There have been three notable developments in the aftermath of the public confrontation between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos. The first was the unveiling of preliminary plans to develop a Turkish-Arab strategic assistance project between the Arab League states and Turkey. Although the details have not yet been firmed up, apart from stressing ties on political, economical and security related issues, the underlying message behind the decision and its timing are critical. Muhammed Fatih el Nasiri, head of the Arab League's Europe Division, announced that the details of the cooperation initiative would be discussed at the next meeting in Cairo scheduled for April, to be attended by the foreign ministers of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Djibouti and Turkey. Despite Nasiri's remarks that steps towards closer Arab League-Turkey cooperation would be taken with due consideration of the sensitivities and interests of all parties, the project seems to bolster the Turkish government's new initiatives towards the Middle East. Moreover, Nasiri's move to acknowledge Turkey's stance towards the Israeli offensive in Gaza is an clear indication of where Arab public opinion rests.
Relations between Turkey and the Arab League have been steadily improving for a number of years, with statements coming from both sides signaling interest to strengthen institutional ties in the past. In light of this, strategic mutual assistance between the Arab League and Turkey is not a new idea considering the overall perspective of the Turkish government's policies towards the Middle East. We need to remember that the first agreement on this issue was achieved at a meeting among Iraq`s neighboring countries in Turkey held back in 2007.
The second striking development was the radical "Gaza and Victory" meeting held in Istanbul during the second week of February. The BBC reported that close to 200 religious intellectuals from across the Middle East came together with HAMAS officials to unite and plan a new jihad rallying around the recent events, heralded as a victory by the participants, in Gaza. A crowd consisting of radical Sunni sheikhs and religious leaders expressed their allegiance to HAMAS and voiced support for an uprising and jihad against Israel. The delegates shared a common sense of proud recognition for Prime Minister Erdogan's act of protest, as he walked away from the panel discussion on Gaza at Davos, leaving behind a startled Israeli President.
Delegates from around the Middle East, Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan and Indonesia were present at the meeting with the notable exception of Saudi religious intellectual, Muhsin el Avaci and the high ranking leader of HAMAS in Damascus, Muhammed Nazzal. Promises were made to help Hamas acquire weapons, money and mujahedeen, and called for open borders for mujahedeen.
Although the meeting was certainly not an official event which received government support, that it was convened in Turkey is significant. Having inherited the Ottoman legacy, Turkey abolished the Sunni Islam leadership of the Caliphate. Rising from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire as a modern, Western-oriented and strictly secular state, Turkey earned a special status in the region. While choosing to keep the Arabs at arms length, it established a special relationship with Israel, founded on what was historically Ottoman territory. Nowadays, even hard-line Arabs appear ready to abandon old grievances and ideological differences with the Turks, for the time being anyway. The irony is that while some Arabs are in favor of a rapprochement with Turkey, Arab regimes are wary of policies that may bolster radical tendencies. Under these circumstances, the jury is still out on who will be the Turkish counterpart and focal point for cooperation in the Middle East. At the moment, the compass appears to be pointing towards those favoring hard-line Arab policies.
The upcoming local elections to be held in late March may be a key consideration defining the Turkish government's current thinking. Prime Minister Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) is rooted deeply in its conservative support base. After the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, anti-West and most prominently anti-U.S. sentiment has been on the rise in Turkey. And for the time being, Turkey is holding on to its claim with the highest rate of anti-US views in the world. Much of this is owed no thanks to the failures of the Bush administration and its misguided approach to the region.
An interesting perspective was voiced in Iran just after the meeting of Sunni intellectuals in Istanbul. A foremost authority on Lebanese Shiites, Allameh Fazlullah, known for his close relations with Iran, proposed the establishment of an Iran-Turk-Arab axis. According to Fazlullah, this alliance is necessary in order to solve common Arab and Islamic problems, including the issue of Palestine. As Fazlullah was expressing these views, an agreement on the establishment of a "Joint Border Market" was signed at the Turkey-Iran border on February 21. The agreement, which is vaguely reminiscent of the Schengen Agreement, aims to ease restrictions on travelers and vehicles passing across the border, improve opportunities for job-creation for border residents and increase trade and economic exchange between border traders. Certainly, this agreement cannot be compared with the Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union. However, it is an important indication of the priorities of Prime Minister Erdogan's administration in its second term.
Despite domestic pressure from voters which elected the AKP, a party rooted in Islamic tradition, to office in 2002, the AKP took steps to preserve Turley's Westward orientation during its first term of political power. Erdogan embraced the EU accession process, which gained momentum in 1999. He did not even hesitate to take bold steps toward meeting reform criteria. However, when the accession negotiations were finally initiated with more resolve, the Turkish government turned its face towards its historical friends in the Middle East instead. The government's decision to invite HAMAS to Turkey and Erdogan's accusations of Israel for carrying out state-sponsored terrorism are reflections of this period. Perhaps that the EU accession process was still ongoing, albeit sometimes just barely hobbling along, was reassurance enough. The opening and closing of unimportant sections in the negotiations became a routine practice.
On a related front, the disagreements in the IMF-Turkey partnership during the global financial crisis are also significant.
The third important development is Turkish President Abdullah Gul's visit to Moscow in February. During the official visit, President Gul described the relations between the two countries as follows:
"In recent years there has been an unprecedented increase in the rate of development of trade and economic relations between our countries that have made a huge leap forward. Bilateral trade turnover last year amounted to 38 billion dollars - to become Russia's largest trading partner of Turkey.
... at the moment 2 / 3 of natural gas and 25% of oil consumed by Turkey, comes from Russia. The total cost of projects undertaken to date, the Turkish construction firms in Russia is 30 billion dollars. A quarter built by Turkish contractors around the world building is located on the territory of Russia. In addition, the number of Russian tourists rested on Turkish resorts in 2008 was three million. All this proves that trade and economic relations between our two nations have reached the top step.
...In many ways, our countries share similar positions on international issues, as well as with regard to relevant regional issues.
The declaration on the expansion of multifaceted cooperation and strengthening friendship between Russia and Turkey, signed during the visit of Vladimir Putin to Turkey in December 2004, proclaimed the purpose of cooperation to create a wide and lasting partnership. Since 2004, the mutual visits of high-ranking representatives of the two countries continued, the relationship went to a new level, to strengthen strategic partnership and friendship." ii
Debates on the signs of change in Turkish foreign policy have long been underway. After 4 years of vigorous work and commitment towards the EU accession process, it appears that the Turkish government has turned its face more clearly towards Islam and the Arab world. There are criticisms that Turkey is distancing itself from both the EU and the West and is shifting priorities towards the Middle East.
There are those inside the powerful Turkish Army who favor an evaluation of other options beyond the EU, the U.S, and NATO. Among these, there are some high-ranking generals who in the name of broadening Turkey's options and strengthening its interests, have proposed that Turkey may benefit from partnership with Russia and Iran.iii One of the largest armies of NATO, the Turkish Army feels that it has lost some of the advantages promised by European Security and Defence Policy or ESDP, and is uneasy about this.
But while discussing what other options may be pursued to meet Turkey's strategic interests, no one in the Turkish military establishment would consider moving away from the West to this extent. For the Turkish Army, establishing partnerships with the likes of HAMAS or other Islamic organizations in the region is like walking deep into a minefield.

i Mehr News Agency, 22 February 2009.
ii İzvestia Online, 12 February 2009.
iii Wolfango Piccoli, "Enhancing Turkey's EU Membership Prospects via Securitizing Moves: The Role of Turkish NGOs in the Country's Europeanization," Paper presented for presentation at the 7th Annual Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop, Harvard University, 4 February 2005.