On 31 August 2009 Turkey and Armenia formally launched a process aiming to establish diplomatic relations and open the shared border with the initialling of two protocols under the meditation of Switzerland. The ministers of foreign affairs of both states made public that Turkey and Armenia had agreed to start their internal political consultations on the "Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations" and the "Protocol on the development of bilateral relations" which lay the foundation for the normalisation of bilateral relations. Whether long-standing obstacles to rapprochement between these two states can be overcome and how the bid to ‘reset' these relations will fare will become more clear in the coming weeks.
It would be helpful to look at the agreed timetable that was revealed as part of the talks before going into to the details of the protocols, since it provides the framework for the concrete steps that are expected to be taken by both sides as the process moves forward.
From the onset, it was stated that internal political consultations would last six weeks, at which point the protocols are expected to be signed. The documents will be presented to political party leaders in Turkey and Armenia and sent to the parliaments of both states, kicking off a ratification process. In a news conference on 30 September upon his return from New York to discuss the UN General Assembly meetings and next month's foreign policy calendar, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said the protocols to normalize relations with Armenia would be signed before the soccer game between the Turkish and Armenian national teams on October 14.
According to the timetable, the protocols would come into effect on the first day of the first month following the exchange of the ratification documents. The border will open two months after the protocols become effective.
The basis for the negotiations leading to the current turning point in relations started in September 2007 in Switzerland, and now the protocols are seen to signify a landmark moment between the two states whose relations have been defined by long-standing tensions. What the documents entail and their intended consequences merit closer scrutiny. While public opinion in Turkey and Armenia responded to the announcement of the protocols and what this could mean for their future on somewhat different terms, what is certain is that Azerbaijan has been observing the developments with tempered anxiety. The Armenian diaspora, especially in the United States and Europe, have been vocalizing criticism over the content of the protocols.
The first protocol deals with establishing diplomatic relations and foresees the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two states. Under the framework of the protocol, both Turkey and Armenia commit themselves to "respect and ensure respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, in their bilateral and international relations." Regarding the shared border, the protocol states that the parties confirm "the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by relevant treaties of international law." Yerevan avoided direct reference to the Kars treaty here in order to fend off possible reactions from the Armenian public. Nonetheless, "the relevant treaties of international law" essentially must mean the Moscow and Kars treaties since there is no other treaty concerning the border between the two states. Further clinching the agreement on the matter is the stated commitment to respect the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers by the parties, thus restating the recognition of the existing border.
Additionally, both states reaffirm their commitment to "condemning all forms of terrorism, violence and extremism irrespective of their cause, pledging to refrain from encouraging and tolerating such acts and to cooperate against them." By ratifying the protocols, the Yerevan government will have guaranteed to Turkey that it will treat PKK elements in Armenia as terrorists.
The second protocol, namely the "Protocol on the development of bilateral relations", aims for the improvement of relations between Turkey and Armenia in a number of areas of joint interest. With a view towards expanding future cooperation, the ministers of foreign affairs of both states are expected to meet regularly for consultations. In addition, the protocol foresees the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions to carry out the wide-ranging commitments set forth in the protocol. Importantly, this includes a sub-commission, with the inclusion of Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international experts, to undertake an "impartial scientific examination" of what has been termed the "historical dimension."
There is little doubt that the most significant issue in the protocol concerns the "historical dimension"-what is meant by this phrase are the events before and after the Armenian emigration in 1915-and the formation of the related sub-commission. As it is well known, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan had sent a letter on 14 April 2005 to then-President of Armenia Kocaryan on the issue of convening a scientific investigation into the genocide claims. In the letter, Erdoğan proposed "a study on the events and developments in 1915 by a group of historians and other experts composed of not only Turks and Armenians, but also third parties, and to disclose the findings of the research group to the public." However, there has not been any further development on this recommendation since then. The protocol states that the sub-commission for the historical dimension would investigate historical records and archives through an impartial scientific examination with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations. The goal of the sub-commission is to identify existing problems and prepare recommendations for their resolution.
The second protocol also foresees cooperation in other areas such as transportation, communication, energy, protection of cultural heritage, consular issues, trade, tourism, economy, environmental problems and science and education and exchange of students and experts. The parties agreed to establish an "inter-governmental bilateral commission" and sub-commissions for the realisation of the above objectives.
The most debated issue regarding the protocols from Turkey's perspective is not about what they say, so much as what they do not. The problem of Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupation of Azerbaijani territory, which caused the initial closure of the border between Turkey and Armenia in 1993, after Turkey objected to Armenia's war with Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Karabakh, is noticeably absent from the draft protocols. Since Turkey's involvement in the Karabakh dispute is indirect, that there is no reference to the contentious issue in the protocols is understandable. However, the Karabakh problem is an irrefutable part of the protocols' back-story. The reason is that Turkey earlier offered a guarantee to Azerbaijan that unless this thorny problem is resolved, normalization of relations with Armenia would not go forward and the border would remain sealed. What is meant by the "resolution of the Karabakh issue" is not a solve-all political settlement, but a phased process of reconciliation, which would likely continue for many years. The stages of this process would entail the withdrawal of Armenian forces from seven Azerbaijani provinces that surround Karabakh; the return of Azerbaijani refugees to their homes; the opening of the Lachin corridor that connects Karabakh to Armenia; the deployment of an international peace force; and the determination of the status of Karabakh. So as the situation stands, talk of a resolution of the Karabakh problem does not rest on the expectation of an immediate settlement, but instead entails, at the first instance at least, reaching an agreement over the future course of the peace process by both sides. At the moment, parties are still working on the document called the Madrid Principles, which was the result of the Minsk Group's mediation efforts. If Azerbaijan and Armenia were to sign such a document, Turkey could consider this as sufficient cause for the opening of the border.
Another issue that protects Azerbaijan's interests against Armenia is hidden in the protocols. Although the Karabakh problem appears to be a regional dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the continuing Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory is actually an international problem. Reference to principles of equality in bilateral and international relations, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders and agreement on the recognition of the borders of neighbours necessitates Armenia to recognise Turkey and Azerbaijan's borders and withdraw from the occupied territories.
Speculation over how the protocols might affect the Armenian occupation of Karabakh will not go away any time soon. The OSCE Minsk Group, under the joint presidency of the US, France and Russia have been trying to resolve the Karabakh problem for a long time. Turkey also has a say in the Minsk Group, but has been seeking ways to play a more active role. If the protocols come into force and Turkey-Armenia relations are normalised, Turkey would have more initiative over the Karabakh problem and its role in the region would become more significant.
In case of normalisation of relations with Armenia, Turkey would see other benefits of this diplomatic achievement. For example, Turkey would be able to finally overcome, in more concrete terms, the annual "24 April" syndrome in its relations with the US. For years, Turkish diplomatic efforts have aimed to rebut with scientific data the description of 1915 events as genocide. Turkey's efforts, made through its scientists and archive documents, often remain unanswered. The most important reason for this is the Armenian diaspora's lobby activities. If the protocol came into force, the commission which would be set up according to the mutual agreement of both states would consist of scientists and experts and be required to investigate the historical events systematically, with scientific rigor and impartiality. In such a case, the genocide issue would be examined by a commission based on the mutual approval of both states, and this would render unilateral decisions taken by foreign parliaments or statements made by leaders condemning Turkey without any evidence, useless.
Opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia, following parliamentary approval of the protocols, and establishment of diplomatic relations would support peace, security and stability in the region. The protocols initiated a historical process. Turkey, moving forward from the principle of "zero problem with its neighbours" took a significant step toward the establishment of stability in the Caucasus.
When the border with Turkey, seen as a vital lifeline for Armenia, opens, the possibility of expanded trade comes into unprecedented proximity for Yerevan. The green light from Turkey on cooperation with Armenia in international and regional organisations, and specifically within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the BSEC, has been interpreted as a sign that Turkey would abstain from using its veto power against Armenia. In doing so, Turkey, which has been able to draw more international attention lately for its role in the energy sector, also sends the signal that it will not by-pass Armenia in future energy projects.
The protocols have generated heated debate in both states since their announcement. There is an interesting convergence in the comments and criticisms that are being vocalized on both sides of the border: the opposition parties in both Turkey and Armenia are in solidarity and agree that the protocols are unacceptable, though obviously for different reasons.
The issue of withdrawal from Karabakh comes at the top of the Armenian opposition parties' agenda. Other points stirring discontent are over the recognition of current frontiers and leaving the genocide claims up to the commission. The Armenian opposition argues that relations should start without any pre-conditions.
The Armenian community in the United States opposes the protocols, while the reaction among the diaspora in Europe has been little different. Diaspora organisations, which were perhaps shaken that Yerevan took the decision to move forward on the protocols without consulting with them, argue that the establishment of the history commission will put the project of "imposing the Armenian genocide" into jeopardy.
But despite the strong opposition from diaspora and opposition parties, normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia is important for Yerevan. Reconciliation with Turkey stands as the only way for Armenia to escape from its current situation. For the past few years, Armenia has been experiencing touch economic times and was left out of most of the region's important projects; therefore, the prospect of normalization with Ankara is an appealing and necessary move for Yerevan in many ways. Armenia, which does not have natural resources and sea access, is stuck between Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Sarkisyan administration sat down at the negotiation table with Ankara aware that progress on establishing economic relations with the outside world could no longer be put on hold and unlike frustrated opposition parties, it seems hopeful of the recent diplomatic steps which are seen as a way forward to improve the country's regional standstill.
As is expected with any political undertaking that has the potential to rattle the status-quo, there are risks involved with the ratification of the protocols.
First, should the protocols fail to yield positive results, Turkey will be accused of making too many concessions without receiving anything in return, while backtracking from its commitment to defend the Karabakh issue. As a result, Turkey could lose Azerbaijan's confidence, damage its credibility and seriously undermine this relationship. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Turkey has considered its national interests throughout the course of this process of rapprochement with Armenia, while at the same time trying to expand its influence in the region and have more say over the Karabakh peace process. Turkey, which froze its relations with Armenia due to the occupation of Azerbaijani territory, will not become a part of any solution that does not take Azerbaijan's interests into consideration.
Another strategic risk for Turkey may arise if the process is poorly managed or if despite recent improvements in the climate of relations, Armenia refuses to back down from its occupation and fails to honour the foreseen commitments presented in the protocols. As a result, if Turkey finds itself in a position where politically speaking, it cannot ratify the protocols, this may lead to a situation where Armenia and the Armenian diaspora find it easier to portray Turkey as the side responsible for the stalled reconciliation process and put the blame on Ankara. A new wave of accusatory rhetoric and lobbying activity against Turkey by the diaspora would nullify the value of the painstaking effort made up until this point. The result would be increased mistrust between the parties and an escalation of regional tension. If the protocols, which are the building blocks for the normalisation of relations between Turkey and Armenia, fail to achieve the desired result, this could cause a deepening of animosity and disagreement between the two states.
How the protocols will impact the wider challenges facing the region depends on how the current process will progress and the ensuing outcomes that emerge. The process has been criticised because Turkey is seen by some to have been rushed into agreeing to a timetable and target date for ratification. However, before criticising the pace of the process now underway, we must turn back and look at all the years spent in deadlock. Rather than maintaining a wait and see approach and settling for a non-solution, it would be better to take calculated risks, which could take both sides closer to an eventual resolution of longstanding issues. It is possible that rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia could encourage a positive turn of events between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and could even be a harbinger of long awaited stability in the South Caucasus.
From this point forward, progress can only be achieved through sustained mutual commitment. For its part, Turkey seems to be on its way to fulfilling its responsibilities. Armenia's approach to moving the reconciliation process forward is critical in determining its ultimate success.
Oya Eren is an expert at the Center for Eurasian Studies (Avrasya Incelemeleri Merkezi - AVIM) . She may be contacted at oeren@avim.org.tr.