The UK as Guarantor
The UK, along with Greece and Turkey, is a Guarantor power of the Republic of Cyprus. This status derives from the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, Article II of which obliges the three guarantors to ‘recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution'. The three also ‘undertake to prohibit, so far as concern them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island'.

For its part, according to the Treaty's Article I, the Republic of Cyprus ‘undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island'. Ankara justified its 1974 military intervention on the island by plausibly claiming that both Cyprus and Athens had acted in breach of their obligations under the Treaty. Turkey surely had a point, for Athens and Nicosia had undoubtedly conspired to subvert the treaty-based status of the island and its internal governance. It could also be argued that Cyprus's 2004 accession to the European Union (EU) breached Article I of the Treaty because of the EU's commitment to political and economic union of its members, but especially so in the light of Greek EU membership.

On the other hand, with the formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983 and Ankara's diplomatic recognition of it, it can also be argued that Turkey too has breached its obligations as a Guarantor power. Subsequent threats by Turkey to annex the TRNC and thus permanently divide the island, and Turkey's widely perceived intransigence - at least until the election of the Justice and Development Party (Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP) in November 2002 and its support for the Annan Plan in 2004 - served only to reinforce this impression. Furthermore, the UK chose not to act militarily alongside Turkey in 1974. In general, the UK has interpreted its Guarantor status in a somewhat passive manner. Thus, it also failed to act decisively in the face of Greek Cypriot transgressions against the 1960 treaties during the years that followed the establishment of the island's independence. London also agreed to the 2004 accession of Cyprus to the EU, even though no agreement on the island's future had been arrived at. London, with other EU members, had feared both a Greek veto on EU enlargement in eastern Europe, and a Greek block on negotiations for Turkey's EU accession. This record serves as a reminder that Cyprus does not loom as large in the minds of British policy makers as it does in the minds of Cypriots.

Thus each of the three Guarantor powers could be said to have breached their obligations at one time or another, or to have failed to live up to them. Yet, until the 1960 treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus are superceded by a new diplomatic settlement, the status remains legally in force. From London's perspective, what does this amount to? Greek Cyprus, and especially its present government, wants an end to the idea of external guarantors, regarding it as both a colonial legacy and as a legitimisation of Turkish interference in the island's affairs. Turkey and the TRNC prefer its retention, as an insurance policy to protect the rights and security of the island's Turkish minority against further encroachments from the Greek side. London, however, is best described as ‘neutral' on the issue and would probably be prepared to cede its rights as Guarantor as part of a negotiated settlement. From the British perspective, the island's continued division serves as an obstacle to much more important objectives, such as full inclusion of Cypriot territory into the EU's acquis, and progress on Turkey's EU accession. For the principle of Guarantor status to be discarded, however, the Greek and Turkish sides would first have to agree on the question of security guarantees. Thus far, the prospects of any such agreement being achieved have been dim. And the UK of today is not the military power that it was, or thought it was, in 1960.

The UK as interested party
In the meantime, the UK remains very much an interested party where the future of Cyprus is concerned. The appointment of the experienced diplomat, Sir David Hannay, as the UK's Special Representative for Cyprus, a post he held from 1996 until 2003, is testimony to London's high level of engagement with the issue. Indeed, Hannay's hand is widely held to have been instrumental in drafting the UN's Annan Plan, which was put to a referendum in both parts of the island in April 2004. This engagement is partly explained by the UK's historical responsibility for Cyprus, and its knowledge and experience of the island and its problems. Indeed, some - especially on the Greek Cypriot side - would argue that the UK bears primary responsibility for the mess that emerged subsequent to the granting if independence. For this reason alone no external state has been more active than the UK in trying to achieve a negotiated settlement. The UK is also one of the most consistent advocates of Turkey's accession to the EU, and recognises that failure to settle the Cyprus issue constitutes a major obstacle to Turkey's eventual membership.

Cyprus is also a domestic issue for the UK. There are reckoned to be almost 80000 Cypriot born residents in Britain, and around 300000 subjects of Greek Cypriot descent. Those of Turkish Cypriot descent - 100000 or more - constitute a larger community than exists in Cyprus itself. Furthermore, UK-based Cypriots are concentrated in a relatively few areas of north and east London, which enhances their capacity to organise and lobby. The UK's universities are also popular with hundreds of Cypriot students. There are also believed to be around 60000 British expatriates living in Cyprus, and thousands more British second-home owners. The legal status of some British-owned properties located within the TRNC zone also ensures a degree of British political interest in the island's affairs. Furthermore, the UK is Cyprus's main trade partner. Cyprus is a member of the Commonwealth, and both the Cyprus and the UK are EU member states. The UK has also been the biggest contributor to the island's UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

The UK also possesses the two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), at Akrotiri and at Dhekelia, agreed by the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. These constitute around three percent of the island's territory, although around sixty percent of the area enclosed within them is locally owned, mainly for farming. Seven thousand Cypriots live on this land, Cypriot laws apply, and Nicosia is obliged too to provide services to the areas within the SBA's boundaries, such as water, power, transport and food supplies. London offered to give up the bulk of this locally owned land within the SBAs as part of the Annan Plan, and the offer remains on the table in the event of a negotiated agreement.

Cyprus and intelligence gathering
Although the SBAs retain their usefulness to the UK for the purposes of troop rotation, training, and basing, more important are the intelligence gathering, signalling and intercept facilities that have been progressively installed on the island since 1960. These have far greater significance than could possibly have been envisaged in 1960, when the UK acquired the bases in pursuit of its role as a regional, and still colonial, power. Today, their interest to London lies much more in their intelligence utility, most especially to the US. Many of these facilities have been quite recently enhanced at considerable cost, and include the British electronic intelligence gathering station at Ayios Nikolaos in Dhekelia. The 1960 Treaty also gave the UK extensive rights to and control over a number of additional so-called ‘Retained Sites' on the island, and some of these too contain intelligence facilities, such as the Mount Olympus radar facility in the Troodos Mountains.

Cyprus-based intelligence facilities, some of which are US-owned such as those at the US embassy in Nicosia, and many of which, one can assume, are partly or wholly US-funded, are incorporated into the USA's global Echelon intelligence network. UK-US intelligence sharing arrangements are intense and comprehensive and are governed by informal agreements dating back as far as the 1940s. Little information is available in the public domain, but the importance of Cyprus to US and UK intelligence efforts in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia is substantial. This ensures both that the US has a stake in the problems of the island, and that any position the UK adopts is likely to take account of US sensitivities and interests. Whatever agreement can eventually be arrived at by the island's opposing factions, it is hard to envisage circumstances in which the UK and the US would be prepared to lose their ability to use the island's geographical advantages and expensive intelligence facilities. This too needs to be taken into account when contemplating the UK's approach to Cypriot affairs.

The status of the SBAs is not directly related to the current negotiations between the two Cypriot communities. Indeed, Article III of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee declares that, ‘Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus'. London would prefer to maintain the distinction between the two issues of the future settlement of the Cyprus dispute on the one hand, and its retention of the SBAs on the other, and Nicosia has respected that wish. Indeed, under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between London and Nicosia on 2008, the Greek Cypriot government pledged to honour its obligations to the SBAs under the 1960 Treaties. Relations between the British authorities in the SBAs and the Greek Cypriot authorities are generally cordial, and cooperation close. Even so, the present leftist Greek Cypriot President, Demetris Christofius, is on record as regarding the SBAs as an unwelcome colonial presence and has expressed his wish to extend Cypriot sovereignty to them, although he is currently content to defer this objective until after an end to the island's division has been achieved.

The future?
London tries to maintain a degree of neutrality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, although many citizens of an island so attached to conspiracy theories and zero-sum diplomacy as is Cyprus refuse to accept that fact. Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike have been reluctant to recognise either their own responsibility for their island's misfortunes or that primary responsibility for settling these differences lies with them. The current leaderships of the two communities - Christofius for the Greek side and Mehmet Ali Talat for the TRNC - embarked on direct negotiations under the auspices of the UN in 2006. Although the two leaders have amply demonstrated their goodwill - a circumstance that might not easily be repeated in the future - progress on the core issues has been limited. Yet, when in early 2010 the two leaders somewhat surprisingly announced that progress had been made and would continue to be made, London welcomed their profession of faith with enthusiasm. This does not mean that meaningful progress will necessarily be made or that an end to the island's division is imminent.

London can encourage and facilitate progress, but it cannot force it. London can, and does, seek ways to limit the isolation of the TRNC, but it is unlikely to act in ways that contradict the position of the EU as a whole. The UK's preference is that a settlement be found that is acceptable to both communities, that all Cypriots can live in security and prosperity, and that the EU acquis be extended to the entire island. London also wishes that the Cypriot logjam to progress on Turkey's EU accession be removed. But it has no magic want to wave. The arrangements on Cyprus of which the UK was Guarantor have long since been discarded, and the UK's physical capacity - let alone its will - to act as Guarantor in the sense in which the term was understood in 1960 has long since eroded.

Bill Park is Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King's College, London University. He has published, lectures and broadcast on a range of issues relating to Turkish foreign and security policy, and is currently writing a book on Turkey and Globalisation.