Washington's much publicized ambition to ‘reset' relations with Moscow under the watch of President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has already begun to manifest itself as an adjustment in its Ukraine policies. But the first high-level signs of this foreign policy reformulation under the Obama administration came not long ago, with US Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Kiev on 20-22 July.
Until recently, the US had made no secret of its enthusiastic support for Ukraine's bid for NATO membership within the broader course of Euro-Atlantic integration. But increasingly, the tone of the conversation, and nature of the United States' treatment of post-Orange revolution Ukraine, may be undergoing a change. Reading between the lines of Biden's remarks on 21 July in Kiev, "President Obama and I have stated clearly that if you choose to be part of Euro-Atlantic integration -- which I believe you have -- that we strongly support that" essentially was interpreted as "Ukraine's NATO membership is of their own concern." This hints at what may signal the beginning of a new chapter in the US approach to Ukraine. On the other hand, Washington has made a deliberate point of serving up carefully crafted rhetoric to calm Ukraine's shaky nerves about the evolving US-Russia rapprochement. Much of Biden's statements offered reassurances to Ukraine that any progress made on bilateral relations with Russia would not come at Ukraine's expense. He went further to say, "I believe it can actually benefit Ukraine. The more substantive relationship we have with Moscow, the more we can defuse the zero-sum thinking about our relations with Russia's neighbors."
Without a doubt, Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko was hoping for more consistent signals on the thorny NATO issue during the visit, made two weeks after Obama's Moscow program in early July. Yushchenko's reference to former US President George Bush, who had supported Ukraine's NATO aspirations, during Biden's visit was no coincidence:
"I thank the United States for its consistent stance and continuous support for the NATO membership of Ukraine. Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the active participation of Ukraine in international peace missions is important for us. Our country is the only non-member country that supports NATO missions."
Following Yushchenko's speech, Biden reiterated Obama's sentiment expressed earlier in Moscow and pointed out that if Ukraine meets the necessary criteria for admission, the US would support its NATO membership. Biden also underlined that the Ukrainian public must share the government's pro-NATO desire and claim ownership over this consensus. Point blank, Biden drew a line between the extent of US support and where Ukraine's choices lay: "The United States also supports Ukraine's deepening ties to NATO and to the European Union. But again, we recognize they are your decisions, your choices, not ours whether you choose the EU or seek to, or NATO. We recognize that how far and how fast to proceed on your choices is, again, a uniquely Ukrainian choice -- it is not ours." What was striking was Biden's cautious choice of words, mindful of avoiding irritating Russia while trying to strike a delicate balance with Ukraine. Almost half of Ukraine acknowledges the need to establish good relations with Russia and support political parties that look towards Moscow. Ukraine's eastern part is more committed to a Russian alliance and frowns upon a relationship with Europe that is defined strictly on military terms.
A few days after Biden's visit, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was reported to have said that "NATO is beginning to realize that Georgia and Ukraine should not be "dragged" into the alliance." He also suggested that Ukraine should hold a referendum on NATO membership, adding that "We don't think it's right to drag certain countries into military and political alliances against the will of their nationals."
Europe's Doubts
European suspicions on Ukraine's membership to NATO have lately become more pronounced. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer, who had a penchant for arguing in favor of Kiev's membership, seems to have lately shifted away from this attitude and aired concerns over the prospect of Kiev formally joining the alliance. Russian television channels have seized upon the opportunity to frequently broadcast the soon to be retired NATO Secretary-General's remarks. In important ways, this is a symbolic victory for Russia's latest string of allies in Europe. Germany, France and Holland do not want another Cold War to take over the continent and they have not hesitated to align themselves with Russia on the issues of ballistic missile defense, and the future of Georgia and Ukraine.
When Schaeffer uttered the words "every European state has a right to apply for NATO membership, but it doesn't end there," what he was pointing to was the deep and festering problems that have rendered Ukraine institutionally dysfunctional and put the country at a standstill-and most likely to remain that way until at least the presidential election of January 2010. Ukraine appears to be politically divided into two camps. Even Ukraine's pro-Western bloc has failed to demonstrate a unified vision and is split along a widening fault line. Former revolutionary allies, Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko, the current prime minister and candidate in the January elections, are rapidly moving in separate directions.
Yushchenko is aware that he needs to tackle longstanding domestic economic and political problems if he has any hopes of carrying the country any closer to NATO and the EU. The fate of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea comes at the top of the list. Thus, Yushchenko's historical visit to Simferopol on 3-5 July, just before Biden's visit, represented the first step of this new policy.
A reinvigorated Crimea policy under Yushchenko is likely in the aftermath of the visit. That he met with the Crimean Tatars to seek their help for the new constitution during his three-day visit is meaningful. Yushchenko's symbolic gesture along with the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Mustafa Dzhemilev, of laying flowers at the memorial of the victims of the deportation of the Crimean Tatar people in Simferopol is testament to his goal of garnering Tatar support.
Obama's New Black Sea Strategy
During the visit, Yushchenko made promises on planned investments to Crimea in terms of socio-economic development priorities. Yushchenko's vow that Tatars would have a bigger share of the investments made in Crimea should be understood as forward looking political investments in the course of Ukraine's Crimea politics. At this juncture, Yushchenko needs new allies in the run-up to the upcoming presidential election. The Tatars, who returned after the 1944 exile, will likely play a significant role in the future of this strategic peninsula in the Black Sea. Washington is also keenly aware of this. Clemens Bucher and Peter Widler from the Department of State were in Crimea on 25 February to discuss the details of the US Black Sea strategy during the Obama presidency. While Bucher and Widler expressed the new administration's desire to work with the Tatars, they also indicated Washington's willingness to offer financial aid to the semi-official Crimean Tatars National Parliament. This financial aid package will likely be delivered via the Department of State and USAID. The establishment of a new ideological bloc against Russia through Washington's re-emergence in the Black Sea as an active actor is already stirring public protest in Crimea.
The first Global Crimean Tatar Congress, held in Simferopol on 19-22 May, represented a new effort to reorganize the movement, which was strongly supported by Turkey. But it did not render any results other than to demonstrate the division between the Muslim Tatars in Crimea. The Tatar opposition is preparing to convene an alternative congress in September. Dissident opinions are now being voiced out loud among the Tatars. Opposition analysts are questioning who the Tatars can call friends, harping back to soreness over Ukraine's unwillingness to move the Tatars away from the periphery of government decision-making processes. The Tatars, who lived under the Russian Empire for 220 years, are acutely familiar with Russian traditions and envy the higher living standards of their kinsman in Russia's St. Petersburg, Krasnodar and Moscow. On the one hand the Tatars see the mosque in Moscow that was built for them and the security net of the state, but on the other, they are weary of radical groups like Hizb-ut Tahrir taking control of mosques in Crimea.
Turkey's support for the Tatars is undeniable. However, from Turkey's foreign policy perspective, the overriding priority is the security of the Black Sea and the status of the Turkish Straits, both of which are largely driven by the US inclination to interfere in every conflict that has or may erupt between Ukraine and Russia. As NATO's most strategic country, Turkey strictly applies the Montreux Convention, despite the fact that NATO allies, and especially Washington, have often been rattled by the degree of Turkey's commitment to the convention. Ankara has often felt pressured by its allies over disputes on the Black Sea and Turkish Straits.
Another key message delivered by Yushchenko during the symbolic visit was his taking part in the celebration of Ukrainian Fleet Day on 5 July at Sevastopol's navy fleet. The message was loud and clear and directed at Russia. Against Russia's military presence in Sevastopol, this was Ukraine flexing its muscle, presenting its military strength under the banner of its willingness to fight for Crimea, if necessary.
Ukraine Warming up to Russia's ‘NATO'
Many Ukrainians are pointing the finger at Russia for the sudden change of heart in the West's policies towards Kiev. Much of Biden's remarks during his recent visit were tailored to soothe the aggravation among Ukrainians who suspect that they are paying the price for Washington and Moscow pressing the ‘reset' button. At the Kiev House on 22 July, in no uncertain terms, Biden stressed that:
"As we reset the relationship with Russia, we reaffirm our commitment to an independent Ukraine. And we recognize no sphere of influence, or no ability of any other nation to veto the choices an independent nation makes as to with whom and under what conditions they will associate. .. We do not believe that a partnership with one nation must come at the expense of another. It has not. It does not, and it will not."
But regardless of perhaps the best of Biden's intentions, Yushchenko feels like a cheated spouse. It was hardly a coincidence that the parliamentary group formed to inform the public about the Collective Security Treaty Organization was established during Biden's trip, no doubt meant to deal a fine tuned warning to Washington. Ukrainian parliamentarians consulted Nicolay Bordüja, the CSTO Secretary-General, and requested his support to obtain official information about the CSTO, and called for coordination to invite group representatives and establish links between the CSTO Parliamentarian Assembly and the Ukrainian Parliament. In the letter addressed to Bordüja, the group's chair, Anatoly Tolstouhov, stated that the organization is necessary for Ukraine to negotiate its new role in European security. That representatives from every political party in Ukraine's parliament joined the group is significant.
While Russia is moving ahead with plans to leverage CSTO as a Rapid Reaction Force against NATO, the inclusion of Ukraine to this structure, even if as an observer, will be decisive in the future alignment of Russian-Ukraine relations, as well the Washington-Kiev track.