Relations between Moscow and Ankara, which hosted Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on 6 August, are rapidly improving as of late. In fact, Russia has become one of Turkey's biggest trade partners. During the early 1990s, the assumption was that it was only a matter of time before Turkey and Russia would be locked in an intense competition over the Caucasus and Central Asia; not a farfetched scenario given that this was a time when nearly every state had their eye on the newly independent region with its untapped natural resources, now liberated after 150 years of Russian and Soviet domination. At the time, Russia saw Turkey as a crucial security threat to its regional interests, and expected that Ankara, hastened along by Western encouragement, was preparing to dive nose first into the region. In a 1996 Russian Special Forces report, Turkey was defined as a regional power that was supporting Islamic movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus and trying to spread Pan-Turkist ideas. Furthermore, the report asserted that Turkey would potentially be prepared to step in to fill any strategic void in Central Asia and the Caucasus that may appear as a result of the weakening Russian state. During the mid 1990s, Moscow also accused Turkey of providing logistic and moral support to Chechen separatists.
By all means, Moscow's fears were not unfounded. During those years, Turkish public opinion was sympathetic towards the Chechens, who were seen to be fighting a difficult battle against the Russians. When Turkish officials described Chechen militia who had kidnapped the "Avrasya" (Eurasia) Ferry in February 1996 as activists rather than terrorists, Russia was furious. To further complicate matters, Turkey's expanding interest in Central Asia, which began under Turgut Özal and continued during the period of Sűleyman Demirel, made the Russians uneasy. Nonetheless, the much anticipated and perhaps not entirely implausible 'arm wrestling' between Turkey and Russia did not materialize at the time. Much of the reason behind this has to do with the fact that Turkey failed to reach the level of regional reach and influence that the Russians had fretted about, and eventually lost its grip on the status that it had maintained in the region due to repeated political mistakes. Without a doubt, Turkey's gravest strategic miscalculation was the application of Turanism and Pan-Turkist based policies in Central Asia and the Caucasus since the early 1990s. The unintended end result of this policy was to frighten and estrange leaders with communist loyalties in the region, well before Russia. While the region's only Turanist leader, Azerbaijan's Ebulfez Elcibey, was toppled by a Russian supported coup within a short period of time, other notable leaders of the Central Asian republics began to distance themselves from Turkey. Another mistake that would take a toll on Turkey's bid for greater influence over the region was making too many promises that were left unfulfilled. While several of the pipeline agreements signed in those years remained on paper alone, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, which was initiated by Özal, was put on the shelf due to Ankara's inability to finance significant geopolitical projects.
On the other hand, having only recently gained their independence from Russian hegemony, the Central Asian Republics did not welcome the prospect of coming under the watchful eye of Turkey and its ambition to become the region's ‘big brother'. In 1994, an author from Turkmenistan pointed out that Turkey's emphasis on their common language, culture and historical ties with the Turkic Republics made the Turkic peoples concerned. The Turkmen author was expressing the desire of the Central Asian Republics to forge relations on an equal footing with other states, and build upon their independence and identity without Turkey casting a shadow over them. During the mid 1990s, a Turkmen official harshly criticized Turkey's active role in Azerbaijani domestic politics during Tansu Çiller's term.
The ‘Turkish model' that the West prescribed for Central Asia in the early 1990s lost its attraction in a short period of time. The pillars of what such a model would entail, like a free press, multi-party elections and other principles of a participatory and inclusive democracy, failed to capture the imagination of Central Asia's leaders who still had one foot firmly rooted in their communist past. The alternative to the Turkish model was either a religion based Iran-style model or Russian domination. Ultimately, Central Asian politicians shaped their governments in keeping with the former communist Soviet system rather than the Turkish model.
At the same time, the West was prompted to reconsider its tactical approach of promoting a Turkish model to broker its relations with the region when it realized that the fear of Iran's regional influence was exaggerated. Moreover, once the West understood the scope of Central Asia's vast natural resource wealth; it was not long before it decided to remove the middle man Turkey and establish direct ties with the states in the region. The United States started to invest in Kazakhstan's Tengiz region in the mid 1990s; and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, under the framework of Bush's "war on terror", the US established military bases in Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and Caucasia (Georgia). Similarly, Germany and France established logistics bases in support of their soldiers in Afghanistan in Termez, Uzbekistan, and Dushanbe, Tajikistan, respectively.
Turkey, having realized the mistakes that were inherent in its Central Asia policies, reversed its Turanist and Pan-Turkish approach to the region in the mid 1990s and began to establish relations with the Turkic Republics on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual economic interests. The change in Ankara's policy bore fruit in a short period of time. Turkish businessman acquired significant bids on the trot, and started to build hotels, shopping centers and factories in Central Asia. This changed Turkey's image in the minds of the people of the region, who were disappointed by the low-quality products of the Laleli bazaar that were sent to Russian and Central Asia cities.
In 2007, during a meeting at a restaurant in the RAMSTORE shopping center in Kazakhstan's former capital Almaty's Atakent district, my Kazakh friend pointed around him and proudly said, "Your people built this." My Kazakh friend's sentiments about this impressive shopping center, the product of a Koc-ENKA partnership of the late-1990s, made me proud, as someone who stands at an equal distance from both parties. In Almaty, where the Koc-ENKA partnership has opened three large Ramstore shopping centers, Turkish business owners are managing numerous hotels, restaurants, cafes, game centers and casinos. The most luxurious hotel in Almaty, the five star Hotel Ankara, was built and is still managed by Turkish entrepreneurs. Other Central Asian cities share a similar story of an economic boom fueled by Turkish investment and business opportunities. For example, Turkish contractors transformed the face of Turkmenistan's capital Askabat. In the early 1990s, Askabat was a shabby Soviet-style city, but is fast becoming a candidate to become Central Asia's Dubai, with its modern shopping centers, fast food restaurants, five star hotels, parks and multi-lane roads that resemble airstrips. The five star Akaltin Hotel, located near Askabat circus, was the first big project that was spearheaded by Turks in the city. In 1995, my Turkmen journalist friend expressed his admiration for Akaltin hotel, saying, "We Turkmens could never have completed such a project by ourselves."
Today, Turks control a significant share of the private sector in various Central Asian countries. Turkish business owners manage the most luxurious restaurants, casinos and hotels in Askabat, Bishkek and Almaty. This has not gone unnoticed by local populations; many have expressed dissatisfaction with what they see as a Turkish takeover of the corner stones of their national economies. What lies behind these grievances is the widening gap between Turkish entrepreneurs who are becoming increasingly rich thanks to their enterprises in Central Asian capitals, and local people-- Kazakhs, Turkmens and Kyrgyz--who feel that their economic "suffering" at home in their own countries is nothing short of unjust.
It seems that Moscow is content that Ankara's influence in Central Asia is limited to its economic clout. Russia reevaluated its position about Turkey's role in Eurasia since the late 1990s. Pavel Baev from the Oslo-based International Research Institute points out that Russia's outlook on Turkey has shifted from a perception of threat to one of a valuable partner. By all means, this evolved orientation towards Turkey is the outcome of increasing levels of economic relations between the two states since the late 1990s. According to Pavel, the most significant factor in Russian-Turkish rapprochement is over natural gas and the Blue Stream project. Following the completion of the project, Turkey's dependence on Russian gas jumped from 66% to 80%. But Russia treats Turkey more as a transit country rather than a market for its energy supplies.
From the late 1990s onwards, Turkey adopted more accommodating policies on several issues that were sensitive for Russia. For example, the activities of Chechens in Turkey were restricted and many Chechen insurgents were returned to Russia. In the same manner, Russia has been trying to avoid any measures that would disturb Turkey on the PKK issue. Fiona Hill from the Brookings Institute points out that in the Eurasia region, the developing pragmatic and stable economic and political partnership between Turkey and Russia has similarities with the reconciliation that took place between Germany and France following the Second World War-and this may pave the way for wider economic integration and development in the region.
Signs of mutual accommodation and partnership aside, the possibility of less friendly competition, and even conflict, erupting between Moscow and Ankara in the Eurasia region have not disappeared entirely. Russia's main policy priorities for Eurasia are shaped around the strategy of keeping foreign powers, like Turkey and Iran, away from its perceived natural zone of influence. Turkey, on the other hand, wants the former Soviet Republics to secure their sovereignty and free themselves from Moscow's lingering command. Ankara has made genuine attempts to attain this goal by diplomatic means in both Georgia and Azerbaijan, at the risk of aggravating Moscow. In many ways, the Kremlin still perceives Turkey as a state that peddles the US agenda and carries Washington's policies to the Middle East and Caucasia.
Esedullah Oğuz is a regional expert on Central Asia and Afghanistan. He has conducted research and published extensively on the region.