The parameters of the ‘security' concept, much like the international order itself, is shaped by systemic conditions, regional and global dynamics and balance of power politics. In the Gulf region, security is still overwhelmingly defined from a realist perspective, colored with a Cold War style state-centrist and military focus. Putting it another way, security in the Gulf is very much still synonymous with the State, with an over-reliance on the military aspects of security and conventional threat analysis. The leaning towards heavy arms build-up and measures to bolster military muscle has become a permanent feature of the Gulf's defense environment. In short, in the Gulf, defense is defined with three buzzwords, state, military, and threat. The securitization of Gulf oil is another fact that emerges from the region-that is, oil coming into its own as a security issue and concern. The U.S. has had a major role in the securitization of Gulf oil, so much so that the region's energy security policies acutely meet U.S. and Western interests. In many ways, energy securitization is a U.S. invention, and essentially means the undisrupted, secure flow of relatively cheap Gulf oil to Western markets. This then has positioned the ‘Gulf' as a geopolitical and geo-economic concept.
Under the sway of an externally imposed role for itself, the Gulf has failed to break away from traditional definitions of the enemy and military threats; this in turn presented arms build-up as the only security option. This has resulted in a security dilemma among Gulf states, rocking already shaking stability and giving rise to new chasms of potential regional conflict. Another notable feature of the national security environment in the Gulf is that it has become increasingly internationalized. This means that external influence has as much of a role, if not more, in setting the regional security agenda, as the Gulf states themselves. Essentially, the U.S. military footprint in the Gulf has been behind this internationalization. The foremost reason for U.S. involvement in the Gulf is its substantial energy reserves. Combined, these dynamics have created a phenomenon of mutual regional-global security dependency, with lasting impact on any regional security architecture. If these factors are ignored, any regional security mechanism is bound to fail, as may be the fate of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In truth, the Gulf does not face an immediate and overwhelming security threat that justifies the scale of the arms build-up and sense of urgency in its security environment. Far from being a genuine regional reality, these figure more prominently as the features of a foreign policy cooked up by the U.S.
The Energy Factor
With 50% of global petroleum and 40% of natural gas reserves, it is no secret that the Gulf carries great geo-strategic worth. Its vast energy resource makes the Gulf a power-engine behind the global economy and draws the attention of the world's major players to the region. A downside of this attention has been the major power struggles carried out over Gulf oil-stigmatizing the region in a way, as a volatile and unstable area. In a region where eight wars erupted in just ten years, instability and conflict have in some ways become the unfortunate norm. Gulf oil is both a source of unrest in the Gulf, as well as a guarantor of existing regimes and their claim to legitimacy and the ‘right to arm'. Ironically, investing petro-dollars in arms deals with the West under the pretense of defense has actually made Gulf states less safe, not more; the region a magnet for instability, not a stable corner of the Middle East. It seems that the conflict is unlikely to subside until the petroleum is depleted.
Lead Actors in the Gulf's Security Environment: The U.S., Iran and regional structures
In general terms, the main features of U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf have remained unchanged throughout its involvement in the region. Chief among these is the U.S.'s self-declared dominant role as guarantor of energy security for the transatlantic world, ensuring the stable flow of cheap and reliable oil to the U.S. and European markets. Preventing the rise of a strong-minded and iron-willed hegemon in the region, safeguarding U.S.-friendly allies and encouraging the emergence of new ones, have been the main features of U.S Gulf policy. In the 1970s, the U.S. role in the Gulf relied heavily on regional alliances; on deterring Soviet influence in the 1980s; on striking a balance of power in the 1990s; and a unilateral, transformative role in the 2000s, with a foreign policy motivated by plans for ‘regime change'. Based on the Nixon doctrine, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and particularly the Gulf, throughout the 1970s relied on a two-legged security structure-an alliance with the Saudis and the Iranians. This policy approach came to an abrupt stop with the 1979 Iranian revolution. Part of a redesigned policy, the U.S. then turned to the Gulf states instead, and called for a united front against the impending Iranian threat and export of its Islamic regime. This front would come in the form of the U.S.-backed GCC. But the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait both served as grim reminders of the GCC's failure as a security organization in the Gulf. Having come to terms with the GCC's inaction and inability to act in the face of crisis, the U.S. opted for pursuing bilateral relations with the Gulf states. Bilateral defense and security cooperation agreements are the result of this about-turn in U.S. policy in the Gulf. In turn, Gulf states began to view the U.S. as a counter-balance against the encroaching Iranian threat and a guarantor of their security. Increasingly however, U.S. dependency has become a painful thorn in the side of Gulf regimes; their pro-American policies becoming unpopular among the public at home and a banner under which otherwise diverse groups unite to question their legitimacy. The arms deals that the Gulf states sign with the U.S. can be interpreted as a form of insurance taken out against the danger of their regimes being toppled
Beginning with the Gulf War and lasting until the 2003 U.S. occupation of Iraq, the U.S. has been implementing a policy that fosters political instability in the Gulf, and a sense of controlled, but disturbing, unrest, so as to establish itself militarily and permanently in the region. By keeping the Gulf states wired on to a series of possible threats; the U.S. has been trying to legitimize its continued military presence. Whereas, until the 2003 Iraqi occupation, the U.S. had followed a status quoist, balance of power act in the region; the post-Iraq occupation period is marked by a U.S. keen on regime change in line with its ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative'. This was the face of a new U.S. ardently set on unilaterally transforming and re-aligning the region. But the unintended consequence of the Iraq war has been the rise of Iran's influence in the region, not its decline. The U.S. response to the Iranian threat has been isolationist and bullying; and the possibility of an operation targeting Iran was never quite taken off the table during Bush's second term in office. In short, since the 1970s, the U.S. emerged as the self-appointed police of the region, treating the Persian Gulf as if it were the Gulf of Mexico.
Iran
Second to Saudi Arabia in terms of energy reserves, Iran is naturally a leader in the region owing to its geo-political position, status, commanding regime and outward-bound Shiite influence. Iran is perceived as a threat by the Gulf states and Israel, as well as the transatlantic allies. This strongly counter-Iran view runs especially deep in the Gulf, Israel and the U.S.; and is rooted in the trepidation of the Iranian Islamic revolution, that like a series of dominoes, the region would fall into the hands of hegemonic Iran Given that many Gulf states have large Shiite populations, this threat is not completely misplaced: 90% in Kuwait, 60-70% in Bahrain, 65% in Iraq, 40% in Lebanon, 20-25% in Syria, and 5% in Saudi Arabia (a small number but concentrated mostly in oil-rich regions).
For Iraq, the pro-American Gulf states, Israel, and the network of U.S. military bases in the Gulf, constitute serious national security threats. The Iranian response has been to resume its nuclear program with renewed vigor and persistence, despite U.S. political pressure, and the threat of sanctions and even military strikes. Mistakes made by the U.S. during and after the 2003 Iraq occupation, including the policy of immediate de-baathification, has resulted in the unintended Shiite consequence: the rise to prominence of a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad, a growing Iranian stronghold in the region, and has brought the vision of a ‘Shiite Crescent' cutting across the Middle East, even closer. Seeking the role of hegemon in regional politics since the Iranian revolution, today Iran is leaning further towards a security-oriented policy stand, made most apparent in its bid to counterbalance the nuclear Israel. In more blunt terms, possessing nuclear arms is seen as a claim to legitimacy for the Iranian government, and a cause they are not likely to give up easily. A nuclear-armed Iran is absolutely unacceptable to the Gulf states, Israel and the U.S.; which is why the Gulf states define their security priorities and policies via the U.S.-Iranian axis.
Security Structures in the Gulf
Among the first security arrangements in the Gulf region are the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), formed with U.S. backing in 1951; the 1955 Baghdad Pact; and the 1959 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). MEDO was envisioned to be a U.S. security mechanism in the Middle East, fashioned after NATO; but was declared a defunct organization at the end of the Truman presidency. Later, with Turkey's support and the active engagement of the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the Baghdad Pact was launched as a buffer against the Soviet threat, and included Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Britain. Under Saddam, Iraq pulled out of the pact a year after the 1958 coup. The pact became CENTO the same year, but was entirely abandoned in 1979. None of these structures were ever entirely successful in fulfilling their mandate as effective security mechanisms in the region.
1979 was a turning point in the history of the Middle East, particularly as it pertained to Gulf security. The Iranian revolution elevated regional instability to a new level, and raised the red flag on the topic of Gulf security, putting it firmly on the international agenda. In 1979, the Gulf monarchies found themselves caught between dangerous regional developments: an Iran that was politically determined to export its ideology and regime, fresh on the heels of its successful Islamic revolution on the one hand, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the other. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war further escalated tensions in the Gulf and made security cooperation in the Gulf a necessity. With U.S. support, the Gulf Cooperation Council was established on 26 May, 1981, in Abu Dhabi. GCC's headquarters are in Riyadh, and is made up of Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Seeking regional cooperation on security, development of joint defense strategies and defense systems, GCC Secretary-General Abdullah Bishara's statement in June 1981, made the GCC position clear: an attack on any GCC member would constitute an attack on all. This led to interpretations of the GCC as a regional defense and alliance pact. Anticipated to have a definitive say on political and security issues, and even claim international recognition as an influential alliance, the GCC failed to play any meaningful role in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and the 1991 Gulf War. . From its founding, the GCC has tried, and failed, to respond to criticisms on its efficiency, capacity, and political will. Developments in the region have sadly shown that the GCC has done little more than scurry to organize summits, pay heed to U.S foreign policy dictate, and serve as a U.S. satellite in the region.

Several dynamics emerge as the reasons behind GCC's failure to have a lasting say on the region's security agenda:
A climate of mutual suspicion and insecurity leading to a set of miscalculated policies among regional states;
An abundance of militarily weak mini-giants that are unable to exert any pressure or influence on regional super-powers like Iran or Iraq; and,
The influence of regional and external conflicting interests.

It should be acknowledged that the possibility of leaving the issue of Gulf security exclusively in the lap of the Gulf monarchies is no longer a realistic option, given the history of U.S. and Western involvement in the region. Having said this, an attainable alternative option is engaging the rising powers of China and India, who are paying more attention to the region with a view to meet their domestic energy demand. Furthermore, any hope of actually implementing a working regional security structure will falter if it fails to engage Iran. Further still, the mutual security dependence between the Gulf monarchies and the West will likely gain momentum with the establishment of a regional-global, collective, multi-party security mechanism in the Gulf.
The gulf security dilemma has earned its place not only in the Middle East, but also as a global security and stability concern. This is why Gulf security has consistently been on the front burner since the 1970s. Regional arms build-up and nuclear ambitions are constant threats to regional security and are problems that must be overcome. An unchanging feature of Gulf politics has been their reliance on an outside force to ensure their security. But as China and India's attention turns to the Gulf, the rules of the game may be changing. Increasing competition for Gulf partnerships and energy deals may mean that the Gulf cuts-back on its U.S. dependency. With more global powers vying for their attention, the Gulf monarchies may finally have their chance to counter U.S. dominance-if that is, they are inclined to do so.
During the Cold War, balance of power politics seemed to be the optimal and indispensable security tool. As the security concept later became increasingly multi-dimensional and internationalized, it also became much more complicated. Looking at the issue of Gulf security necessities an understanding of the messy network of mutual dependence relations among regional and global actors. This essentially means that Gulf security cannot be taken up alone, but in conjunction with super-power interests and strategy towards the region. From a broader perspective, that Cold-War era style thinking of security and threat perceptions still prevails in the Gulf is perhaps the most stubborn obstacle to regional stability. Security mechanisms that are sourced by the U.S. and define threats in conventional military terms are designed to address American foreign policy priorities in the Gulf, not regional objectives. This in turn has built obstacles to GCC effectiveness and will likely fuel a deep crisis of legitimacy among the Gulf monarchy regimes. A more viable alternative is to fashion Karl Deutsch's political, economical, and socio-economic approach to the Gulf. What is certain is that the interest in Gulf security and its related challenges will preserve its place on the global agenda for a considerable time.