By all accounts, cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's movement in Iraq has been fragmented since the onset of its political and military decline in early 2007. The impact of the surge, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's emergence as a strongman of Iraqi Shiite politics, and disputes within internal factions has led the Sadrist movement to struggle to remain relevant as the political structure in Iraq takes shape.
Under the leadership of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, the Sadrist movement gained momentum in the 1990s but it was not tolerated by Saddam's regime from the beginning and was seen as a grassroots movement that was not even political. He and his two sons were assassinated in 1999. Al-Sadr was expected to follow in his father's' footsteps to become an ayatollah, but with the fall of Hussein's regime in 2003, his seminary studies were interrupted and he formed the Mehdi Army militia to stake a claim in the new Iraq. Following the 2003 invasion, the Sadrist movement reemerged with the support of Iranian-based Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri.
In 2005, Sadr loyalists opted to join the political process and won 30 parliamentary seats in the January 2006 election. But from January 2007 to mid-2008, coalition and Iraqi offensive operations not only targeted the Mehdi militia's military strength in Baghdad and southern Iraq, but they also empowered political rivals to marginalize the Sadrist movement. Rival political groups such as Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's Da'wa Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) gained greater influence and have sought to weaken the movement by winning over its key constituency of the urban and young Shiite poor and rural tribes. After a series of setbacks, it had become evident that Sadr's militia was not enough to strengthen his political odds. Sadr has since then sought to strengthen his control over the movement and his political options by enhancing his religious credentials, backed by Iran.
The success of the U.S. surge accentuated rifts in the Sadrist movement and deeply divided its political, religious, and military factions. Calculating their political and military losses, the Sadrist clerical and parliamentary leadership sought to consolidate their splintered bid for power and launched an internal restructuring to improve their image and political prospects in the summer of 2008.

In the lead up to the provincial elections held in January, it was anticipated that if Maliki proved successful in forging a coalition with leaders from the fractured Sadrist faction, he would be in a position to consolidate enough clout, resources and influence to singlehandedly determine Iraq's political fate for the foreseeable future. The success of Maliki's "State of Law" coalition in southern Iraq and the election results have been touted as an indication of his ability to do so.

With parliamentary elections to be held on the provisional date of January 30, 2010, any hopes Sadr has to reorganize and reconstitute the movement hinges on his ability to compete with the Da'wa Party and the ISCI for the traditional voter base. Should the Sadrists succeed in holding on to their electorate and appealing to the Sunnis as well, they may have a real opportunity to form parliamentary coalitions in the post-election environment.

Sadr's visit to Turkey in May is part of the evolution of his movement which began when its leadership moved to restructure, improve and consolidate their political prospects. Essentially, this meant a return to the original Sadrist vision and an emphasis on the ‘intellectual and ideological' aspects of the movement rather than armed resistance. Reorganized as the Mumahidoon, or ‘those who pave the way' the group would be engaged in education and social aid projects. Shifting to a social works approach and harnessing voter support in exchange for community handouts is a familiar tactic that harps to the transformation of militant groups like Hamas to political parties hoping to play the democracy card. Furthermore, engagement in the democratization process promised the Sadrist clerical and political leadership with a source of income and a deeper patronage network.

Largely marginalized from the Iraqi government, most noticeably over negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) last year, the Sadrist bloc is entering the parliamentary election period from a position of political weakness. Maliki has taken great pains to collect support from within the traditional Sadrist power base, most clearly demonstrated by the tribal support councils established in the Shiite south from late 2008; largely interpreted as a bid to consolidate a patronage network ahead of the provincial elections.

This year's provincial elections were marked by wider participation overall and cautious signs of a shift away from an ethno-sectarian based model to one that increasingly looked to ideological and core political issues and to some degree, candidate qualifications. The Sadrists did not participate directly but supported independent lists, urging their popular support bases to support nationalists or candidates with a nationalistic viewpoint. The Sadrists supported two lists of independents and technocrats running in most southern governorates and Baghdad, and received between 5-10% of the votes, with a stronger showing than the ISCI in Baghdad. Da‘wa emerged as a more prominent player than before, having drawn a more strict distinction between itself and the ISCI.

It is most likely that the main discourse defining next year's national elections will be along the lines of the recent provincial elections, with a strong emphasis on the combined forces of nationalism and centralism, largely spearheaded by Maliki and his supporters. Results at the ballot box in January raised hope that a shift towards a rejection of sectarian identity politics is not beyond possibility in Iraq. In southern Iraq this was reflected in a fragmentation of the vote in many councils. Although progress has been made, the political balance remains fragile, especially with the Kirkuk issue still unresolved and the risk that Kurdish-Arab tensions may flare up. With U.S. combat troop withdrawal looming ahead, the risk of a reemergence of violence unfortunately remains.

Sadr in Turkey

An interpretation of Sadr's visit to Turkey on May 1, during which time he met with President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, as a manifestation of an encroaching confrontation between Turkey and Iran over who would have a say over the future of Iraq would be an oversimplified and false one. Despite rhetoric claiming the contrary, Sadr could not have made the visit without Iran's consent. The most likely scenario is that Sadr supporters requested Turkey's blessing for their Shia party to convene in Istanbul with Sadr's participation, because Turkey would be less likely than any Arab state to interfere in their gathering. The request must have been given the green light not only by Iran, but checked by Ankara with Baghdad as well. Keen for Turkey to play a constructive role in securing political stability and the commitment to a working democracy in Iraq, the U.S. must have endorsed Sadr's visit to Ankara as a means to facilitate the process of an Iraqi integration whereby various factions reject armed resistance and seek their interests through the political process. The popular notion that the visit of the staunchly anti-U.S. firebrand cleric marks a break in Ankara's relationship with Washington is similarly shortsighted. Turkey's engagement with relevant parties that have a stake in the future of Iraq is in line with the general features of the U.S. vision for Turkey's role in the stabilization of Iraq, particularly in light of the approaching troop withdrawal deadlines.

What Sadr's visit does point to is the possibility of his imminent return to Iraqi politics after an absence since 2007. Turkey has made it clear both in its foreign policy discourse and practice that it is in the enviable position of engaging with all factions in Iraq. But although Turkish officials have stressed that Sadr's appearance in Turkey should be read purely in this light; it is nonetheless a significant development. Turkey may feel that Sadr's appearance has strengthened Turkey's ‘soft power' in Iraq and clout with various groups in the country, increasingly over the Shiite community as well-a noteworthy feat for Sunni-majority Turkey. Given current trends, the coming period will be marked by important developments in Iraqi Shiite and broader Shiite politics. Why the Sadrists chose to convene in Istanbul is linked to Turkey's position over the past few years as a strong regional player with a stake in the future of neighboring Iraq, coined popularly as Turkey's renaissance in the Middle East or the age of ‘neo-Ottomanism'. With Turkey on his side and not completely dismissing the odds of opening a representative office for his movement in Istanbul, Sadr may hope of improving his chances as he reemerges in Iraqi politics. The visit is part of a game Sadr is playing to get more support for his movement in the Middle East.

In selecting Turkey, Sadr may be seeking viable ways to 1) underscore his Iraqi nationalist credentials over Iranian Shiite priorities, and 2) demonstrate the makings of a developing Turkey-Iran cooperation axis in Iraq. For now at least, the U.S. may be putting up with this as part of their project of peacefully engaging Iran in stabilizing Iraq, as long as Turkey plays the role of honest broker and balances any perceived threats posed by Tehran. For Turkey, Sadr's visit symbolizes its expanding role on a number of vital interests in Iraq and the broader region.

Already proving itself to be a relatively amorphous movement, it looks like Sadr is simultaneously trying to emerge as the definitive leader of his fragmented movement and a counter-balance to the ISCI. The ISCI, which suffered a serious setback in the provincial elections, now may have to reorient itself around an ‘Iraq first' identity as well, if it has any hopes of fairing better in the national elections. But unlike what has been suggested by some analysts, Sadr is not likely to be seeking means to free himself from Iranian influence, the visit is more likely a bid to play his role in maintaining Iranian interests in Iraq-not dissolve them. It must also be kept in mind that Sadr is not that close to the Iranian government. Iran had very soon realized that support for Maliki would be a better option for Iran. Sadr will likely try to garner as much Iranian support as possible until his movement can consolidate enough domestic support in Iraq to rise to political prominence on his own credentials.

There are several items that may have been on the agenda during Sadr's meetings in Ankara:

Kirkuk: Espousing a strictly nationalist line, Sadr has consistently voiced opposition to a federalism-based system for Iraq. In broad terms, his position on oil-rich Kirkuk aligns with Turkey's. The Sadrists have a strong power base among the Shiite community who moved there during the Ba'thist Arabization policy. A Kirkuk that falls within the borders of the Kurdish government would contradict Sadr's support for a strong central government and Iraq's territorial integrity. A rejection of any ethno-sectarian system of government or pro-federal fragmentation of the country would serve both Turkey's interests and buttress Sadr's position in Iraq against other Shiite factions.

Upcoming elections: The Prospect of Sadr's return to Iraq and Maliki's reaction to Sadr's bid for political relevance are important indicators of how Iraq will fare in the short to medium term. Maliki's strong nationalist focus put to the test in the provincial elections may be an overture to Sadr's splintered factions. The U.S. position on the provincial elections held in January was that it was not only a vote of confidence in its own success in helping Iraq securely reach this benchmark, but also a step towards a pluralistic post-Saddam political structure, with the integration of Sunni Arabs and the more moderate elements of the Sadr faction. Their view on the national elections is little different.

Sadr City, Iraq's security and political integration following U.S. troop withdrawal: Although no official statement was made by Turkish officials, the meetings in Ankara were likely an opportunity for Turkey to emphasize the importance it places on maintaining Iraq's security gains and the relative decline in sectarian violence. With the June 30 deadline for U.S. combat troops to evacuate urban centers nearing, there is more doubt than not in the ability of Iraqi security forces to take-over from the Americans. This is more true in Sadr City-the once battleground of some of the fiercest fighting against U.S. forces experienced in Iraq-than elsewhere. It has been reported that the U.S. is preparing against the threat of a renewed insurgency bent once more on wresting control of Sadr City. The recent upsurge in violence-mostly targeting Shiites-has raised new questions about whether Iraq will slide back into violence. Assurance of Sadr's support to do his part to maintain the security situation in Iraq may have been one of the issues on the table during the Ankara discussions.

It was reported that Ankara advised Sadr on an electoral strategy, which broadly included plans to join the democratization process in Iraq. However, this is unlikely to have focused specifically on Sadr forming a political party, at least for the time being. The Shiite meeting in Istanbul, reportedly attended by 70 members of the Sadrist movement from Najaf, and 5 Iraqi parliamentarians, may be the stirrings within the Sadrist movement to consolidate their political momentum within Iraq, perhaps with a view to balance Maliki's Da'wa or unite against ISCI. Whether the splintered Sadrist movement can emerge as a politically capable force, especially given its sectarian past, remains to be seen. The fact remains that Sadr is a radical clergy with no credential in the Middle East and little enthusiasm for democratic values. The power source is Sistani and organizations affiliated with him. The assembled Sadrists reportedly discuss political strategies and coalitions for the coming election period. Iraq's 275-member parliament has 32 Sadr loyalists. But whether al-Sadr can garner broader ethno-sectarian support in the coming term hinges on his ability to convincingly shed his militant past. It was reported in the media that Salah al-Ubaidi, Sadr's chief spokesman in Iraq, said the movement has held meetings this year with minority Sunni Arabs and Kurds and with members of a state-backed Sunni militia movement; no doubt part of overtures to cast itself less as a Shiite sectarian political actor.
Sadr's visit to Turkey came not too long after an unofficial meeting held in Istanbul in February where hardliner Sunni sheikhs and scholars met Hamas officials and pledged support to Hamas in Gaza. It also was not long after the infamous Davos panel where tensions flared between Prime Minister Erdogan and Israeli President Shimon Peres and when anxiety peaked on whether Turkey was turning a cold shoulder to the West. Ankara also hosted Hamas political leader Khaled Mashaal in 2006. Now, the recent visit has led to more speculation on whether Turkey is creeping closer to an axis with Iran and Syria. But dealing with Hamas and dealing with Sadr are two different things.
As national elections approach, in all likelihood Maliki will be able to consolidate his vision for a strong central government, the ISCI will struggle to remain relevant as the cleavage between it and Da'wa widens, and intra-Shiite politics will be the stage of a determinant competition. Whether or not Maliki will attempt bold coalition-building will be a test of his staying power. The coalitions that will form in the run-up and aftermath of the national elections will be pivotal in defining the next stage of Iraqi politics. Should Maliki succeed in any attempts to build parliamentary coalitions with politicians loyal to Sadr, he will likely consolidate his power further and have the final say over this stage of Iraq's political development. Sadr may be preparing to prevent further hemorrhaging of his movement to Maliki. But he faces difficult odds given that his movement is severely split and disorganized. It was reported in March that close to 200 moderates from the Sadrist movement separated to form a splinter group under the name of Shura al-Ulla'ama, or Clerics Advisory. The group is expected to run candidates in January's national elections.

Whether Sadr can espouse a non-violent political culture and find inroads to integrate into Iraq's still fragile political system will remain on the agenda for some time to come. He is not expected to retreat into the shadows, but rather press forward to strengthen his limited hold on his fractured movement, and probably sooner, rather than later. Whether and how he will be able to do so will have important implications for the longer term prospects for national reconciliation in Iraq.