The swearing in of a new president and a new administration in the United States has ushered in a period of re-evaluation and reassessments in all major policy areas. However, even before the new President actually stepped into the Oval office, U.S. concerns with Pakistan loomed large over other issues. The new administration has set about to think of creative ways to salvage the fast deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. A more coherent picture is expected to emerge following the NATO summit and Afghanistan policy review in April.
The defining slogan for the Barack Obama election campaign was "change". However, early evidence suggests that on Pakistan, the overall thrust of the new administration's policy is likely to be a continuation of the broad Bush era objectives. Where there are signs of "change" they are only present in terms of added emphasis on certain elements of the old policy.
Some of the defining elements of the Bush era policies on Pakistan were as follows: the Bush administration had sought to address Pakistan within a regional context; had provided both economic and military assistance; and used multilateral as well as unilateral tools. For example, the outgoing administration had authorized 750 million USD in aid for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) under its Sustainable Development Plan. It had also sought to promote initiatives under the Friends of Pakistan Group and other multilateral bodies, many of which were also involved in Afghanistan. Upon deeper examination, it is evident that despite the rhetoric of change, the new strategy under consideration by the Obama team represents a change of emphasis but not a fundamentally new approach to Pakistan.
There are certain constants inherent in the U.S. security strategy for Pakistan which are not likely to be altered despite the change in the Presidential office. In the post 9/11 security environment, there have been four main Pakistan specific strategic objectives which are of enduring importance for U.S. policymakers:
1. The elimination of al-Qaeda.
2. To deny sanctuary to the Taliban and neutralize their ability to mount cross border attacks on U.S. and NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan.
3. To provide economic and military aid to Pakistan.
4. Assure the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets.
The main difference between what has gone before under the Bush administration and what is expected from the Obama presidency is tactical: the real change is evident in the strategies designed, the resources allocated and the emphasis placed on the achievement of the goals. In all the four policy sectors new strategies and tactical plans are likely to be initiated in order to bring the situation in Pakistan in line with the U.S. strategic interests in the region.
The elimination of the al-Qaeda network in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
There is a sustained and broad consensus in U.S. policymaking centres that the number one threat to U.S. security remains the threat of a terrorist strike by al-Qaeda on U.S. territory. Furthermore, it is believed that there is a great likelihood that such an attack would emerge from the al-Qaeda sanctuaries in the border regions of Pakistan. This growing conviction within the U.S. security establishment is predicated on two vital aspects; the first is based on real intelligence estimates regarding the force multiplication and enhanced ability of al-Qaeda to not only operate out of the FATA sanctuaries but also potentially have the ability to mount a terrorist strike on the U.S. homeland. Secondly, it is important to understand that this broad consensus is underpinned by certain domestic political determinants which carry immense importance for U.S. policy makers. When the al-Qaeda threat is resurrected, it becomes far easier for the U.S. administration to convince congress and the American public that the ever mounting costs of war in remote Afghanistan is a necessary burden. Media coverage in the U.S. regarding the names and identities of al-Qaeda operatives allegedly eliminated in drone strikes helps to create an image of effectiveness and tangible success in a campaign which has so far suffered serious setbacks.
Guided by these two overarching considerations, during his election campaign, President Obama indicated that he was ready to take the pursuit of al-Qaeda to the next level and would order unilateral military actions in Pakistan if U.S. policy makers had "actionable intelligence". Although Obama's statement produced some controversy at first, subsequent developments have made it clear that this was far from an innovative plan, as the Bush administration had already decided to put this position into practice. The most controversial element of the new Bush strategy was the use of U.S. Special Operations Forces in a ground mission inside Pakistan. Subsequently, however, due to strong Pakistani resistance, the U.S. administration reverted back to aerial drone attacks.
The twin U.S. drone missile strikes on 23 January, 2009, which struck targets in North and South Waziristan were the first strikes ordered by President Obama since coming into office. These strikes signaled a continuation of the highly unpopular Bush era policy of eliminating al-Qaeda operatives in the tribal belt of Pakistan through UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) or drone attacks.
There is some indication that one tactical variation that the Obama administration would like to test is the potential of joint operations in full coordination with the Pakistani military. An example of such cooperation on a limited scale was evident recently in a sting operation carried out in the Khyber agency in which local law enforcement agencies, the Frontier Corps (FC) and CIA operatives, jointly acted to apprehend foreign al-Qaeda elements and their local sympathisers.
For the Pakistani military and the U.S. forces to be in a position to mount joint operations on a more decisive scale, there has to be enhanced and preferably institutionalized linkages between the command and control of the Pakistan military and the U.S. Central Command. Various proposals are being floated around to this end: one of which focuses on declaring FATA part of the Afghan war theater. This would in effect mean that CENTCOM will be able to operate and coordinate joint operations with the Pakistani army. It is suggested that by establishing better liaison with CENTCOM and NATO the Pakistani army can have greater input in targeting and regularizing UAV attacks in the FATA area.
Deny sanctuary to the Taliban and neutralize their ability to mount cross border attacks on U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan
The corner stone of Obama's Afghanistan policy is the troop surge. U.S. forces in Afghanistan are set to increase from the present 33,000 to around 50,000 approximately by the additional deployment of 17,000 U.S. troops by the middle of the current year. The increase in force levels is aimed at improving the fast deteriorating security environment in the south and eastern border regions of Afghanistan. The troop surge is also expected to increase the vulnerability of the U.S. forces; greater hostile encounters usually result in higher casualties-which are always unpopular in home countries.
There is a general consensus among U.S. policymakers that no substantial gains can be made without addressing the Taliban and insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas. So far, the peace deals made by the Pakistani army with the militants have reinforced and not uprooted these sanctuaries. According to U.S. perceptions, such deals have only prevented casualties among the Pakistani soldiers rather than eliminate sanctuaries. Moreover, U.S. policymakers believe Pakistan so far has not acted against the Taliban leadership based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan. Crippling the Taliban leadership by attacking the ‘Quetta shura' and weakening its influence over Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan is likely to be an important element of the new U.S. strategy on Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The new and potentially destabilizing element added to the equation is the growing capability of insurgents to critically disrupt the two supply routes through Pakistan which carry 40% of fuel and 80% of all non-fuel supplies for the war effort in Afghanistan. This has led to frantic efforts by NATO and the U.S. to find alternate transit routes through the north via Russia and Central Asian states.
There appears to be certain indications that within the Obama administration there is a generalized perception that the Pakistan army is the critical partner for the U.S. and the primary kinetic force which must be relied on to disrupt and destroy the Taliban, insurgent sanctuaries and trans-border networks of support.
There is also the view that the leadership of the Pakistani security establishment has not fully embraced the strategic objective of destroying all militant networks and has intermittently used militant groups as a foreign policy tool. There is likely to be greater pressure on Pakistan's security establishment to use military action against the Afghan Taliban leadership based in and around Quetta. This is something the Pakistani establishment has so far stubbornly resisted.
U.S. policymakers are suggesting various approaches to wean the Pakistani military off from this inclination. The first and the most important of these is enhanced U.S. engagement with the Pakistan military. Greater efforts will be made to enhance long term cooperation, such as building capacity and equipping the Pakistani military and the paramilitary Frontier Corp to undertake Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against militants. In all likelihood, greater emphasis will be made to provide COIN training and create a new doctrine for COIN operations within Pakistan.
It has been suggested that joint operations and close cooperation between Pakistan's military and CENTCOM would enable Pakistan to access resources and equipment directly from CENTCOM without undergoing a lengthy bureaucratic process. Certain informed quarters in the U.S. have suggested that Pakistan consider signing a Status of Forces agreement (SOFA) that would regularize U.S. military presence in Pakistan and lead to a long term military bilateral relationship. The SOFA agreement would cover the status of U.S. military trainers, personnel and equipment on Pakistan's territory.
The other significant initiative is the regional approach, which essentially seeks to adjust Pakistan's cost-benefit calculus by addressing its legitimate security interests in the context of both Afghanistan and India. Within this framework, Pakistan's foremost concerns related to Afghanistan include progress towards the recognition of the Durand line; India's use of its consulates in Afghanistan for anti-Pakistan activities; and the anti-Pakistan elements of the Northern alliance within the power circles in Afghanistan and the Afghan National Army. In India's context the focus is on seeking a long term solution to the Kashmir conflict which has historically informed and shaped Pakistan's security perceptions.
The appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the U.S. Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan bears testament to the U.S. sponsored quest for a broader regional solution to the problem of trans-border militancy in FATA. It is believed that strong Indian lobbying may have prevented the inclusion of India and the Kashmir issue to Holbrooke's mandate. This regional approach has three main facets:
- Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relations and treating the Pak-Afghan border zone as a seamless theater of operations.
- The trilateral context where the concerns of Pakistan's security establishment are addressed with reference to India and Afghanistan both: this context addresses the long standing security fault lines within South Asia which have shaped the complex relationship and policies of Pakistan's military towards the Taliban and militants in the FATA region.
- The third is the Broad Multilateral Initiative where regional countries such as Iran, Russia and the Central Asian states and Pakistan's strategic partners such as China, Saudi Arabia, and UAE are brought on board to coax Pakistan into dedicating all of its military and political energies to eradicating militant movements and disrupting trans-border support to the Taliban offensive inside Afghanistan.
Bring about a balance in U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan
President Obama and his advisers have endorsed congressional efforts to provide a more balanced distribution between military and non-military aid provided to Pakistan. The Bush administration had provided approximately 11 billion USD in assistance to Pakistan since September 2001, including about 6 billion USD in "coalition support funds" that reimburse the Pakistani military for its contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Obama administration is of the view that too much of this assistance has gone to the Pakistani army and that the provision of aid has often proved insufficiently transparent. They want to make future American assistance more accountable by increasing U.S. oversight.

The Kerry-Lugar (previously called Biden-Lugar) bill recently offered legislation designed to shift this paradigm of a security centric relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. This legislation titled "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008," introduced in July 15, 2008, aims to transform the relationship from what Vice President Biden terms "transactional" to a deeper, broader effort that connects the Pakistani population to America. Under this bill Pakistan will receive 1.5 billion USD a year in non-military aid, for the next five years extendable to fiscal year 2018. The non-military aid is intended to promote projects to strengthen democratic governance, including an independent judiciary, anti-corruption efforts at all levels of government and the legal system, and transparent accounting by all branches of government. The present administration is of the view that the overwhelmingly military nature of all previous U.S. aid packages has failed to effectively counter the long-term drivers of instability that plague the country.

It is already evident that this non-military economic aid does not come without some strings attached. Recent policy statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, indicate that the latest aid package is tied up with the Pakistan military's performance in meeting the security objectives in the border regions of Afghanistan. In other words, it is a classic carrot and stick policy.

The greater portion of this non-military aid is designed to address economic, developmental and social roots of militancy and insurgency especially in the FATA region and undertake large scale infrastructural and economic generation projects.

Assure the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets
The potential for the collision of terrorism and nuclear weapon technology is arguably the greatest threat to American national, and even global, security. The shadow of the Dr. Qadeer Khan episode still hangs over U.S. perceptions regarding the safety of Pakistan's nuclear program. On March 12, 2009 U.S. Democratic Representative Jane Harman introduced legislation aiming to cut off military aid to Pakistan unless U.S. officials are able to interrogate Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is allegedly accused of nuclear proliferation, calling him a loose nuke scientist. Dr. Khan was released from house arrest on February 6, 2009 by a Pakistani court.
The legislation would also tie continued U.S. military aid-equipment, supplies, and training-to getting satisfactory assurances from Islamabad that it is monitoring Khan's movements and activities. The measure would tie aid to the White House guarantee that Pakistan is making Khan available to the U.S. government for interrogation and is providing adequate assurances that it will watch him closely to prevent any efforts to disseminate nuclear technology or know-how. It would also, however, give President Barack Obama the power to waive the restriction if he certifies that it is in the U.S. national interest to do so.
Signs within Pakistan of deteriorating law and order, political fragmentation, the rise of militancy and an apparent lack of consensus within the Pakistani security establishment have raised fears in the U.S. over the safety and security of nuclear materials and weapons in Pakistan. As such, enhancing command and control safeguards and ensuring the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets remain a critical concern for the Obama administration.
There is an enduring fear in Pakistan that under the guise of safety concerns the U.S. hopes to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The Obama administration is likely to assist, fund and institute improved systems of command and control for Pakistan's nuclear assets and increase surveillance and screening of personnel employed at Pakistan's nuclear installations. The challenge for the Obama administration is to ensure reliable safeguards are in place without making the Pakistani establishment doubt their intentions.
In the first week of April 2009, the Obama administration is likely to unveil what is popularly being termed as the new ‘AfPak' strategy. Skeptics warn that U.S. efforts to adopt a broader approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan might actually lead to a dangerous broadening of the conflict by engulfing Pakistan into the vortex of war. Also it remains to be seen how receptive Pakistan-its state and various elements of the polity-are to the various proposals outlined in the strategy. The test of this strategy is going to be in its execution; how rigid or how open the architects of this policy are to the input offered by various stakeholders within Pakistan, is likely to seriously impact the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in the long term.

Director, Eurasian Studies, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad