When, as a result of their colonial activities known as the "Great Game," [1] British India and Imperial Russia confronted each other at the Wakhan Corridor, the spectre of what would have been the First World War loomed large. Fortunately, there was no war. The contestants coexisted. Russia signed a treaty (1891) with Amir Aburrahman that made the Wakhan River the boundary between Afghanistan and Imperial Russia. Sir Mortimer Durand signed a similar treaty for Britain (1893); it made the Durand Line the border between neutral Afghanistan and British India.
The Amu treaty divided the Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen populations so that the tribes north of the Amu fell under Russian, and those in the south under Afghan control. The Durand line divided the Pushtuns so that the southern tribes were included in British India while the northern tribes remained under Afghan authority. Pushtunistan as a whole was denied the possibility of gaining independence. These divisions created a neutral Afghanistan; the British administered its foreign affairs, the Russians its cultural and economic affairs.
Afghanistan has over 100 tribal chiefs and many regional warlords. The latter control Herat, Mazar-i Sharif, Panjsher Valley, and Qandahar. Usually a Pushtun Durrani or Ghilzai leads the Loya Jirgah (Assembly of Tribal Chiefs and Clergy).[2] Once we add the Shi'ite Hazarah chiefs, remnants of Mongolian invaders who settled in central Afghanistan, we have the making of one of the most mismatched groups to ever attempt to build a viable nation. Nevertheless, in 1921, the fledgling Soviet Union assigned itself the task of bringing this unruly population within its fold.
Using the cultural and economic control of Afghanistan, and the good will of the Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen elites, the Soviets assisted King Amanullah (1919-29) to undertake the difficult task of nation building. Amanullah consolidated his rule, gained the independence of Afghanistan, adopted a constitution (1923), and established a Loya Jirgah. He legalized private ownership of land, abolished religious endowments (waqf), and promoted modern agriculture and industry.
The cornerstone of Amanullah's social reforms is the elevation of the status of women and an overhaul of the educational system. He opened many schools taught by foreign teachers and made attendance obligatory. A variety of courses on medicine, agriculture, architecture, home economics, and music were offered, the latter in spite of the vehement protest of the clergy. A large number of students were sent abroad. Amanullah faced stiff opposition when he tried to curtail the authority of the tribal chiefs and the clergy by establishing secular courts of justice; more poignantly, when he insisted that mullahs must be recertified. Nevertheless, he introduced mixed education for boys and girls, banned polygamy, and abolished the burqa.
Initial opposition came from the mullahs, who labelled the reforms as being against the Qur'an and Shari'a law, and called the Amir "an enemy of Allah." Soon the tribal chiefs joined in and demanded full authority over their wives and daughters and the closure of all schools, particularly those for girls. They also demanded that the mullahs should not be recertified.
At an impasse, King Amanullah abdicated (1929) and Bacha Saqaw, a barefoot brigand casually referred to as the son of the water-carrier, became the ruler of Afghanistan. He championed the cause of Islam by fomenting uprisings in the regions adjacent to the northwest frontier. The mullahs, the tribal chiefs who had the pulse of the south in their hands, and the British, supported him. [3] His attempt to install a true Islamic rule in Afghanistan foreshadowed the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the rule of the Taliban.
Bacha Saqaw's rule lasted about six months. He was replaced by Nadir Shah (1929-33) who reaffirmed support for the 1921 and 1923 amity treaties between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Thereafter, cordial relations flourished and Afghanistan became the first non-Communist, Third World nation to receive Soviet aid. Early aid packages included Radio Moscow's broadcasts in Pushtu and the opening of an Afghan/Russian Friendship House.
During the 1950's and 1960's high level visits by heads of state took place. Soviet leaders paid short visits during which they met Afghan leaders, assessed strategic points, and proposed avenues of cooperation. Afghan leaders stayed longer, two or three weeks, and familiarized themselves with the application of Soviet technology to Afghan needs. Aid packages contributed by the Soviets included kits for building a combined flour mill-bakery-granary or for motor repair works or an asphalt factory. Later on, Soviet equipment and trained personnel built major tunnels and roads, such as the famous Salang highway that cuts a four-day Kabul-Mazar-i Sharif journey to one day. [4]
Improvement in Afghan agriculture included not only digging large canals and building dams, but also mechanised farming, building fertiliser plants, and adopting Soviet techniques to Afghan traditions of river valley farming. The development projects of most strategic benefit to the Soviets included a gas pipeline spanning the Amu Dariya, hydroelectric power stations, and airports, including Kabul International.
The objective of the Soviets was three-fold: Afghanistan's neutral stance vis-à-vis the United States and the People's Republic of China; showcasing the viability of Communist International; and maintenance of trade relations with the Afghans. The latter was of special importance to land-locked Afghanistan, particularly during the periods of hostility with Pakistan on the question of Pushtunistan (1950's).
These activities benefited the city of Kabul the most. With its university, colleges, hotels, and elegant houses, it became a true showcase of progress in the region. Even in the back alleys there were Western women on small billboards, advertising eyeglasses. But nowhere was this progress more visible than in the fields of medicine and education, fields that before were under the strict scrutiny of the mullahs and tribal chiefs. In 1961, Afghanistan had 10 universities; 22 colleges; 31 professional schools; 52 high schools; 533 elementary schools; 788 rural schools; and 26 Islamic schools. [5]
The modus vivendi between the Afghans and the Soviets lasted as long as the Soviets built roads, airports, and irrigation canals. But when, during the prime ministership of Daoud Khan (1953-63), communist cells were formed and sacred tenets of Islam-the divinity of Allah, the prophethood of Muhammad, the authority of the Qur'an, and the centrality of prayer-were questioned, the clergy's tolerance gave way to an uncompromising confrontation. Introduction of land reform and emancipation and education of women is what broke the camel's back.
In 1979, the spectre of an Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, supported by Iran, loomed large. Iran's implied intent provided the Soviets with a good reason to move into Afghanistan militarily to safeguard their assets. The move was also consistent with the wishes of Peter the Great who had dreamed of expanding Russia's borders to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. The Soviet invasion devastated the delicate infrastructure they themselves had built, and destroyed the central authority in Kabul. Each clan leader and regional warlord carved out a portion of the country as his own territory and, with the help of his allies among the military ranks and the clergy, became an independent ruler. The Soviet invasion also caused the Americans to come to the aid of Muslim Afghans. American funds, the revival of the Mujahidin core, and the good will of Muslims from around the world, including Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zwahiri, helped the Afghans gain their independence.
Under Gorbachev, the Soviets left Afghanistan. The United States, too, no longer worried about a resurgence of Communism, followed suit. These events deprived the Afghans of any meaningful education. Under the oppressive Mujahidin, the country was plunged into chaos. Their program of de-Sovietisation pitted brother against brother. It removed women from education, the labour force, and all social functions. Entering private homes, raping young women, and looting people's property became routine. Everyone sought prestige, wealth, and satisfaction for himself and his immediate family.
Left alone between hostile India and fundamentalist Mujahidin, Pakistan became worried. What if the Mujahidin decided to export their Islamic fanaticism into Pakistan? The situation had the potential of destabilizing not only Pakistan, but also the already shaky republics of Central Asia. [6] Suddenly, the Taliban, theological students in the refugee camps, appeared as the best hope of Pakistan, and indeed the West, for establishing a moderate Islamic rulership in Afghanistan. Aided by Pakistan, the rag-tag band rose from the Pushtun stronghold of Qandahar (1994) and, within two years, captured the capital city of Kabul. They hung President Najibullah and his brother in the Kabul Public Square and committed atrocities that pale those of the Mujahidin.
The refugee background of the Taliban is noteworthy. The populations of the camps fell into two categories: doctors, teachers, engineers, lawyers, and artists versus destitute people forced by circumstances to find refuge in the camps. After the departure of the Americans, the control of the camps fell to wealthy nations like Saudi Arabia, and rich individuals like Osama Bin Laden. The Saudis promoted strict Wahhabi teachings in schools, community centres and mosques of their own construction. The more enterprising Bin Laden used these schools and centres to groom an elite army of his own, ostensibly to keep the Soviets away but, in reality, ultimately to undermine and topple the Saudi regime. Al-Qaeda, the international face and the cutting edge of the newly formed Taliban state and its network of devotees was created at this time. [7] The Taliban absorbed the disenfranchised (since the Great Game) tribal and regional populations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.
Terrorism commands a peculiar mindset worth scrutinising. The murder of Imam Ali (661) divided the Muslim community into Sunni and Shi'ite sects. The Sunnis followed the rule of the caliphs, while the Shi'ites followed their saints (imam). The Shi'ite line split into Zaidi, Isma'ili (also Sevener), and Twelver Shi'ite. We are concerned with the Isma'ilis, the sect that promoted esoteric teaching to inculcate the necessity of the existence of an imam at all times. They claim that divine knowledge transmitted through the Shi'ite saints resides within the house of Isma'il.
The rise of the Fatimid dynasty (AD 909-1171) in Egypt, especially its propagation of Isma'ili teachings (ta'lim), encouraged the Shi'ites to rise against the oppression of the Sunni caliphs. Using esoteric instruction, they rallied people from all walks of life to their cause: restoration of Islam's rulership to the House of the Prophet.
Hassan-i Sabbah, a native of Ray, hearing the Isma'ili call, travelled to Egypt (1086), received esoteric training, and became an Isma'ili missionary (da'i). Upon his return to Iran, he formalised esoteric teaching into a hierarchy of knowledge at the apex of which were the Prophet and the guardian (wasi), the middle was occupied by the saint (imam) and the grand teacher (hujjat), and the lower ranks by da'is and low-level missionaries (ma'zun). Only the latter two disseminated knowledge at the community level. Trustworthy recruits were directed to learn more from the hujjat and the imam. For the headquarters of his shadow government Hassan chose the inaccessible fortress of Alamut (1090). In the fortress, he created a "paradise" in which women, boys, food, and hashish were placed at the disposal of all those who made the grade. The fort also accommodated his administration, military, and training camps.
Within a short time of Hassan's appearance in Alamut, it was not unusual to meet a person who would draw you in with his extensive knowledge. The magical properties of the number 7 (cf., Seveners) began a conversation that led to salvation and the necessity of the intervention of the imam. The individual was being recruited by a da'i who would refer him to the hujjat to further his knowledge. The political aspect of the teachings detailed the caliph's infringement on the rights of the descendants of the Prophet, [8] and the promise of "paradise" awaiting the truly faithful.
The recruits who experienced Hassan's paradise always wished to experience it again. They could not re-enter that wonderful world, however, before assuring the Hujjat of their unflinching loyalty. Loyalty was shown by the murder of a named, prominent member of the Sunni administration. The murder of Nizam al-Mulk (1092), the powerful wazir of the Seljuqs, is indicative of what the recruits were ready to do.
The word "assassin" comes from the Arabic term hashshashin (consumers of hashish). The recruit was assigned to assassinate a prominent politician. After the deed was done, he was to remain with the murdered figure until he was torn into pieces by the crowd. He did not wish to disappoint either his lord at Alamut, or deprive himself of another glimpse of Paradise.
Rather than unhinged or bloodthirsty, Hassan-i Sabbah was pious and just. He executed his own two sons for transgression. His activities portray him as an individual who was cruel, calculating, decisive, and extremely devoted to the Isma'ili cause. These, therefore, are the questions: Is not Bin Laden a 21st century Sabbah with the Northwest Frontier as his impregnable Alamut? Is not drug trafficking central to his operation? Isn't the al-Qaeda network the 21st century equivalent of the 11th century ring of assassins? Are not the men and women who blow themselves up, guide airplanes into high-rises, and perform beheadings and stoning in public, the equivalent of the stranglers of Syria and stabbers of Persia?
The Mongol onslaught ended the activities of the Assassins (1256). Genghis Khan's grandson, Hulagu, made sure that the last Assassin leader was brought down from the Alamut Mountain. That was the last time the Assassins harmed anyone. Those intent on capturing Bin Laden, too, could have sealed the borders around Tora Bora before subjecting the mountainside to bomb blasts. Additionally, rather than moving their operation to Iraq to topple Saddam, they could have stayed and pressured Pakistan to hand over the outlaw.
The mission of the Taliban and its cutting edge, the al-Qaeda, hinges on directions originally set forth by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837-97). [9] Witnessing the helplessness of the Ottoman Empire, and the Islamic world, against the West, he advocated two remedies: revitalisation of the caliphate (Pan-Islamism) to strengthen Islam's political power, and building a virtuous city (madinat al-fazila) to return to research in scientific fields. Pan-Islamism and the revitalisation of the caliphate became the responsibility of al-Qaeda; while research in scientific fields (cf., the current study of the Qur'an and the ahadith) fell on the Taliban! The original mission has been altered to suit 21st century realities: It is to employ the West's technological advances for the recreation of the caliphate on the ashes of the Islamic governments sustained by the West and, should the opportunity occur, on the ashes of the West itself. [10] This, of course, is not what al-Afghani had hoped for. He visualised his "Virtuous City," as a hierarchically structured society that, on the one hand, functioned on the principles of shame, trustworthiness, and truthfulness, and, on the other, aspired to the ideals of intelligence, pride, and justice. Higher intelligence, al-Afghani argued, leads to new capabilities and advanced civilisations; pride leads to competition and progress; and justice leads to global peace and harmony among nations.
Al-Afghani knew very well that the 13th century condemnation of philosophy rested at the core of Islam's inability to stand shoulder to shoulder with the West. Were it not for Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who retained reason within the Christian framework as a handmaid of theology; today, the West, too, would not have experienced its Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Industrial Revolution. Islam and the West that stand in such stark contrast would have been standing on level ground. Once deprived of the wealth of their own invention, the Muslims resorted to imitation of the West. When imitation proved unsatisfactory, they turned against the West. Today, rather than on the path to a logical solution to their problems, they find themselves on the path to self-destruction.
The leaders of al-Qaeda are aware of their need to return to scientific thinking. The manuals recovered from their hiding places indicate that. The Taliban, however, have been, and continue to be unable to fulfil their task of educating knowledgeable individuals to fill the ranks. To compensate for this, the al-Qaeda turns to the West. It is the responsibility of the stewards of the welfare of the West to deny al-Qaeda the professionals-doctors, engineers, and professors-it seeks. That would automatically deny it access to lower level recruits, i.e., advisors, teachers, coaches, and coordinators who direct university students in various disciplines and control the high schools. This is not to mention access to educated blue- and white-collar workers, their families, and the mosque crowd at large.
An analysis of global efforts to combat terrorism indicates that much of this has already been accomplished. The next crucial stage is to enlighten Muslims to the true nature and values of Islam. There is nothing in the Shari'a that precludes the study of intellectual sciences. In fact, intellectual sciences are a prerequisite to a better understanding of the Qur'an and the ahadith. This statement is not new. It was made in the 16th century by the famous philosopher and theologian Mullah Sadra Shirazi. [11]
The individuals who blow themselves up are helpless slaves. They are confined to dingy rooms, forced to memorise the Qur'an, and learn how to blow themselves and others up. The West, for its own sake, must redirect the dynamics of global education in the outlying regions to its pre-al-Qaeda standards (cf., Afghanistan circa 1960's). Combating ignorance, in regions that have been neglected for a century, is a colossal task. It needs an army of dedicated directors, coordinators, and teachers, but only a fraction of the funds spent in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Otherwise, the Taliban will continue to draw on the ignorance of people and the wealth of nations to further their cause. They will whittle down the will power of their host by creating undue hardships, and only then bring the coup de grace (cf., the rise of Islam in the context of the weakened empires of Rome and Persia).
Western progress is based on the efforts of Plato and Aristotle and the contributions of Plotinus, St. Augustine, St. Aquinas, and many others. Harmonising scientific thinking with the dictates of the divine, they created an enviable society that lives at once in a city on the hill, and among the amenities afforded by 21st century science and technology. Muslims, too, could live in similar circumstances if they would choose to build their society on the contributions of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, al-Biruni, and Mullah Sadra. In the 16th century, equating Islamic Shari'a with intellectual endeavour, Sadra advocated the need for reason-based studies for the well being of Islamic societies. Echoing Sadra at the close of the 19th century, Al-Afghani reiterated the same call to reason only to be misinterpreted and misrepresented. Let us place ourselves in the shoes of the child in the dingy room, seeking instant entrance into paradise, and judge which needs instruction, the student or the teacher? Only when Muslim leaders grasp the true import of the teachings of al-Afghani and Mullah Sadra will they be able to teach the true meaning of Islam. Was it not St. Augustine who lamented in Confessions: What can I learn from teachers who themselves are limited in understanding?

Department of History
University of Minnesota
© Iraj Bashiri, 2008

[1] For the Great Game, see Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Duke University Press, 1983, pp. 9, 15.
[2] For the ethnic structure of Afghanistan, see Hassan Kawun Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, University of Texas Press, 1979.
[3] For a comprehensive study of the rule of Bacha Saqaw, see Vartan Gregorain, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization 1880-1946, Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 275-92.
[4] For a comprehensive study of these exchanges, see Charles B. McLane. Soviet-Asian Relations, Columbia University Press, 1973, pp. 11-23.
[5] See Mir Ghulam Muhammad Ghubar, Afghanistan dar Masiri Tarikh, (Afghanistan in History), Markazi Nashri Inqilab, 1981, p.15-16; see also Kakar, op. cit, pp. 150-63.
[6] For the crucial role that nuclear rich Pakistan plays in the region, see Eric Margolis, War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet, Routledge, 2001, pp. 101-11.
[7] For the political and military structure of the Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid. Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, 2000.
[8] A. E. Bertles, Nasir Khusrau va Isma'ilian (Nasir Khusrau and the Isma'ilis, tr. I. Arin), Iran Cultural Foundation, 1968, pp.202-12.
[9] See Iraj Bashiri, "Jamal al-Din al-Afghani," Great Lives from History, Frank N. Magill (ed.), Salem Publishers, 1990, pp. 1149-54.
[10] For the struggle to establish a global Islamic state based on an interpretation of the Qur'an, see Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam, Harvard University Press, 2002.
[11] See Mullah Sadra Shirazi, Al-Asfar (sojourns), vol. 4/2, Mowla Publishers, 2007, pp. 212-13.