The Persian Gulf region is one of the main new markets that has opened to Russian arms exports since 1991. The Soviet Union provided significant quantities of arms to Iran and Iraq; but of the conservative Arabic regimes, Kuwait was the sole Soviet partner in this sphere of activity. The other "oil monarchy" governments for political reasons were strongly set against cooperation with the USSR. The USSR had not even established diplomatic relations with the majority of members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) until the last years of its existence: with Oman in 1985, Qatar in 1988, Bahrain in 1990, and with Saudi Arabia only in 1991.
Decisive factors promoting improved relations between Moscow and the Gulf Cooperative Countries included the elimination of communist ideological expansion as an element of Soviet foreign policy, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which forced Kuwait's Gulf allies to seek the broadest possible international support and to isolate Iraq from the USSR. The position adopted by the USSR, which amounted to de facto support for the anti-Iraq coalition, prompted the Arabic monarchies to pay greater attention to the USSR, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and the initiation of military-technical cooperation with a range of states in the region.
RUSSIAN ARMS DELIVERIES TO KUWAIT
After the collapse of the Soviet Union this same foreign policy orientation led the Kuwaiti government to ramp up its military-technical relations with post-communist Russia. In February 1993 the two parties signed a memorandum of mutual understanding in the military sphere, which allows for deliveries of Russian arms to the emirate and joint consultations in case of threats to the stability and security of Kuwait itself or the region as a whole. In essence, this agreement is analogous to similar agreements aimed at deepening military relations signed by the USA and West European countries with the Arabic monarchies from the 1950s to the 1990s. Joint Kuwaiti-Russian naval exercises took place under this agreement in December 1993. In August 1994 Russia signed the first comprehensive contract for the delivery to Kuwait of 122 BMP-3, its most modern infantry fighting vehicle (Kurgan Machine-Building Plant), and 27 9A52 Smerch 300 mm multiple launch rocket systems (Motovilikhinskie Plant and Shtamp Plant in Tula). The total value of these contracts amounted to $762.6 million.
As of May 1996 the Russian MOD established a permanent representation with the Kuwaiti MOD. Kuwait apparently paid the Russian MOD over $3.5 million for the services of ten military advisors from 1999 to 2002.
In 2000 the Russian state company Promeksport signed a contract for the delivery to Kuwait of parts for the Smerch multiple launch rocket system for $12.9 million, and in January 2001 the state company Rosoboroneksport concluded an agreement to deliver from 2001-2002 ammunition for the Smerch multiple launch rocket system and the BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles for a total price of $156.7 million.
The political dimension of the Kuwait purchases of Russian arms, designed to secure Russian support in case of a conflict with Iraq, is confirmed by the fact that the Kuwait government for the first time also began to make arms purchases from another permanent member of the UN Security Council: the People's Republic of China. From 2000 to 2003 China supplied the Kuwait army with 54 PZL45 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, the same number of PCZ45 ammunition resupply vehicles on the same chassis, and 10 command posts and fire-control vehicles on armoured carrier chassis for a total cost of $387 million.
The unpaid 1991 Soviet debt to Kuwait was another factor affecting relations with Russia. It was not until May 2006 that an intergovernmental agreement on the debt's settlement was reached. Of the total $1.7 billion owed, Kuwait agreed to cancel interest penalties amounting to $400 million, and Russia agreed to pay the principal of $1.1 billion in cash over the course of five years. The interest of $600 million would be paid over the course of five years in the form of "mechanical-technical products," taken to mean arms deliveries. However, there has been no published evidence of any actual contracts under this agreement, or of any transfers of Russian armaments.
Apparently, over the past few years Russia has offered Kuwait deliveries of air defence systems and BMP-3M modified infantry fighting vehicles, as well as modernization previously delivered BMP-3 vehicles.
RUSSIAN ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)
It is generally thought that Russian military-technical cooperation with the UAE began with the notable contract for BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles concluded in 1992, just a few months after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, already in 1987, the UAE army purchased a set of 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems from the USSR.
Negotiations on the delivery of BMP-3 to the UAE with the USSR began right after the end of the first Gulf War, and the testing of four vehicles was conducted in Abu-Dhabi in August 1991. The first contract in 1992 envisaged the delivery to Abu Dhabi of 250 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles produced at the Kurgan Machinebuilding Plant, and were the first BMP-3 to be exported. A larger contract for the delivery of 402 BMP-3 for the army of another emirate, Dubai, followed in 1994. The total value of all contracts for the BMP-3, related vehicles and armaments has never been officially published, but is usually estimated in the Russian press as surpassing $1 billion. According to Kurgan Machinebuilding Plant executives, negotiations are underway with the UAE to establish a joint venture offering turnkey full repairs of all versions of the BMP-3 fleet.
The UAE army highly values the performance of the BMP-3, and in 2004 undertook a so-called "program for modernization to 2012" that envisages, in the first phase, the modernization of the BMP-3 in five aspects: the installation of an automatic gearbox, an automatic anti-tank missile loader, a rear-view chamber, updated fire-control and driver observation systems, and fume reduction systems.
In 1999 the Tula Instrument Design Bureau delivered a batch of 9K129 Kornet-E (AT-14) anti-tank missile systems with 9M133 guided anti-tank missiles. The Russian press reported on technical problems that arose during the fire testing of Kornet-E systems in the Emirates. Nevertheless, the UAE clearly maintained its interest in the system. In 2004 the Kolomenskoe Machinebuilding Design Bureau demonstrated the Kvartet, a quadruple launcher version at the Paris arms exhibition, with Kornet-E system 9M133 guided anti-tank missiles, mounted on the French Panhard VBL light armoured vehicle, and it is thought that this version was designed specifically for the Emirates.
In February 2007 Rosoboroneksport signed a contract to deliver a batch of infantry armaments for over $50 million, including small arms, ammunition, RPG-29 Vampir anti-tank rocket launchers and an additional number of Kornet-E anti-tank missile systems. Earlier reports in 2006 told of negotiations relating to the delivery of the 120 mm 2B16 Nona-K towed combination mortar/gun.
According to published reports, the UAE is highly interested in the Iskander-E (SS-26) short-range ballistic missile system with a maximum range of 280 km.
Likewise, Russian aviation has yet to show any success in the UAE. Negotiations on the possible delivery of 24 Sukhoy Su-39 (Su-25TM) attack fighters concluded with no results in the early 1990s. In November 2005 the deputy director of the MiG Russian Aircraft Corporation Vladimir Vypriazhkin said his company was negotiating to establish the licensed production of a new MiG-AT trainer jet in Egypt and the UAE, though in the end this proposal did not make the list of either UAE tenders for basic and advanced trainers in 2006.
RUSSIAN DELIVERIES OF ARMS TO OMAN, BAHRAIN AND QATAR
Russia's military-industrial cooperation with these three countries has not developed broadly. In our view this is due to the almost complete orientation of the local political and military elite towards the West, and the absence of any serious political stimulus towards development of relations with Russia, including in the military sphere. The US and the UK continue to dominate the three states as the main suppliers of arms. The unresolved issue of Russian debt to Qatar poses an additional complication.
The first Russian delivery to Oman had a dubious character: in 1992 six T-72S main battle tanks produced by Uralvagonzavod were sent to that country. These vehicles were not taken in service by the armed forces of Oman, but rather, as far as one can tell, by the intelligence service of some Western country with the purpose of studying modern examples of Soviet and Russian armaments.
The Russian press later reported sporadically on the maintenance of certain "contacts" with Oman in the military-technical sphere, but no details were ever forthcoming. It would appear that a few insignificant batches of arms and ammunition for the land forces were delivered.
The only significant known contracts with Qatar and Bahrain are the delivery to these countries of the newest all wheel Mustang family drive trucks produced by KAMAZ. In 2004 Rosoborneksport supplied Bahrain with 40 KamAZ-4350 double axel trucks for $1.1 million, and Qatar with 500 KamAZ-6350, KamAZ-5350 (6x6) and KamAZ-6350 (8x8) for a total price of $20.1 million. It would seem that these purchases were motivated by the low prices of the Russian trucks relative to the analogous offerings of Western suppliers.
FUTURE MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND SAUDI ARABIA
Until recently Russia and Saudi Arabia had not maintained any sort of military relations, and even political relations between the both countries have been cool. The ultra conservatism of the Saudi regime and Saudi views of Russian actions in "Muslim" Chechnya are the main reasons for this. Some shift in Saudi policy towards Russia became evident after the events of 11 September 2001, when the West came to view Saudi Arabia with more suspicion with respect to the latter's position as a willing or unwilling source of Islamic radicalism. In its attempts to define alternatives to its pro-Western orientation, including in the military sphere, the Saudi rulers began to foster relations with Russia. They showed interest in purchasing Russian arms, especially since the US, the main supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia, has traditionally maintained a policy of limiting Saudi access to the most modern types of arms, for fear of creating a threat to Israel.
Like Kuwait and the UAE, Saudi Arabia has shown the greatest interest in the acquisition of Russian tank technology. Over the last few years Rosoboroneksport has been conducting negotiations on the possible sale to Saudi Arabia of 150 T-90S main battle tanks. In August 2005 one T-90S tank was successfully tested in Saudi Arabia, covering 1500 km while firing tests. President Vladimir Putin's visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2007 included discussions on military-technical cooperation. The main points of discussion included the possible delivery of 150 T-90S tanks for $1 billion, as well as a batch of BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles and armoured personnel carriers (probably the BTR-80A). Sergey Chemezov, the Director General of Rosoboroneksport, made an official announcement to this effect. However, this contract has not yet been signed.
According to the estimates of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), "this deal would have a greater importance than the mega-contracts in the military-technical sphere with Venezuela ($3 billion) and Algeria (over $7 billion), because it would not only crack open the biggest market in the world but also give Russia's relations with the most important Islamic state a new dimension, including on security matters."
It has also been reported that Saudi Arabia is interested in the S-300PMU-2 (SA-20) and S-400 (SA-21) air defence missile systems, the Tor-M1 (SA-15) and Pantsyr-S1 (SA-22) air defence system, the Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters, and special forces armaments. However, one must presume that the path towards concluding any such deliveries to Saudi Arabia will be long and difficult for Russia.

Conclusion
The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation were never leading suppliers of arms to the markets of the six conservative oil monarchies of the CCASG, which maintained pro-Western orientations. The USSR sold its arms to Kuwait alone among these countries, and on the eve of collapse penetrated the arms market of the United Arab Emirates. After 1991, Russia continued military cooperation with Qatar and intensified its relations with the UAE, but scored no such victories with the remaining countries, including the wealthiest, Saudi Arabia.

The total value of contracts for the delivery of Russian arms to the states of the CCASG can be estimated at $3.6 billion, of which the UAE accounts for $2.5 billion and Qatar for $1 billion, with no more than $100 million going to the remaining four countries -- an entirely insignificant proportion of the military sales to this group of states. It suffices to note that, according to the research arm of the US Congress, the six states of the CCASG signed contracts for the purchase of arms totalling $39 billion from 1998-2005, of which $21.6 billion was from the USA. To this one could add that Saudi Arabia alone contracted with the USA and France arms purchases for $13 billion. Thus, Russian deliveries to the region are quite insignificant in terms of their dollar value.

This becomes even more apparent if we recall that the principal deliveries to the UAE from Russia took place in the 1990s (BMP-3 vehicles and the Smerch multiple launch rocket systems), while the number of contracts concluded after 2001 is really quite small, and by our estimates worth no more than $300 million when added together.

One must therefore speak not of an increase, but rather of the decline in the role of Russian arms deliveries to the Persian Gulf region in the new century. The ongoing delivery to the UAE of the Pantsir-S1 air defence system is currently the most important agreement being implemented. Deliveries of the BMP-3 vehicles have finished, and new contracts for armoured equipment or for the modernization of previously delivered M-84AB tanks or BMP-3 have not been secured. Moreover, Russian exports of arms and military equipment to the CCASG since 1992 have been almost exclusively for the land forces. The relative cost of such equipment is in principle quite low. Russia's inability to promote its aviation technology (currently the most expensive type of armament) to the six states is the main factor determining the relatively low figures for its arms trade with the Persian Gulf region.

At the same time the markets of the CCASG are extremely important for Russia. Although our estimates put the total volume of Russian deliveries to these states accounts for only 5% of total Russian arms exports over the past 15 years, one must not forget either the importance of the political aspects of these deliveries, or the high purchasing power of the CCASG states. In economic terms arms deliveries to these states is highly profitable, and the prestige value to Russian suppliers of purchases by these respectable, Western oriented "oil monarchies" is very high. Finally, Kuwait and the UAE have hastened to purchase the most advanced Russian defence systems, like the BMP-3, and in volumes that played a direct role in the survival of the producers of these systems - the Kurgan Machinebuilding Plant and the Tula Instrument Design Bureau. The creation of the Pantsyr-S1 by the Tula Instrument Design Bureau, financed by the UAE, in spite of all the associated problems, was uniquely valuable to Russia, allowing for the creation of a cardinally new type of armament for both export and internal military use, all paid for with the money of "rich Arabs."

It would seem that Russia's position as a supplier of arms to the countries of the CCASG remains uncertain, and is presently at a critical juncture. The best scenario for Russia, after the pause of recent years, would be to secure a new wave of contracts with the countries of the region. This would require new, large-scale commissions from Kuwait and the UAE (including deliveries of new equipment and modernization of old), as well as a historical breakthrough to the defence market of Saudi Arabia. Agreements to create an air defence system for the UAE on the basis of the S-400 air defence missile system, to modernization the BMP-3 already purchased by the UAE and Kuwait, the acquisition by Gulf States of modern Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles, and the purchase by Saudi Arabia of T-90S tanks, BMP-3s, armoured personnel carriers, helicopters and Russian air defence systems would be key to Russian success in this area. The opportunities for space cooperation the with states of the region are also important for Russia.

But in any case Russia will remain for the foreseeable future a secondary and niche supplier of arms to the states of the CCASG, behind the big three Western suppliers - the US, UK and France - in terms of the dollar value of deliveries.

To a large extent, the future of Russia's military-technical cooperation with the states of the CCASG continues to depend on political circumstances. Paradoxically, the recent worsening of relations between the regime of President Vladimir Putin with Western countries will only increase the interest of Gulf states to cooperate with Putin's Russia. Such leading players in the CCASG like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are clearly troubled by the excessive influence of the USA on their armed forces and determined to diversify their sources of military supply and defence policy options as a whole. This tendency is evident in the purchasing policy of the UAE, whose purchase of the BMP-3 was clearly motivated by a desire to diversify its sources of armaments. The same intent has been demonstrated by Saudi Arabia, and by turning to Russia for arms purchases (or even the threat of such purchases), the conservative Arab regime is able to put pressure on Western countries with the aim of securing more favourable treatment in terms of military cooperation, including access to more modern Western arms.

Thus, Russia's current "anti-Western drive" makes it a more attractive partner for the most valuable and rich potential importers of arms on the Arab Peninsula. One might expect the Russian leadership and the politically sophisticated Rosoboroneksport to take full advantage of this situation in the region.