Mid-July saw Turkey entertaining guests from Israel, the Russian Federation (RF) and India. The reason for these visits and the topic of the meetings was the new route for crude oil and natural gas that will originate from the RF and the Caspian basin. The visitors were Mr. B. Ben Eliezer (Israel Ministry of Infrastructure), Mr. Narayanan (India National Security Counsellor) and Mr. A. Medvedev (Deputy President Gazprom). The topic of the meetings that the Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) Mr. H. Güler hosted, dealt with the crude oil, natural gas, water and fibre optic pipeline bundle project connecting Ceyhan-Turkey to Ashkelon-Israel.
Before going into the detail of the project, it would be useful to take a quick look at the pipeline in question and the policies of the countries in this region.
Turkey aims to be the energy hub of the Eastern Mediterranean with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, for which its struggles began in 1992. Ceyhan was also the loading terminal of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) which transfers about 70 million tons of Iraq crude oil annually. Therefore, Ceyhan was planned to be a loading terminal for about 120-130 million tons/year of crude oil, which is about 3% of the world demand or 6% of the region's. Unfortunately, after the Gulf and Iraq wars, the pipeline either did not operate or operated at a low capacity. Following the invasion of Iraq by the USA, a new destination for Iraqi crude oil was on the scene, this being the Kirkuk-Haifa crude pipeline which had not been in operation for more than 20 years. The old Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAP) which was transporting Saudi crude to Haifa is also once more under consideration. With these alternative pipeline connections to Israel, it would not be true to say that Ceyhan-Turkey will act as a sole terminal for the Caspian and Iraqi crude to be routed to the Mediterranean.
The intensive traffic at the Turkish Straits, especially the Strait of Bosphorus, means that there are restrictions and rules for the passage of tankers through these straits. This situation has forced Governments and oil companies to search for alternative routes for the crude transported via the Black Sea. Up until 1992 different routes were studied as alternatives, such as the Thrace Pass of Turkey (İğneada-İbrikbaba), the Black Sea-Mediterranean Pass (Zonguldak-Ceyhan) and the Bulgaria-Greece Pass (Burgas-Alexandroupolis). Some years ago another route, originally Samsun-Ceyhan [1] then later Ordu-Ceyhan, was attached to the Turkey pass projects by a consortium of private companies. In spite of positive intense interference by the Turkish Government, up until now, the pipeline company has not been able to make throughput agreements with probable suppliers. In the meantime, the RF made an agreement with Bulgaria and Greece to build the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline and appointed ENI of Italy as the main contractor. This means that, the crude oil originating from the Black Sea will find port in the Aegean Sea, and it will take time for the access of oil to come to Ceyhan with the planned pipeline.
As stated in the media, Israel conducted meetings with the RF to extend the "Blue Stream" gas pipeline to Ceyhan and Israel. India also asked the RF to make a throughput agreement for Ordu-Ceyhan and extend this pipeline to Ashkelon of Israel, giving a purchase guarantee for the oil that will be transferred to this port. Up until 2003, the original Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline which was planned and constructed by Israel and Iran in 1968, to transfer Iranian crude to the Mediterranean from the Red Sea bypassing the Suez Canal, is now operating counter wise for transferring crude oil from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. [2]
The Turkish Energy Minister Mr. M. H. Güler added two more items to this pipeline bundle originating from Turkey, namely, water and fibre optic lines, and named the whole system as a "Peace Project".
When looked at from the technical and strategic view points, the following picture emerges;

1. Israel has a gas production capacity of 710 million cu mt/yr and concluded a gas sales agreement (GSA) with Egypt in 2007 for 20 years. The pipeline will start at Al-Arish-Egypt and it will be extended to Ashkelon-Israel. [3] Considering the improving relations of Israel with USA controlled Iraq - which has a huge amount of gas reserves to be operated by 2010 - the shortest and cheapest way of getting gas would be this source. The question is, besides the Egyptian and Iraqi gas facilities, what will Israel do with the relatively expensive Russian gas? The answer being, that the Russian gas will be used in a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Train to be installed in Israel. This means that the Mediterranean market will be served from Israel instead of Turkey and result in strategic and financial losses for Turkey.
2. The loading ports of energy resources such as Crude oil and LNG have more commercial and strategic importance when compared to the transfer ports. Transfer points/ports after the first load are only mid-terminals with a lower degree of importance compared to the first loading point. That is why Turkey was insistent on extending the pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan instead of running only a bypass line from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Ceyhan with its existing facilities, BTC and ITC, extension of the "Blue Line" to Ceyhan and the installation of a LNG Train, which connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean-Ceyhan with a bypass crude pipeline, would give major importance as being an "energy hub" in the East Mediterranean and would serve the international markets as well as all of the Middle East with the RF and Caspian sources of crude oil and gas as LNG. The direct transfer of any of these energy sources via pipelines to Israel will either be a loss or will mean that Turkey will have to share the revenue. Israel can use its terminals by transferring the necessary crude oil from Ceyhan by tankers as it does now.
3. Energy is the most important element for any given country, for transportation, production, defence and social life, but there are alternatives. On the other hand there is another component necessary for the sustenance of life, which does not have any alternatives, that being water. Water is a vital element without any alternative. In our geography/region, the most significant problem is the supply of potable/drinkable water. The average water sources are 1500 cu/mts per person per year, with the world average being 7000 cu.mt/person/year. [4] The region also suffers from poor "water management".

Turkey has 3.170 cu mt/person/year "renewable water resources", "drinkable" being 1430 cu mt/person/year. Taking into consideration the birth rate, the percentage of young people in the population (age 0-35, 50%) and the development in the industrial and agrarian sectors, Turkey should be very careful in the utilisation of its water resources. Unfortunately, even with the application of effective and economic "water management" policies, Turkey will be far from today's water resource level. Turkey is not in a position to solve the water problems of the Middle East. A couple of days after singing the agreement for the "peace project", The Energy Minister Mr. M. H. Güler spoke to the press in Tokat [5] stating that "In the coming days of suffering from global warming, water will be more important than crude oil, and Turkey must evaluate all its water resources carefully".
Being one of the vital water resources in southwest Asia, the rivers originating from Turkey namely the Euphrates and Tigris are vital water resources in this geography covering a wide area and population. They constitute a single transboundary watercourse system and are linked not only by their natural course when merging at the Shatt-al-Arab, but also as a result of a man-made Thartar Canal connection between the two rivers in Iraq. Turkey, Syria and Iraq are the three major riparian owners of the Euphrates-Tigris river system.
The uncoordinated nature of these supply-led developments as well as inefficient and ineffective demand management practices within the framework of national water policy and management of the co-riparian continue to be the principal causes of water imbalance in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
As described above, in the fast-paced 21st century, the strategies and/or disputes to possess and control the sources of the no-alternative vital resource of water are not far away. To possess or control water resources will be more important than energy sources, which can be replaced by alternatives. Being conscious of this vital situation, besides the Euphrates and Tigris, one cannot name the waters of the rivers Seyhan, Ceyhan, Manavgat and Göksu as excess and allocate them to "peace projects". Such an act will be risking the future of generations to come.
To conclude; the Mediterranean pipeline bundle, transferring crude oil and natural gas resources of the RF and Caspian region through Turkey, directly to Ashkelon-Israel and routing water sources to Israel are very far from the expedience of Turkey. Those who are governing the country should be cognizant about the geopolitical and strategic status of Turkey and should follow and apply politics and strategies by which the country will gain and be in peace with its surrounding, neighbour states.

[1] In July 2007 at Çarşamba-Samsun the go-ahead was given to the Project but after a couple of months, the Black Sea terminal was moved 50 km east to the Ünye-Ordu location.
[2] The Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline was constructed as a joint Israeli and Iranian company (50%+50% partnership of governments) in 1968. The aim was the transfer of Iranian crude oil to the Mediterranean and the Haifa Refinery of Israel. But the Iran revolution meant the end of this partnership. In 2003, the line was arranged so that it could be operated in two ways which gave access from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. The 42 inch pipelines are 254 km long, from Eilat to Ashkelon with 3 pumping stations that can transfer 60.0 million tons per year, and from Ashkelon to Eilat 2 pump stations can transfer 20.0 million tons per year of crude oil. Between Ashkelon and Haifa there exists a 16/18 inch 197 km pipeline by which the Haifa Refinery is fed.
[3] Ronit Morgenstern: "The Green Peace: Egypt-Israel Undersea Natural Gas Pipeline Plan Approved" Newspaper Ma'ariv (Asaqim supplement), 19 April 2007, BBC Monitoring Middle East
[4] Buket Bahar Dıvrak, "Water in Turkey", WWF, "Su Kaynakları", http://www.wwf.org.tr/wwf-tuerkiye-hakkinda/ne-yapiyoruz/su-kaynaklari/
[5] Anayurt Gazetesi (Newspaper Anayurt), dd. 22.07.2008