Over 90% of goods imported and exported globally are transported by strategic shipping lanes, and the international sea transport industry is likely to continue its growth in parallel to global trade rates. Estimates made by Turkey's Chamber of Shipping (TCS) forecasted an 8.4% growth in global sea transport volume for 2008. Pointing to a similar trend, the Annual Container Market Review and Forecast projects an annual growth of 5.6% in Asian-European trade until 2015. In the current global financial slump, global trade has hit a low, and although it is inevitable that sea commerce will also feel the impact of the crisis and enter a period of lull, it is likely to return to a trajectory of stable growth in the long term. <0}
Ensuring maritime security is an integral part of sustaining global trade volumes.
Among the foremost threats to maritime security are the illicit drug trade; organized crime; human smuggling and terrorism. Although each of these constitute serious security threats and should be taken up singularly, the focus here will be on 21st century piracy on the high seas.
Today, armed robbery and piracy against ships must be treated as acts of terrorism. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), piracy poses a tremendous terrorist threat and it should not be overlooked that pirates and terrorists use similar tactics, maneuver in sensitive and conflict-prone geography, and that the cross-influence between them is increasing (Reinhardt, C.).
Types of Piracy
There are three main types of piracy that take place at sea. Firstly, attacks against ships that are preparing to anchor, or at anchorages and approaches. These types of attacks generally occur at ports where global standards of security and safety measures are not strictly enforced. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB)) classifies piracy of this kind as low-level armed robbery. They are carried out by pirates on speedboats armed with knives, guns and small arms, near coastlines. The sought after ransom amount for this type of piracy is between USD 50,000-150,000, as well as high-value personal goods (Chalk, 2000; Fursdon, E. 1996)
Classified as medium-level attacks, the second type of piracy poses a more serious threat and involves armed attacks and acts of robbery on ships in the open sea and territorial waters. Carried out by organized pirates from a professionally armed mother ship, these illegal operations usually involve more intense conflict leading to injury and casualties (Chalk, Fursdon, 1996; Valencia, M. 2005). When carried out on narrow shipping lanes or sea routes such as the Malacca or Singapore Strait, hijacking of crew or vessels seriously delays or damages international sea trade.
According to the IMB, the most sophisticated and dangerous form of piracy involves schemes to reap insurance dollars by way of what is known as the ‘phantom ship' phenomenon (Chalk, 2000; Abyankar, J. 1997). These types of well-organized attacks are carried out by professional crime rings with considerable external networks and logistical support (Chalk, 2000; Abyankar, J. 1997).
21st century pirates employ a variety of modern information technologies to support their attacks and are adept with operating the necessary high tech communications equipment, such as GPS, satellite phones and military hardware (Anouk, Z. 2008). Transmitting a false SOS alarm to disrupt maritime traffic is also a common tactic, as is carrying out most attacks at nighttime. Intelligence gathering is critical for pirates and they are willing to pay considerable sums to this end.
Underlying causes of sea piracy

In parallel to the rise in international trade, sea commerce and traffic has also expanded, as well as the number of port facilities worldwide. Today, almost 90% of world trade is transported by sea, with an estimated 12-15 million cargo ships crossing the world's seas. There are 6,591 terminals where these freight carriers are handled, each one a potential golden opportunity for piracy gangs.
The increased sea trade is concentrated in narrow, strategically important and therefore high-risk chokepoints such as the straits of Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal. While traversing these narrow waterways, vessels reduce their speed, thus making them more vulnerable targets for attack.
The tremors of the Asian economic crisis in Southeast Asia have meant sustained reductions in wages, hikes in food prices, and high unemployment rates-consequently bringing with it a related rise in criminal activities, including piracy.
Insufficient coastline and port surveillance and inspection capacity. Lapses in port security mean attacks and robbery of docked ships is common. This has been the case in Nigeria's major ports and terminals.
Factors such as regional political instability, a systematic tolerance of bribery and nepotism, and loopholes in legal instruments, often encourage the ‘phantom ship' phenomenon. The 2007 IMB report found that organized piracy gangs in the Philippines, Indonesia and China have showed a tendency to seek and receive support, either directly or indirectly, with corrupt elements in government.
Poorly trained or equipped coastguard or local law enforcement in high-risk piracy hotspots.
Although second to economic motivations, sea piracy has also been linked with ideological aims, thus suggesting that piracy can evolve into more deadly forms of maritime terrorism.
Most sea pirate recruits are former fishermen. The civil war that broke out in the 1990s in Somalia and the ensuing incapacity of the central government to clamp down on crime encouraged new pirates, who initially carried out attacks to shelter their fishing resources from foreign ships (denizhaber.com).

Piracy in Somali waters
Located in the Horn of Africa, Somalia is bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Kenya on its southwest, the Gulf of Aden with Yemen on its north, the Indian Ocean at its east, and Ethiopia to the west with a total of 3.025 km of coastline. Although rich in resources such as uranium, iron, copper and tin, the country faces severe poverty due to its messy civil war dating back to the 1990s. With the outbreak of a conflict again in 2006, Somalia was invaded by Ethiopia. A militia loyal to the Islamic Courts Union (or "I.C.U.") seeking to institute Sharia law was toppled by the U.S. and Ethiopia, and the country was left in the grips of chaos. Sea pirates took advantage of the authority gap on the Somali coast and began to launch attacks that put sea based commerce at risk (Kohen, S. "Denizde Terör", [Terror at Sea], Milliyet, 19.11.2008, (Celalettin, Y. 2008; denizhaber.com). The Gulf of Aden, targeted by Somali sea pirates is pictured:
Sixteen thousand ships pass through the Gulf of Aden annually, jointly controlled by Somalia and Yemen. Somali waters and the gulf together account for approximately 2.5 million km. of sea lane (Mahalli, H., 2008). In 2005, there were 35 reported cases of severe attacks in the waters off Somalia; two years later, in 2007, the same waters were host to the highest number of ship hijackings and 154 crew were taken hostage in 11 major attacks. Southeast Asia and particularly Nigeria and Somalia still are targeted by piracy attacks. In 2008, 92 ships were attacked in Somali waters, 36 were hijacked and USD 30 million ransom was paid (dw-world.org; denizhaber.com). The east and northeast coasts are the most dangerous, and ships are advised to sail 200 miles offshore, if they are not planned to deliver at port (Terzi, H., 2008). Three Turkish vessels-the Karagöl, M/V Yasa Neslihan and Bosphorus Prodig--were also hijacked. The hijacked ships are generally taken to the port of Ely in Puntland, the self-declared autonomous region known as a safe haven for pirates, in Somalia's northeast.
The Somali conflict in the 1990s struck a severe blow to the central government's ability to patrol the waters ensuring security and created a power vacuum which was filled by pirate gangs comprised of ex-fishermen, who are considered the brains of the operation due to their knowledge of the ocean waters. Initially, the pirates began operations patrolling their fishing waters against foreign vessels (denizhaber.com), It has even been reported that certain pirate groups were responsible for lending to businessmen in the Puntland state to support its bid in gaining economic autonomy (Anouk, Z, 2008).
Between 3-3.5 million of Somalia's 8 million population faces severe malnourishment. Somali pirates target the UN aid ships carrying food and other supplies to Somali refugees, destructing the agency's ability to deliver the much needed supplies to the poverty-stricken population (Björn, H.; Peters, K., 2008).
The implications and financial losses incurred by sea piracy
Although sea piracy handicaps maritime trade and commerce, there has yet to be a comprehensive and systematic assessment of the financial losses incurred by acts of piracy. The IMB has released figures that put the annual damage to the maritime sector at an estimated USD 1-16 billion. The damages caused by piracy in 2008 are estimated to be between USD 60-70 million. Around USD 150 million was seized as ransom in 2007, and it is estimated that this money was used as investment by pirates for future operations, including arms and equipment purchases (BBC News, 2008).
Especially economically hard hit by piracy are ship owners, exporters of shipped cargo, carriers and insurance firms. In the competitive maritime sector, ship owners are forced to incur a daily loss of about USD 10,000 in port fines during an investigation process. This, coupled with lengthy and cumbersome investigations, high insurance covers and delays mean ship owners do not always report attacks.
The 2002 attack on the French oil tanker Limburg, off the Yemen coast, caused severe setbacks in commerce in the Arabian Sea, with a 90% cutback in container traffic, spikes in insurance costs and delivered a blow to the Yemen economy. The global economic aftershocks of an attack that was carried out on just one of the almost 50,000 merchant vessels that traverse the word's waters is an indication that the necessity of securing the seas is also a guarantee of the global economy (Gürdeniz, C., 2006).
In addition to the grim economic forecasts, piracy also heightens the risk of a major environmental disaster-a risk that is multiplied in the event that pirates become agents of international terrorist networks. Attacks on oil tankers and other vessels carrying hazardous materials will not only disrupt world trade and cause a rise in insurance premiums, but would severely endanger marine life. The shipping sector and its customers are hard hit when cargo is stolen and shipments experience delays; these concerns are escalated further when the large sums of ransom fees are considered.
NATO has stated that since 2008, close to 100 ships were attacked and USD 100 million paid in ransom in the Indian Ocean (CNN-Türk). Somali piracy has forced ships to opt for the Cape of Good Hope instead of the 139 year old Egyptian Suez Canal-a less risky choice for now, but longer and more costly. Comprising 75% of the world's independent tanker fleet, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) has reported that opting for South Africa's Cape of Good Hope has meant a 30% increase in costs (BBC News, 2008). For ship owners, in turn, this has meant a daily loss of USD 20,000-30,000 (tgrthaber.com).
Current Security Measures
Article 100 of UNCLOS on ‘Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy' clearly places importance on the role of international cooperation to combat sea piracy when it states that: "All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State."
The term of duty for the NATO command engaged off Somalia, composed of warships from Canada, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Greece, Holland, Italy, the U.S. and Turkey (the Gokova vessel) expired on December 15, 2008. In December 2008, the EU agreed to deploy six warships and three maritime reconnaissance aircraft in an anti-piracy operation to replace the NATO naval force that had been patrolling the region and escorting cargo ships carrying relief aid to Somalia. The EU also previously agreed to provide naval escorts to protect ships loaded with UN food against piracy, In addition, Russia, Malaysia, and India conduct piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden.
Since piracy off the coast of Somalia jumped by 75%, increased security needs have created a lucrative market for private security firms. These contractors can charge as much as USD 5,000-10,000 daily for escorting merchant fleets in piracy hotspots.
Looking at specific facts paints a grim picture of the progress made thus far: There are 20 warships engaged in anti-piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean. Pirates that initially roamed Somali waters have expanded their reach by 800 km offshore, but the warships can claim control over a radius of only 20 km. An area of 6.5 million km squared (km2) spanning from Pakistan to Kenya needs to be controlled (CNN-Türk). The U.S., with the help of the coastguard, has completely eradicated piracy from its own shores and the Caribbean, but Somalia and the Strait of Malacca continue to present serious setbacks in the fight against piracy (Rigel, A., 2008).
Fleets, coastguards, police marine units, customs and other government agencies engaged in Southeast Asia are taking measures against the piracy threat, and the efforts of the international community and coalition forces have in large part been successful. Southeast Asian countries, Nigeria and Somalia have agreed in principle to collaborate in the face of rising piracy attacks. The collaboration's primary objective is intelligence-sharing, as well as sea and air patrolling coordinated by Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The precautions taken by the Indonesian government in particular have been relatively successful in reducing the number of attacks. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, all coastal states, conduct joint naval patrols. Similarly, improvements were seen in the Malacca Strait, one of the world's most strategic sea lanes and target of intense piracy attacks. With the aid of certain measures, the number of attacks dropped from 32 in 1991 to 5 in 1993; no attacks were reported in 1997 and 1998. Although 1999 saw a spike in violence, there has been a significant decrease since 2004, as has been the case in the straits of Malaysia and Singapore (marisec.org).
On October 9, 2001, NATA launched operation ‘Active Endeavor' enforced by its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED, later renamed SNMG2) to monitor and protect the sea lanes of the Eastern Mediterranean. In March 2004, NATO extended the area of operations to the entire Mediterranean, through which 30% of the world's maritime traffic passes, and invited certain non-NATO nations to participate, including Russia and Ukraine. That no acts of terrorism took place in recent years is evidence that Active Endeavor has reached a notable level of success (Yavuz, C., 2008).
Annually, close to 15 million containers pass through the world's sea lanes, navigating 230 million journeys. In January 2002, the U.S. began implementation of the ‘Container Security Initiative' (CSI) to minimize the threat of any possible terrorist attacks against high-risk containers. Operationalized in a number of ports across Europe, Canada and Asia, CSI essentially screens containers with X-ray and gamma-ray devices. The World Customs Organization, the EU and the G8 have supported resolutions in favor of expanding CSI to include global strategic ports. Despite such encouraging measures, gaps in international procedures to effectively combat piracy still remain. Chief among these are existing restrictions on warships that cripple their effort to effectively pursue pirate ships (Vinci, A., 2008).
The International Marine Organization (IMO) has issued statements calling for a series of new preventative measures, including amending existing resolutions to include sea piracy, which would pave the way for legitimizing military responses against attacks. The IMO also calls on states to undertake the necessary judicial reforms to facilitate the legal trying of sea pirates (denizhaber.com, 2008).
In November 2008, the UN, NATO and the U.S. agreed to take steps towards ensuring the security of sea transportation in the Gulf of Aden, where close to 22,000 ships pass annually. US Department of Defense officials proposed that commercial vessels position armed guards on board(Bijörn; Katharina, P. 2008).
Recommendations to prevent Sea Piracy

Effective physical security infrastructure;
Competency in crisis management;
Operational collaboration between states;
Effective port and coast surveillance and control mechanisms in place;
Security plans prepared for ships, port facilities, coasts and anchorages;
Streamlining of human resources practices to include thorough background review and security checks in shipping firms;
A security chain established from the port of departure to arrival, particularly for high-risk containers;
Technical collaboration for the full implementation of IMO standards and conventions; preparation of piracy incident reports in standard format;
Training of coastline personnel and crew; joint surveillance and patrol between states; effective information gathering and sharing;
Regional and international cooperation to ensure compliance with security measures ;
Effective use of cutting edge technology and technology transfer (ie. Night vision equipment; telecommunications; next-generation radars) ( Top, C., 2008);
Disrupt lines of land and port-sourced logistical support;
Equip ships with Central Identification Friend or Foe for Ship Defense (CIFF-SD) systems which provide data on vessel identity, registration, owner, route, cargo, crew and other vital information. System can be enabled with camera, radar or other technical features;
Developing region-specific security plans, sensitive to port of departure, destination and route (Celalettin, Y. 2008);
Measures taken aboard the vessel to enhance self-defense capability;
Adoption of legislation and legal instruments to govern jurisdiction for instituting legal proceedings against pirates. Installing armed guards on commercial vessels;

Conclusion
After a long absence, the world's seas have once again become the pirate's playground. Piracy is on the rise, especially in Southeast Asia, and is becoming increasingly complex, better organized, and more violent. The Gulf of Aden, where about 20,000 ships pass annually, has seen a startling 300% jump in piracy in 2008. The attacks have forced ships to opt for the more costly and lengthy alternative route of the Suez Canal.
Today's pirates share the same motivations as their predecessors. In order to prevent future and potentially more damaging blows to global commerce, the author's above recommendations for enhancing the security of strategic waterways is critical. Preventing the escalation of piracy into full blown terrorism must be a global priority.
The piracy threat can be dismantled through an integrated and multi-dimensional approach. A collaborate effort by regional actors to solve the problem is step in the right direction. But it is not the only step that must be taken. Persistent challenges such as internal strife, political insecurity, extreme poverty, hunger and unemployment rife in regions known as hotspots for piracy like Somalia, must be addressed by the international community. Only by genuinely tackling the underlying causes that drive up crime rates and piracy-by adopting effective relief, development and sustainable measures to support local economies and pull desperate populations out of the slums of poverty will lasting solutions be reached. This is no longer just a recommendation, but a global necessity.