After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the geopolitics of the Black Sea started to transform. Black Sea's geo-strategic characteristics and developments in the region has put the region on the international agenda and increased its significance. The Black Sea is a strategic intersection linking Europe, Asia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is an intersection which links the issues of energy and security. These characteristics make Black Sea the pivot of political initiatives and the clash point of energy/security related interests. Recently discovered oil reserves increase the significance of the Black Sea even further.
Control of the Black Sea on the energy transportation routes would mean the control of the Caspian energy routes as the competition for Caspian energy routes inevitably extends into the Black Sea. In addition, economic co-dependency would flourish in this region since the producer, consumer and transit states are all located in this region, enhancing its significance. These factors have promoted initiatives in the Black Sea that are energy and security related.
The first initiative in the region is Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), which aims at economic cooperation/integration between the Black Sea states. The idea of BSEC first arose at a conference in Ankara in 1990 and was formalized with the Bogazici Declaration at the Istanbul Summit in June 1992. Turkey, which proposed the establishment of regional cooperation in the Black Sea, planned the organization of the BSEC and undertook its establishment. The organization, which accepted EU's Helsinki Final Act and OSCE's principles, drew attention during its initial phase of establishment, inviting several conjectures, but of late it has started to lose its effectiveness. Furthermore, Turkey was also the forerunner of the first security initiative in the Black Sea. Although the idea of establishment of multi-national naval force in the Black Sea was first discussed during 1994-1995, the Turkish Naval Forces supported this idea during the Second Black Sea Chief of Naval Forces summit in Varna in 1998. On 28 June 2000, the letter of intent for BLACKSEAFOR was signed in Ankara. On 2 April 2001, the agreement on establishment of the Black Sea Force followed. Finally, the agreement was put into force with the ratification of Russia and other states. ‘Black Sea Harmony' is another important regional security initiative that should be mentioned in this regard.
After the above initiatives that spawned the period of 1990s to 2000s, new kind of energy and security related initiatives started to appear in the Black Sea as result of NATO and EU's enlargement strategies and resurgence of Russia with its monopolist energy policy. The proposal for EU's Union for Black Sea (UfB) was first discussed in Elmar Brok's report within the framework of enlargement strategy at the European Parliament on 24 June. We need to evaluate EU's UfB project by looking at EU's political, economic (energy) and security needs in the region. Enlargement towards the east in 2004 and 2007 made the Union an actor in the Black Sea. EU's borders extended to the Black Sea with the membership of former Soviet states in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. These borders are more than political borders; they also represent EU's economic and security borders. EU's new member states, which are pursuing anti-Russia policies, played an active role for making the EU more active in the Black Sea to check Russian power in the latter. Consequently, the UfB proposal appears to be an initiative of EU's new members rather than that of Germany and France. The dependency of EU's East, Baltic and Black Sea members and Russia's use of this dependency as a tool in foreign policy forces the EU to craft policies towards the Black Sea for energy security. Thus, "Wider Europe - European Neighborhood Policy: A New Framework for Relations with Out Eastern and Southern Neighbours" in 2003 and "Black Sea Synergy" in May 2007 established the basis for the UfB. These initiatives defined the framework for relationship with the EU neighbors after the enlargement. Therefore, it is safe to assert that UfB is an extension of the EU's enlargement strategy and neighborhood policy in the Black Sea.
Furthermore, the German factor has an important place in the EU's UfB initiative. Germany, during its rotating presidency of the EU, started to renew the Union's Black Sea and Caucasia policies to make the Union more active in the region. Moreover, the EU's energy based TACIS, TRACECA and INOGATE programs are other initiatives that constitute the foundations of the UfB project. The Black Sea has an important place in the EU's bid for creating multiple energy transportation routes to Europe to sustain energy security. EU's dependency on Russian natural gas and Middle Eastern oil creates the energy security problem. The UfB can be seen as a part of an attempt to resolve EU's energy security problem. In other words, the UfB is an attempt to solve EU's energy dependency by establishing economic cooperation/integration and creating co-dependency in the Black Sea. Moreover, the EU will opt for an integration level in the Black Sea similar to Coal and Steel union, which is an economy-security based approach. In accordance with the spillover effect, the EU is expecting that economic integration in the Black Sea will transform into a political union. In short, the EU's Black Sea policy, which is crafted around enlargement and neighborhood strategies, is being developed in accordance with the requirements of energy security.
The EU, which sees the Black Sea as its economy, energy and security interest area of close proximity, is aiming at economic integration without membership opportunity. It seeks the establishment of a free trade area and cooperation in energy and security with the Black Sea states through the UfB initiative. Under this framework, the EU is trying to play an active role in resolving frozen conflicts, promoting democratization process in the region, and enabling market economy reforms in the Black Sea. In other words, the UfB will target the above goals. Thus the EU is bidding for integrating the Black Sea into the Euro-Atlantic economic, energy and security structures. Although the complementary structure of the Black Sea economies seems to facilitate EU's bid for economic integration of the region, frozen conflicts, historical perceptions, mutual suspicions, insecurities and clashing interests in the region appear to be significant obstacles that the UfB initiative is faced with.
On the other hand, we need to compare EU's UfB initiative with the United States' Black Sea policies, because the EU and the United States' policies towards the region compliment each other. For example, we can observe the same parallels that exist between the EU and the United States' energy policies towards the Caspian in their policies towards the Black Sea. Thus, membership of Black Sea states of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007 points to the complementary characteristics of EU-US foreign policies. Inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in NATO is a sign of NATO's goal of expansion to the Black Sea. Likewise, EU's introduction of the UfB initiative after bordering the Black Sea with acceptance of these two states in the union is not unusual. In fact, it may even be called a late move. The United States' strategy to expand towards the Black Sea via NATO is supported in particular by Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Georgia. These states want to check Russia's dominant power in the Black Sea with the introduction of the United States.
The United States' expansion towards the Black Sea was first discussed at the June 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul. Another overt move in this direction was the Unites States' plan to expand NATO's Active Endeavor operation to the Black Sea in 2005. However, coordinated opposition from Russia and Turkey (claiming that this would weaken the Montreux regime) prevented the United States from entering the Black Sea. Furthermore, this development helped to increase the effectiveness of the Black Sea Task Force under the leadership of Turkey and proved that the region does not need NATO after the insertion of struggle against terrorism in its mission statement in 2004. The Black Sea, which is the only region where the US hegemony cannot enter, is historically a closed inland sea. Hence, the Ottoman Empire had closed the Black Sea to foreign powers for 300 years and used it as an Ottoman Sea. Today, both Russia and Turkey have a common stance when it comes to the prospect of entrance of foreign powers. The United States, on the other hand, did not give up its desire to enter the Black Sea. Today, it is linked to the EU's UfB initiative. It can be asserted that the United States is planning to enter the Black Sea via the EU. Although, the EU and the United States' plan to expand to the Black Sea is perceived as part of a strategy to surround Russia, akin to the Cold War policy, the United States is pursuing global ambitions rather than regional in accordance with the changed circumstances of 9/11. In short, the United States and EU's Black Sea policies complement each other.
Key states of the Black Sea will play an important role in shaping EU's UfB initiative, Russia being the most significant one. Russia naturally wants continuation of its supremacy in the Black Sea and consequently, will not look positively at the entrance of global actors that could counter balance and limit Russia's influence in the region. Since the United States and the EU's Black Sea policies directly interest Russia, they would encounter the Russian obstacle while attempting to implement their regional initiatives. Clearly, the United States' plan to enter the the Black Sea via NATO disturbs Russia. Consequently, the Black Sea, the new geopolitical and geo-economical competition area, will experience struggle between Russia and the United States and the EU to increase influence in the region. Therefore, waters of the Black Sea will heat up in the future.
Turkey is the other most effective state in the Black Sea, thus its attitude will determine the future of the UfB. The Montreux Convention and BSEC, although no longer that effective, form the foundations of Turkey's Black Sea policy. Moreover, Turkey is the only state that all other Black Sea states trust. Consequently, Turkey's stance will be a major determinant. Furthermore, Turkey is the only state that can act as a mediator in case of rising tensions between the parties. On the other hand, a careful examination of whether the EU will present the UfB as an alternative to Turkey's EU membership is needed. Although, Turkey's effectiveness and role in the Black Sea appears vague today, it is possible that it will act together with Russia, as seen when the United States' tried to enter the Black Sea via NATO. In short, Russian and Turkish security interests in the Black Sea overlap. On the other hand, in energy , Turkey's interests overlaps with that of the EU.
Furthermore, Ukraine's policies also have a critical role to play in the future of the Black Sea. Especially when the end of the lease of Sevastopol port, headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Navy, approaches in 2017. Consequently, there will be a struggle between Russia and the West over Ukraine and possibly Crimea will become casus belli. Ukraine's prospective policy is still undetermined because of the East-West division within the country. Apart from this, Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia apparently would support the United States and the EU's Black Sea initiatives.

Conclusion

The UfB proposal, coupled with the UfM, creates the question; would the Union dissolve into smaller unions? Moreover, synchronous conduct of the UfM and the UfB will create pressure for the EU finances. Thus, member states would be unwilling to share the financial burden of these two ambiguous projects. In addition, both the UfM and the UfB proposals are the result of EU's structural needs and enlargement strategy. They are important for the future of the Union and its potentially global character. The stance of three significant actors, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, will determine the future of all initiatives in the Black Sea region. Moreover, the future of the UfB lies in the hands of Turkey because it is the pivotal state. As the initiatives increase, the Black Sea would lose its exclusiveness and become a new area for global power struggle. Consequently, new blocks would form, EU-US vs. Russia-Turkey, resulting in the formation of different power centers. That the center of gravity is shifting from the Caspian to the Black Sea in the Eurasian energy geopolitics is an important point to remember.
Time will show whether or not the UfB is another sensational EU initiative. Although it is difficult to assert that the UfB, like the UfM, is a still born proposal, the UfB cannot be more successful than the UfM. Both the UfM and the UfB projects are envisioned within the framework of EU's common foreign and security policy. As such, the failure of these initiatives will signify the crisis implicit within the European Union itself.

Sinem KAYA- Global Strategy Institute, EU Expert
Muharrem EKSI- Global Strategy Institute, Caucasia and Central Asia Expert