly raised its efforts in the context of military support and made available 6 military utility helicopters to the Georgian Air Forces on 7 October 2001. Claiming that Al-Qaeda militants were settled in the Pankissi valley, situated between Georgia and Russia (Chechnya), the US dispatched five military consultants to Georgia on 26 February 2002 based on the premise that consultants would help Georgia in its fight against Al-Qaeda operating from its territory. In the following months, the number of US military personnel based in Georgia, sent for training and military consultancy purposes, saw a continuous increase.
Towards the end of 2003, the US also began to openly vocalize its military policy interests in Azerbaijan. The official acknowledgement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on US initiatives to acquire bases in Azerbaijan and several remarks by US officials equating Caspian security to US security are some of the examples that indicate the position the US took on its military interests in Azerbaijan.
Although both the US European Command Deputy Commander Charles Wald on his visit to Baku on 21 November 2003 and more pronouncedly Rumsfeld during his visit on 3 December 2003 had pointed to US interest in establishing military bases in Azerbaijan; these statements were later revoked facing possible backlash from the Iranian and Russian reaction. In mid-December 2003, Novruz Memmedov, head of the International Relations Office of the Azerbaijan Presidency, and Vilayet Guliyev, Foreign Affairs Minister, and later President Ilham Aliyev during his visit to Russia on 5-7 February 2004, denied statements on US attempts to acquire military bases in Azerbaijan. Actually, in a statement dated 20 December 2003 Vefa Guluzade, Foreign Policy Consultant for former Azerbaijan President Haydar Aliyev states that in a meeting that took place several years ago with US Secretary of State Madeline Albright (Guluzade never mentions the date of the meeting) Haydar Aliyev gave the green light to the US plan to deploy US soldiers in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Rumsfeld's statement also gives credence to the notion that the US planed to establish a military base in Azerbaijan when it felt the time was right. Therefore, statements to the contrary given by Azerbaijani officials during those times were formulated so as to minimize a harsh Russian reaction. But Charles Wald's statement at a press conference on 13 March, 2004 during his second visit, emphasizing that the US was not planning to establish a military base in Azerbaijan shows that Azeri attempts to assuage Russian apprehension and lessen the political pressure on Azerbaijan had in large measure, failed.
The geopolitical significance that the US recognized in the Caucasus during that period should not be understated. The frequent visits of high-ranking US officials to the region, including that of Secretary of State Richard Armitage to the South Caucasus; US European Command Deputy Commander Charles Wald to Armenia; and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to the region all took place in a relatively short period of time. Moreover, Defense Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan Sefer Ebiyev's long visit to the United States also shows the intensity of efforts to create strategic alliance. During Ebiyev's almost week long visit to the US between 21 -27 March, 2004 he met with almost all ranks of the US military forces, including the US Armed Forces Headquarters and Special Operations Headquarters, and conducted several important meetings with key experts. Meetings with the US Armed Forces Central Command Commander, R. Steven Whitcomb and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were especially important, where the issue of improving US-Azeri military cooperation was at the top of the agenda.
Furthermore, the significance of the messages conveyed by Richard Armitage during his visit to the South Caucasus in late-March 2004 in Armenia and Azerbaijan should not be overlooked. A 2005 US regional aid project that that for the first time foresaw more military aid to Azerbaijan compared to Armenia, resulted in predictions that in the event of a regional conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the US would ally itself with Azerbaijan. A US official swiftly denied such remarks, emphasizing that the United States would embargo both states in case of a full-blown out war. Prior to Secretary of State Armitage's visit, Ambassador of the United States to Azerbaijan stated the Armitage would be expected to discuss pressing military issues during his visit to Baku, despite the fact that he was not in a formal position to negotiate on a military agenda. After his meetings in Baku, Armitage made a formal statement reassuring those who were uneasy about the prospect that the US was not actually seeking to establish a military base on Azerbaijani territory.
During Charles Wald's visit to Armenia on 26 April 2004 several issues dominated the agenda. Among these were targeted measures to improve US-Armenian military cooperation; a commitment from Armenia to increase the number of Armenian troops in Iraq; and an agreement to settle internal disputes between South Caucasian states. At the top of the agenda was without a doubt, an attempt to pull an Armenia stuck in the complicated nexus between Iran and Russia to adhere more closely, and more permanently to Washington's strategic regional line. Following Iranian President Muhammed Hatemi's visit to Baku, Rumsfeld's made a visit between 11-12 August 2004, where in addition to more general issues pertaining to Azerbaijan-US military cooperation, the Iran was also taken up. This was the first time that a top US official would direct harsh criticism to Iran from Baku.
The level of representation that the South Caucasian states sent to the NATO Summit in Istanbul on 28-29 June 2004 reflected the emerging trends in relations between the states that make up South Caucasus and the US and provided clues as to intentions for the future. Looking more closely, Azerbaijan was represented by its head of state and was careful to make balanced and act cautious about the political messages it projected. Georgia was also represented by its head of state but gave noticeably warmer nod towards improving relations with NATO. In a show of loyalty to Russia, President of Armenia Kocaryan sent a its minister of foreign affairs, following the Russian example, because he needed to have Russian support on his domestic and foreign policy..
At every available opportunity, the US did not fail to express the geopolitical significance it attached to the Caucasus. At a speech to Congress in early-February 2005, Commander of the United States European Command General James Jones defined Caucasia as "the most significant region in military terms". Commander Jones expressed that this region stands as both a bridge between Afghanistan and more broady Central Asia, as well as a critical energy route for a large part of global traffic in the near future.
Over the course of the following years, the United States intensified its foreign policy efforts to strengthen its position in the region through several positions. The US supported the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, NABUCCO and other international projects; placed notable importance on facilitating NATO membership of South Caucasian states, especially the most eager Georgia; as well as maneuvered for entrance of US warships to the Black Sea. The US was successful on international project that carried economic significance despite some minor obstacles working against them. However, the US failed to garner the same degree of success on Georgia's NATO membership and opening up of the Black Sea to US warships. On the former, serious opposition of the Russian Federation was bolstered by support from Germany and France, and by Turkey on the latter resulted in frustration for US demands.

Latest Developments

The course of relations has seen a definitive turn in light of the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. Despite harsh US criticism of Russia during the events that led to the escalation of conflict, the general perception has been that the United States failed to demonstrate that it was capable of protecting what is its most loyal ally in the former Soviet bloc. Moreover, observes asserted that if the US does not take confidence-building measures to demonstrate its commitment to the region and address the sense of betrayal simmering in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia against the US and NATO; their hands will be forced to consider the fallout from a potential Russian retaliation before taking any further steps towards improving their relations with the US. The US did however attempt a show of its commitment to its pro-Western ally, although not as much as Georgians had anticipated, by rallying up an international reaction against Russia.
Moreover, the conflict enabled the US to achieve several of its longstanding goals in the region, previously blocked by Russian opposition but now possible in large part because of Russian aggression in the Georgian conflict and the international reaction to it. US warships entered the Black Sea and anchored to Georgia's Batumi port. In addition, the US appeared to be right in its claims about the potential implications of Georgia's (and Ukraine's) membership to NATO, after having failed to launch the process in their favor at the last NATO summit. In the aftermath of events in South Ossetia, the likelihood of Georgia's bid for NATO membership is improving, with a more favorable shift in the French and German position on the issue.
The last significant development worth mentioning is Vice-President Dick Cheney's visit to the region. Cheney's visit to Azerbaijan on 3 September 2008, and Armenia on 4 September 2008 signaled that US strategic interest in the region is far from declining. Cheney also met with high-ranking officials of oil companies in Baku. In all of the meetings, Cheney stated that the relationship between Azerbaijan and the United States would strengthen because of joint energy, transportation and security issues. It was claimed that Cheney gave a guarantee of US support to Azerbaijani officials, although these statements were not confirmed. Interestingly, the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev called President Ilham Aliyev just minutes after Aliyev ended his meeting with Cheney. It was claimed that the phone call was a message to both the United States and Azerbaijan that the Russian Federation is watching the developments closely and would not let its interests in the region undermined.
During his visit in Georgia, Cheney placed special emphasis on democracy and stated that the United States will support the "democratically elected, brave president" of Georgia. Cheney's statement is perceived to be a response to President Medvedev, who during a statement the same day characterized Georgian President Saakashvili as "politically dead". Cheney also stated that the United States would continue to provide financial, military and technical aid to Georgia.
Relations between Armenia and the United States remained unchanged during this period. However, the United States was disturbed by Russian use of Armenian territory during the Georgian conflict. Armenia, probably aware of the US uneasiness, has not yet recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Conclusion

Today, the US continues to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus. However, resurgent Russia certainly does not welcome this development and feels compelled to punish both American military interventions in the region as well as regional states that espouse pro-American policies. The Georgian conflict is a clear indication of how far Russia is willing to go to defend its own interests in the complicated and unpredictable region. While the regional struggle between Russia and the US continues in a fashion all too reminiscent of the Cold War, the region is faced with severe problems. Georgia's territorial integrity has become an even more pressing issue; Azerbaijan has not been able to liberate its territory under Armenian occupation and Armenia is left out of potentially stabilizing regional projects due to its poor rapport and relations with its neighbors. Despite these problems, or in some ways, because of them, both the US and the Russian Federation are continuing their pursuit of their interests in the region.

QAFSAM, Head of Caucasus International Relations and Strategic Research Center