As Barack Obama assumes the oath of office as the 44th president of the United States on January 20, one of the critical questions on the minds of many diplomats and political leaders in Turkey is how U.S. foreign policy may change under his leadership. What are Obama's foreign policy goals and priorities and what do they imply for U.S.-Turkish relations?
Obama's election has provoked excitement - as well as some concern -- in Ankara. Many Turks are only too happy to see President Bush's departure. His policies - especially the invasion of Iraq - were widely disliked in Ankara and contributed to a significant deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations and a sharp increase in anti-American sentiment. Indeed, according to recent polls, Turkey has the dubious distinction of being the most anti-American (or more accurately, most anti-Bush) country in Europe.
Obama's election provides an opportunity to repair many of the fissures that emerged during the Bush years and put U.S.-Turkish relations on a firmer footing. On many issues -- especially those related to the Middle East -- U.S. policy under Obama is likely to change in ways that will be welcome in Ankara. However, the Armenian Genocide issue could pose an early challenge to - and possibly even doom -- efforts to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and create new strains that could undermine security cooperation between Ankara and Washington.
GREECE, CYPRUS AND THE EU
Obama can be expected to encourage and support the continued improvement in Greek-Turkish that has occurred since l999. The rapprochement between Ankara and Athens has significantly contributed to enhancing stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and removed an important irritant in bilateral relations with both countries. At a time when the United States faces the prospect of growing instability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the last thing Washington wants to see is an escalation of tensions between Greece and Turkey.
Like Bush, Obama is also likely to strongly support Turkey's bid to join the EU. Turkish membership in the EU would help anchor Turkey more firmly to the West at a time when some forces in Turkey are pushing for Ankara to reorient its foreign policy away from the West. The United States can play a supportive role behind the scenes. However, the heavy lifting will have to be done by Turkey. The Erdogan government needs to reinvigorate the process of domestic reform, which has slowed visibly since 2005. As long as the domestic reform process remains stalled, U.S. support will have little tangible impact on Turkey's membership prospects.
The Cyprus issue is important in this context. Many Turks hope that Obama's election will give the search for a Cyprus settlement new impetus. However, Obama faces a large number of pressing domestic and foreign policy challenges: dealing with the impact of the global economic crisis on the U.S. economy, extricating the U.S. militarily from Iraq, stabilizing Afghanistan, reducing the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program and preventing a further escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Promoting a Cyprus settlement, while important, is likely to be fairly far down on his to-do list. Thus, Obama is likely to leave the main responsibility for promoting a Cyprus settlement in the hands of the UN -- at least until there are signs that active U.S. diplomatic engagement could make a real difference in achieving a settlement.
THE MIDDLE EAST
On many issues in the Middle East, Obama's positions are likely to more closely coincide with those of Turkey than the policies pursued by the Bush administration.
Iraq. The withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq will provide an opportunity to begin to build a new, more constructive relationship with Turkey. Turkish and U.S. goals in Iraq broadly coincide. Both countries want a strong central government in Iraq capable of maintaining internal and external security. Both also want a gradual, orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops that avoids creating a security vacuum and destabilizing Iraq.
A key factor will be the impact of a U.S. troop withdrawal on the situation in northern Iraq. The United States acted as an important constraint on the Iraqi Kurds. Turkish officials worry that with the reduction of the U.S. military presence, the Iraqi Kurds may feel freeer to pursue their own narrow, parochial interests, particularly regarding Kirkuk. However, with the U.S. military withdrawal, the Iraqi Kurds will face stronger pressures from the central government in Baghdad. This may give them a stronger interest in seeking an accommodation with Turkey.
The future of the Kurdistan Regional government (KRG) in northern Iraq -- particularly its economic future -- will depend heavily on its relationship with Turkey. While the northern Iraq is rich in oil, the KRG needs to be able to extract and transport the oil to Western markets. Oil pipelines from northern Iraq already flow into Turkish ports on the Mediterranean. They provide the most efficient and cost-effective means to get the Iraqi oil to European markets. Thus both sides have strong incentives to find a political accommodation over the long run.
Obama is likely to continue to provide military and intelligence support for Ankara's efforts to combat cross-border attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This support has contributed a visible improvement in bilateral relations. However, like Bush, he is likely to insist that the cross-border strikes be limited to targeting PKK camps and troops and oppose a large-scale Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq, which could exacerbate tensions not only with KRG but also with the central government in Iraq.
Iran. Obama's policy on Iran is likely to differ from Bush's policy in important ways. Obama has argued that tough-minded diplomacy backed by a range of instruments of American power -- political, economic and military -- can be effective with countries like Iran (and Syria). While not ruling out the use of military force, he has insisted that the United States should not hesitate to talk directly to Iran. He is likely to seek to open a dialogue with Iran, though initially at a relatively low level. Such a move will be welcomed in Ankara, which has long advocated a policy of greater openness and engagement with Tehran.
However, Obama is likely to seek tougher sanctions against Iran if Tehran continues its nuclear enrichment program. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Turkey could come under stronger U.S. pressure to support tougher sanctions toward Tehran. Turkey's energy ties to Iran are also likely to remain a problem in bilateral relations. Barring a major shift in Iranian policy, Obama, like Bush, is likely to oppose Turkish investment in Iranian oil and gas development and encourage Ankara to curtail its gas deliveries from Iran.
Syria. Obama is also likely to open dialogue with Syria in an attempt to woo Syria away from Iran. Such a move would be welcomed in Ankara, which favors a policy of trying to engage Syria. It would bring U.S. and Turkish policy toward Syria into closer alignment and reduce Syria as an irritant in bilateral relations.
Arab-Israeli Conflict. Here, too, Obama's policy is likely to differ in important ways from Bush's policy. Bush regarded Iraq as the key to stability in the Middle East and was reluctant to become actively engaged in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict until the closing months of his administration. By contrast, Obama is likely to give an Arab-Israeli settlement a high priority and adopt a more active approach to seeking a solution - or at least defusing - the conflict. However, Obama has made clear that the starting point for his policy is a clear and strong commitment to the security of Israel. Thus while he may pursue a more active effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, Obama is likely to remain sensitive to Israeli concerns for domestic as well as strategic reasons.
However, upon assuming office Obama will face a highly explosive political situation. The Israeli offensive in Gaza has radicalized the Palestinian population and increased support for Hamas, while weakening the position of Palestinian moderates like President Mahmoud Abbas. As a result, Hamas is likely to emerge politically stronger from the conflict. At the same time, as the number of civilian Palestinian casualties caused by the Israeli offensive has mounted, the moderate Arab governments such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which initially tended to blame Hamas for the violence, have come under strong pressure from their populations to take a tougher anti-Israel stance and support Hamas more openly. Thus Obama could find it hard to obtain the support of moderate Arab states in the region if he is perceived as being too pro-Israeli.
A lot will depend on the outcome of the Israeli elections on February 10, 2009. Polls currently show a likely victory for hard-line Likud candidate Binyamin Netanyahu, a sharp critic of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's efforts to create a Palestinian state. A Netanyahu victory would seriously complicate U.S. policy and any attempt to jumpstart the Middle East peace process.

RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS
Policy toward Russia also could prove to be a divisive issue. Obama is likely to try to engage Russia on a variety of issues ranging from energy security to arms control. However, if Russia proves unresponsive or uncooperative, U.S. policy toward Russia could harden. This could exacerbate tensions with some European allies, including Turkey. As Ian Lesser has noted, Turkey's ability to conduct a policy of breadth rather than depth -- to engage diverse partners with conflicting interests simultaneously -- would be severely constrained by more overt competition between Russia and the West. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has had the luxury of not having to choose between its Western and Eurasian interests. This could become more difficult if there is a hardening of U.S. policy toward Russia.
In the Caucasus, U.S. and Turkish policy largely coincide. Obama is likely to strongly support Turkey's recent efforts to improve relations with Armenia. Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would remove an important source of instability in the Caucasus and allow Armenia to reduce it dependence on Russia and Iran. At the same time, it would open up important trade opportunities between Turkey and Armenia. All these developments are in U.S. interest and contribute to greater regional stability.
The Obama administration is also likely to encourage Ankara's recent diplomatic efforts to foster an improvement of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and promote a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Both these efforts are seen in Washington as contributing to enhancing regional security in the Caucasus - goals that Turkey and the United States both share.
THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE RESOLUTION: THE POTENTIAL SPOILER
One of the most important factors affecting U.S.-Turkish relations will be the approach Obama adopts to the Armenian genocide resolution. The resolution has been a perennial source of friction between the United States and Turkey in recent years. In the fall of 2007, the Bush administration narrowly averted a serious crisis with Ankara only by conducting a full-scale lobbying effort at the eleventh hour to get the resolution (HR 106) shelved.
However, the resolution is far from dead. Galvanized by its near success in 2007, the Armenian lobby is likely to press hard to get the resolution reintroduced in 2009. There is a danger that the Obama administration will be overwhelmed by other pressing issues in its first few months in office and will not pay sufficient attention to the genocide resolution until it is too late.
Several additional factors enhance the dangers that the resolution could pass this year. First, Obama intends to make preventing genocide an important tenet of his foreign policy. This could make it difficult for him to oppose the genocide resolution without damaging his broader campaign against genocide. Second, the Congress is controlled by the Democrats, who traditionally are more concerned about human rights issues than the Republicans. The speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, is from California, which has a large -- and very vocal -- Armenian community.
In short, the Armenian resolution represents a potential ticking time bomb. Its passage could deal a severe blow to prospects for putting U.S.-Turkish relations on a new, more stable footing as well as undermine recent efforts at promoting Turkish-Armenian reconciliation that have opened up since President Gul's historic visit to Yerevan in September 2007. If the resolution passes, the Erdogan government could come under strong domestic pressure to take some retaliatory action, including possibly suspending or curtailing altogether US access to Incirlik air base.
Incirlik serves as an important hub for the transport of U.S. troops and materiel to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Loss of access to the base would significantly hamper the ability of the United States to conduct operations in Afghanistan as well as affect the U.S. ability to carry out a timely and orderly withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq. Thus U.S.-Turkish relations -- and US interests in the Broader Middle East more generally -- could be critically affected by the approach that the Obama administration adopts toward the Armenian genocide resolution.

1 F. Stephen Larrabee holds the Corporate Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation. The views expressed in this article represent his personal views and not those of RAND or any of its sponsors.
2 Ian O. Lesser, "After Georgia: Turkey's Looming Foreign Policy Dilemmas," The German Marshall Fund (September 2008), p.2.