No matter how damaging the legacy of former U.S. President George W. Bush has been in the Middle East and elsewhere, democracy promotion will preserve its place as a core tenet of American foreign policy. The how of the issue is less clear: how the U.S. will look to carry out this objective during the Obama administration and what the response of the Middle East is likely to be. Despite talk over the past few months that President Obama will not want to repeat Bush's damaging rhetoric on bringing an American brand of democracy to the Islamic world, the fact remains that democracy expansion is fundamentally in the U.S. interest. But there is an inherent flaw in the assumption that Bush pushed hard for the democracy agenda in the Middle East; the reality is that his was democracy doublespeak, with the pro-democracy agenda lost behind the imperative of the ‘war on terror'. In fact, U.S. commitment to furthering genuine political reform in the Middle East was far from being at the top of the agenda during the past eight years.

The truth is that whatever ardor the U.S. had about democracy promotion in the Middle East cooled significantly after the 2006 election of Hamas anyway. Now, the time may be ripe for the U.S. to move from rhetoric to actionable measures; from tit-for- tat partnerships with authoritarian regimes to genuine political debate on a credible human rights agenda in places where democracy is in desperate shortage. This will be a tough task, and it is too soon to say how willing the U.S. will be to push for democracy abroad while simultaneously tied up in a failing battle in Afghanistan and a pull-out of an Iraq that is only slowly showing signs of political reconciliation and stability. All while American policy makers and political pundits are suggesting that the U.S. should focus more on containing terrorists, and less on building democratic institutions in far away Arab countries.

The business of Bush-style democracy promotion caused popular resentment in much of the Muslim world, viewed as a guise for American military might and interference in the region. The language of democracy suffered a serious blow, and democracy-building became synonymous with the Iraq war, preemptive strikes and regime change. Images of Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, rendition and ‘enemy combatants'-now abandoned terminology-damaged America's credible role as the global guardian of democratic ideals. The reverberating question that plagued the American imagination in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was "Why do they hate us?" and it left an indelible mark on the Bush years. Now, the new U.S. administration may be poised to amend ruptured relations in the Middle East. A credible U.S. democracy promotion agenda should start with the assumption that the tenets of liberal democracy may be an attainable goal for the people of the region. In disassociating itself from Bush's legacy, the Obama administration should not downgrade democracy-building in the Middle East or expect that Muslim nations should settle for a watered-down version of democracy. This would embolden autocratic regimes and undermine the pro-reform efforts of Muslim moderates. The message that violations of civil and political liberties are unacceptable in the West, but can be tolerated subject to Islamic interpretation in the Middle East will not facilitate U.S. efforts to ‘engage' with the Muslim world.

As the outline of Obama's foreign policy in the Middle East emerges, there is a notable change in not only the tone, but the vocabulary. The ‘axis of evil' is being asked to join the conversation. The democracy lingo now preaches reaching out to the Islamic world, entering a new dialogue and promoting ‘smart power' in international diplomacy-a term recently used by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton during her trip to Muslim-majority Indonesia in February. Although the details are yet to be seen, the tone is clearly one of engagement. Will this mean less emphasis on transformation and more on accommodation when it comes to relations with the Muslim world? In treating the world as it is, and not as it should be, is Obama letting down those in the Islamic world who were hoping that the winds of ‘change' would sway their repressive governments as well? Not necessarily. Foreign policy realists view Obama's bid to engage with Syria, Iran, Russia and other countries on bad terms with the Bush administration as they are, and not as the U.S. would have them to be, as a responsible move.

An indication of the new U.S. administration's approach to Turkey came with Secretary of State Clinton's remarks during her visit to Ankara in early March. Welcomed with a sigh of relief -for those who were watching carefully in Turkey, and many were-was the notable absence of the jargon of ‘moderate Islam'. Clinton commended Turkey as a country where Islam, secularism and democracy co-exist, remarking that "The relationship between our two countries is one of alliance, partnership, and friendship. . .We share a commitment to democracy, a secular constitution, respect for religious freedom, a belief in free markets, and a sense of global responsibility". In emphasizing Turkey as a model democracy with a secular constitution, Clinton displayed signs that the U.S. may be ready to stop peddling ‘moderate Islam' in defining Turkey's orientation and role in the region. In a television interview in Turkey, she went on to say that "We're not going to characterize any country's religious affiliation. We're looking for an opportunity to strengthen and deepen our relationship with Turkey."

A month earlier in Jakarta, Clinton had spoken along similar lines, stressing that it is important "to listen as well as talk to those around the world, to support a country that has demonstrated so clearly ... that Islam, democracy and modernity cannot only coexist but thrive together". Interestingly, Clinton's recent visits were significant more in what she did not say, than what she did. Neither in Jakarta nor Ankara did Clinton voice U.S. expectation that these countries should serve as a mouthpiece for moderate Islam. On the flipside, she was criticized in the U.S. for downplaying the annual State Department human rights reports during her visit to Turkey and Egypt. This also sparked reaction in the Turkish media, already under some pressure by the government, in a notable example of how ‘treating the world as it is' may not appeal to everyone.

Increasingly it looks as if this may be the central tenet of Obama's message to the Muslim world. It may be that the debate once so popular on whether political Islam and democracy are compatible is outdated-or was a dead end to begin with. Islamic traditions can coexist within a democratic model of governance, but only under the guarantee of political secularism. An Islamist ideology is not compatible with democracy. The U.S. needs to support secularists, reformists, and liberal democrats in the region struggling to make the Muslim world more democratic.

Engage but with whom?

To those in the Muslim world who are invited to join the new conversation with the U.S., they will have to show that they are serious about forging constructive relations. U.S. policies designed to foster reconciliation between the U.S. and the Middle East must avoid the Bush style tendency to link Islam with the activities of extremist or terrorist groups. But in tangent to this, tolerance for moderate Islamist extremism must also be avoided. To many moderate Muslims who strive towards a humanist, pluralist and representative model of democracy, this represents nothing more than a Western demand to settle for a lesser form of democracy.

Now with the tide of hope and renewal that has swelled up across much of the world with President Obama's election, the pendulum has swung from the troublesome question of "why do they hate us?" to "how to engage with them?" The answer of course is not an easy one, and the question itself is problematic. Although relations with most Muslim-majority nations may not be irreversibly resistant to reconciliation, there are a few cases where diplomacy has hit major road blocks. The U.S. cannot set out to apply a blanket approach to the Arab and Muslim world, the region is a mixed bag and each context will require a different set of solutions. Clearly, the region is not a monolithic bloc, far from it in fact, with little Arab unity to speak of. But who will the U.S. identify as its counterparts: authoritarian regimes in power? Cautious reformers? Shariah adherents who have on the upside, at least denounced violence? How fine is the line between Muslim activism and Muslim radicalism? Extremist Islamist politics minus the firearms and rockets do not constitute partners for the West who share a common vision for the future. Moderate extremism is not a substitute for democracy, human security, freedom of speech, minority rights, and the freedom of the individual in the Middle East. Treating diplomacy as an end in itself is a troublesome approach; it is a tool, not a fix-all solution. Amidst the excitement over engaging, the question of what comes after the initial cordial exchange at the negotiation table should not be dismissed.

Supplying economic and military aid to authoritarian and unpopular rulers that supply oil or host U.S. military deployments, rather than promoting genuine reform and pro-democracy outcomes has undermined and de-legitimized U.S. intervention in the Middle East. This has triggered not only popular anti-American resentment, but also empowered those who are all too ready to question what America claims to stand for: the fundamental principles of democracy itself. The most significant departure that the Obama administration will make from Bush is its rejection of democracy promotion by means of military force. What will likely remain the same are the important trade-offs between U.S. security interests and willingness to exert pressure on governments for political reform. This may continue to discredit how the U.S. commitment to reform and progress on governance indicators is perceived by Muslim audiences. If the U.S. effort to develop a new relationship with the Muslim world is not a hollow call, it needs to show consistency in its advocacy of democratic ideals. Otherwise it will run the risk of diminishing its credibility with reformers and deflate hopeful public sentiment.

The Obama administration is rightly seeking to strengthen relations with moderate Muslims around the world following the anger generated by President George W Bush's invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The opposite would be unthinkable, when one considers the promises of change that swept Obama's supporters off their feet. Not only is the Obama administration's willingness to engage, court, and converse with the Islamic world a hopeful step, it many ways it is also the only step that Obama could take at this critical juncture. More of the same was not an option. At least for now.

Effective and cross-cutting political, economic and diplomatic engagement with the Muslim world cannot be achieved in Obama's administration alone. The enormity of this task requires a commitment in policy focus and resources that will demand a long-term strategy. For now, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and to some extent, the Palestinian Authority, top Obama's shortlist. If the U.S. is going to need the Muslim world more in the coming decades, it needs to employ dialogue and diplomacy to forge sustainable ties. But exactly how much can be achieved through diplomatic channels remains to be seen. There is little likelihood that the period of U.S. willingness to engage will be an open-ended one. Much hinges on how Damascus and Tehran calculate the value of what Washington could offer them in return for their cooperation on critical issues important to the West, such as Iran's nuclear program and support for Hezbollah and Hamas. They will weigh how much they will lose should they miss the window of opportunity presented by U.S. engagement. They must be reminded of what they stand to win.

To Iran: "You, too, have a choice."

President Obama's videotape message to Iran on 20 March ahead of Nowruz, the Persian New Year, was, in many ways, groundbreaking. It was also pragmatic politics. In reaching out to Iran, the U.S. is presenting the regime in Tehran with a choice: either unclench your fist or take the hand that has been extended. It sent a dual message, firstly to the Iranian leadership, referring to Iran as the "Islamic Republic" and calming any nerves on whether the U.S. would seek a regime change or military action reminiscent of his predecessor. The message also pointed to the possibility of direct talks between the U.S. and Iran, not directly setting specific preconditions for this to happen. But importantly, the message was meant to speak to both unelected leaders and reformist movements in Iran that have the potential to change the conversation of hostility. The Iranian people were also sent a sign that the U.S. is willing to change the status quo in the decades-long deterioration of bilateral relations-opening a new chapter that can bring about new economic opportunities, reform and a future without punitive sanctions. But rapprochement with the U.S. will not be easy for Iran, especially at a time when maintaining a distance from Washington is perceived as critical with Iran's presidential elections just around the corner in June. Obama's Nowruz gesture of goodwill may be read as an attempt to raise the pressure on Ahmadinejad to reciprocate. If he does not, the U.S. may be hoping that Iranians fed up with the status quo and eager for change of their own, may respond.

What the Obama engagement doctrine may accomplish over the long term is to marginalize those in the Islamic world, most notably hard-liners in Iran and Syria, who feel that their interests are better served through confrontation than dialogue. By extending a hand, the U.S. administration is in fact putting the burden of responsibility on Tehran, forcing the hardliners to make a decision. Essentially, Obama's Nowruz message and broader plan for diplomatic engagement may spurn a process of bottom-up pressure from within Middle Eastern societies that demand that their governments bend their hard-line stance in response to U.S. overtures. This will take time. And in all likelihood, Tehran's tone towards the U.S. will get tougher and more dismissive before becoming more reconciliatory. Iran's early response to Obama's Nowruz gesture was to point out that more than words are necessary to mend relations. Precisely. Iran must follow its own advice.

Critics of engagement will claim Obama's gesture of goodwill is a victory for Iran. Unless Tehran is convinced that there is a compelling reason or pressure to take its foreign policy in a new direction, it will choose not to, simply because sticking to tried and true positions in the past has ensured consolidation of its power at home. Whether this line of thinking will have the final word remains to be seen. In a race where Ahmadinejad is seen to have virtually no opposition much depends on whether the Iranian reformist camp can unite as a common front.