"I would say that the Straits are the heart of Turkey. The Straits, at the same time, are the lungs of Romania. When a region, due to its geographic location, is the heart of one nation and the lungs of the other, simple wisdom dictates to these two nations to unite and form a whole. Both Romania and Turkey have realized this" Representative of Romania and Minister of Foreign Affairs Titulescu, Montreux, 1936

Turkish Straits and The Montreux Convention

The Turkish Straits (or the Turkish Straits Region) are an integrated international maritime passage, consisting of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles. The Turkish Straits connect to the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean, and to the oceans via the Suez Canal and Gibraltar. The Turkish Straits do not resemble any other international straits due to the Sea of Marmora. These are surrounded by Turkish territory and therefore subject to inner sea regime. Consequently, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which are national straits, are used for international trade in accordance with the Montreux Convention.
On 20 July 1936, the Montreux Convention replaced the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits, which was signed in Lausanne on 24 July 1923 and curtailed Turkish sovereignty over the Straits after thirteen years. Although the Montreux Convention caused a debate about its effective date during the process of signing, the convention has survived the World War II, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. On July 2008, the 72nd anniversary of the Montreux Convention was celebrated. Thus, it is the oldest international agreement that is still in effect.

Brief History of the Turkish Straits

The development of The Turkish Straits regime can be divided into two periods; The Ottoman Empire period and the Republic of Turkey period. International agreements on the Turkish Straits, until the Montreux Convention, can be investigated in three periods; the period of Turkish sovereignty (1453-1809), the period of regulation via bilateral agreements (1809-1841) and the period of multilateral agreements (1841-1923).

Turkish Sovereignty (1453-1809)

After the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, the Turkish Straits came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Legally, this meant that the Ottoman Empire would decide which ships are allowed to pass from the Turkish Straits, prohibiting the passage of foreign flagged ships. Thus, after the Ottoman control of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the Straits were closed to foreign ships and closure became the norm. The norm of "Closure", which was enforced when the Ottoman Empire was strong, eroded in the early 18th century with the erosion of the Ottoman Empire.
Tsarist Russia's deployment of a naval fleet in Azak Sea via seizing Azak Castle, in accordance with the Karlofca Treaty in 1699, was the first serious step towards changing the status quo in the Black Sea, and initiated a new period in the status of the Straits. Consequently, in time, other European states got involved in the Straits' problem between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia. This caused the expansion of the problem and resulted in linking the sovereignty over the Straits to the approval of other states.
With the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774, between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia, Russia acquired the right to maintain merchant ships in the Black Sea. That is; the right for trading and merchant ship passage from the Straits.

Regulation via Bilateral Agreements (1809-1841)

The 1798 and the 1805 Ottoman-Russian Alliance Agreements granted free passage to the Russian warships, while closing the Straits to third parties. However, this agreement was annulled because of war between the two states in 1807. According to the Kale-I Sultaniye (Sovereign Castle) Treaty, signed between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain on 5 January 1809, the passage of foreign warships was prohibited unless The Sultan gave permission, (firman). Tsarist Russia acquired free cruise in the Black Sea and passage right for the Straits as well as extensive trading rights after signing Edirne Agreement with the Ottoman Empire in 1829. The provision in the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi which stated "in case Russia was attacked, the Ottoman Empire would close the Straits against Great Britain and France," which was signed on 8 July 1833, gave Russia a major advantage in the Straits and increased its security in the Black Sea. This was the last agreement in which the Ottoman Empire could exercise its sovereignty over the Straits.

Multilateral Agreements (1841-1923)

A new period had started for the Turkish Straits with the signature of the "London Straits Convention" on 13 July 1841. For the first time the status of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits was regulated by multilateral agreement, bringing to an end the era of bilateral agreements. Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were party to the agreement. The "London Straits Convention" is significant because, besides the fact that the Straits acquired an international status, the Ottoman sovereignty over the Straits was curtailed, Russia lost its advantage over the Straits, and France and Great Britain increased their security in the Mediterranean. Legally, the agreement prohibited passage of foreign warships from the Straits during peacetime. Prohibition of the passage of warships from the straits during peacetime became an international obligation with the "London Straits Convention".
The "Treaty of Paris", which was signed on 30 March 1856 after the Russian defeat at Crimea, demilitarized the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire, Russia, Great Britain, France, the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont, Austria and Prussia were party to the treaty. Russia and the Ottoman Empire's over the Black Sea were tied to a series of provisions. According to such provisions, the passage of military ships of all states, including the Ottoman Empire, was prohibited, mainly to prevent the passage of Russian navy from the Straits. Moreover, according to this treaty, the 1841 Straits Convention was put into effect and both Russia and the Ottoman Empire prohibited having warships and shipyards in the Black Sea.

On 13 March 1871, the London Straits Convention Relating to the Black Sea, consisting of nine articles, was signed. This convention lifted the neutral status of the Black Sea and granted the right to the Sublime Porte to allies for the passage of their warships, with permission for the Sultan, during peacetime. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire was relieved, to a great extent, from the restrictions that were imposed on the exercise of its sovereign right over the Straits by the treaties of 1841 and 1856. In the Treaty of Berlin, which the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, France, Austro- Hungarian Empire, Germany, Italy and Russia signed in 1878, the parties agreed that the Straits - in conformity with previous treaties - should be open to free passage and left to the Ottoman control during wartime. According to the draft of the Treaty of Sevres, which was signed on 10 August 1920, commercial and war-ships and planes of all states enjoyed the right of free passage from Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus. The region was not to be blockaded and the rights granted by the law of war to warring parties were not to be exercised. Regulation of the passage from the straits and its implementation was left to an international commission, in which the Ottoman Empire was not represented.
In the Lausanne Straits Convention, which was signed in accordance with article 23 of the Lausanne Treaty, on 24 July 1923, it was decided that the passage regime of the Turkish Straits would be regulated by the 1871 Treaty of London. In the Lausanne Straits Convention, the norm of free passage for merchant ships was enacted, demilitarization of the Straits was decided, and tonnage limit was set for the foreign ships entering the Black Sea during peacetime. However, because of persistence of Great Britain, right of freedom of passage, regardless of tonnage, was granted for warships during wartime.
The salient features of the Lausanne Straits Convention were demilitarization of the Straits regions and establishment of the Straits Commission. According to the Treaty of London, the Ottoman Empire could open the Straits to "friends or allied" powers' warships, if necessary for its security. The Montreux Convention, which determines the legal status of the Turkish Straits today, lifted the restrictions of demilitarized zone and International Straits Commission that were restricting Turkish sovereignty. The Montreux Convention, which was signed by Bulgaria, Great Britain, Austria, France, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece on 20 July 1936, was approved by Turkish Great National Assembly on 31 July 1936 via Act 3056 and came into effect on 9 November 1936. The Montreux Convention is the main document that regulates merchant and war-ships passage regime of the Turkish Straits. It is one of the few international agreements that are still significant and effective.

The Legal Status and Navigation Regime of the Turkish Straits

The legal regime that regulates the freedom of navigation and transit in the Turkish Straits is the Montreux Convention, as mentioned above. The framework of the Montreux Convention, which consists of 29 articles and 4 annexes, regulates the transit of both commercial and war ships from the Turkish Straits. Signed on 20 July 1936 at Montreux city of Switzerland, the Convention is binding on third parties due to its objective status, includes leges specialis binding provisions for practices concerning the Turkish Straits and possible disagreements, and thus, it is a sui generis convention. Ships that would use the Turkish Straits and the Republic of Turkey have rights and obligations towards each other. "Freedom of Passage" concept within the Montreux Convention has gained new meanings through time.

The Meaning of "Complete Freedom of Passage" for Merchant Ships

According to Article 2 of the Montreux Convention "[i]n times of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of passage and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, (...) without any formalities, except as provided in Article 3"
Prima facie, freedom of transit and navigation can be interpreted as the freedom of navigation in high seas. However, many Turkish international law experts agree that the "complete freedom of passage" for merchant ships in the Montreux Convention is "innocent passage". However, this is a sui generis right of innocent passage. There are two reasons for this. First, since there was not an international law of sea at the time when Montreux Convention was signed, we apply international customary law. Second is the interpretation of information and documents of the preparatory period of the Montreux Convention.
In 1936, there were no conventions which regulate the international law of sea. This situation changed only with the 1958[1] UN Geneva Conventionsi and the 1982 UN Convention on Law of Sea. Because of this, during the preparations of the Montreux Convention, international customary law was consulted and according to the norms of that time, merchant and war-ships have right of innocent passage from territorial waters. The International Court of Justice in the 1949 Corfu Strait case confirmed this norm. The court ruled that passage from straits, which are located between two high seas and used in international transportation, could not be delayed and this is an innocent passage. At issue, in the significance of the case of Corfu Strait for the Montreux Convention, is the right of transit for warships[2]
The definition of "innocent passage", according to law, is "not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of coastal state." However, 46 years later, international laws significantly innovated the right of undeniable innocent passage with the transit passage [3] regime. Although Turkey is not party to UN Convention on Law of Sea (CLS), transit passage rule cannot be disregarded. Because, if the Montreux Convention was annulled some day, the question of which regime will apply will be paramount and Turkey may experience pressures from other states to abide by the transit passage regime.
Documents of the Montreux Convention conference are significant sources for possible problems that may arise in application or interpretation of the right of passage from the Turkish Straits. According to 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, if there is uncertainty in the interpretation of an international treaty, preparatory work of the treaty can be used as a secondary source[4] for interpretation. When the preparatory work or proceedings of the Montreux Convention are examined, it can be seen that Turkey attached great importance to the innocent passage. Minister of Foreign Affairs Numan Menemencioglu protected Turkish sovereignty over the Straits in his opening statement.
The Montreux Convention brought three significant restrictions to commercial ships' freedom of passage, or in other words innocent passage: compulsory pre-notice or ship reporting system (Article 2); health check (Article 3); passage fee and taxes (Article 2 and Annex 1). These restrictions to innocent passage, applied only in Turkish Straits, shows sui generis characteristic of the passage regime because the conditions for commercial and war-ships' passage, such as pre-reporting, fees and taxes and health inspections, do not exist in the international law, especially in the transit passage regime of 1982 CLS. Thanks to the Montreux Convention, Turkey enjoys broader rights than neighbouring states to the Straits, which are party to 1982 CLS. Consequently, Ankara was able to establish international recognition of Turkish Straits Regulation in 1994 and 1998 in accordance with rights given by the Montreux Convention. Although Turkey is not party to 1982 CLS, it was able to keep Turkish Straits out of the transit passage regime of 1982 CLS (all thanks to the Montreux Convention)[5]

1994/1998 Turkish Straits Regulation and International Maritime Organization

Against increasing maritime traffic and accidents, Turkey enacted Regulation Relating to the Traffic Regime of the Straits and Marmara Region in 1994. In 1998, it enacted a new regulation introducing some changes to the previous one. The aim of the 1994 regulation is to provide security for navigation, life, property and environment in the Straits and Marmara region. Such security would be realized through a new traffic regulation. The new regulation in the 1994 statute was crafted in accordance with Rule 10 of COLREG (International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea), and traffic separation scheme was introduced.
A year before the enactment of 1994 statute, Turkey presented the new Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) to International Maritime Organization, which is based in London and Turkey carries its membership. Turkey's decision caused significant and long-lasting debates on the regime of commercial ships' passage from the Turkish Straits. In fact, the main reason for the debate is not the TSS that Turkey presented to IMO but the 1994 regulation itself.
There were some differences between the IMO rules and advices on the Turkish Straits TSS and 1994 Turkish Straits Regulation. Turkish national regulations defined big vessels as 150 meter and longer and deep draft vessel as 10 meter and deeper water draft. On the other hand, the IMO rules and advices define big vessels as 200 meter and longer and deep draft vessels as 15 meter and deeper water draft. It was asserted that Turkish regulation was against the Montreux Convention and international law because it grants the right to shut down the traffic unilaterally and could even prevent the passage of vessels carrying dangerous cargo.
At the end of seven year's of work on secure navigation and the protection of sea environment, IMO can be said to have accomplished its mission. More importantly, Turkey proved that it regulates merchant ships to and from the Straits in accordance with sovereign rights that Turkey protects, not in accordance with high seas regulations, as Menemencioglu's warned at the Montreux Conference in 1936. Fourteen years have passed since the first memo was presented to the IMO. Today, the International Maritime Organization has accepted new rules and regulations enacted by Turkey for the protection of navigation security in its own Straits.

Warships Passage Regime of the Turkish Straits

The United States' request to deploy NATO ships in the Black Sea caused debates about warships related sections of the Montreux Convention. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Black Sea region underwent a historic geostrategic and geopolitical transformation. During the Cold War Turkey was the West's only ally in the Black Sea. Western influence over the Black Sea has increased after 1990. Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004, and the European Union in 2007. Ukraine and Georgia went through pro-Western political revolutions. The Black Sea gained a distinct strategic significance because of the US led allied occupation of Iraq in 2003. The United States wanted to expand NATO's "Operation Active Endeavour", which is currently underway in the Mediterranean with active Turkish participation, to the Black Sea because of the terror threat in the region. However, neither Turkey nor the Russian Federation approached this proposal warmly. Consequently, some think tanks, based in the United States, tried to open a debate about the warship related articles of the Montreux Convention.
Turkey's main goal at the Montreux Conference was to end demilitarized zone in the Turkish Straits that was brought by the Lausanne Treaty. To realize this goal, Turkey succeeded in persuading states that were party to the Lausanne Treaty for a new conference and gathered them in Montreux via rebus sic stantibus, the international law rule of "changed conditions", by asserting that Turkey has a right to self-defence against the approaching Second World War. In short, the main goal of the Montreux Convention was to regulate the legal status of foreign flagged warships passing through the Turkish Straits. Moreover, if the preamble of the Convention is considered, the goal of the Montreux Convention was to secure both Turkey and the Black Sea neighboring states. Further, as seen in the conference proceedings, the approach of the Soviet Union, which wanted to limit the entrance of foreign flagged ships to the Black Sea as much as possible, had not changed since the Lausanne Treaty.
According to the Soviet Union, the Black Sea should be closed to non-Black Sea states. One of the most debated issues of the conference was the navigation status of non-neighboring states' warships in the Black Sea. The Soviet Union questioned the motives of foreign warships in the Black Sea, a sea with no connection with other seas. Because of the insistence of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, which defended complete freedom of passage of the warships, withdrew its proposal at the Montreux Conference. Today, the United States, which backs Great Britain, sends its warships to the Black Sea every year, under the program of "Freedom of Navigation in the Black Sea," to protect and express open seas rights.
Section 2 (Articles 8 - 22) of the Montreux Convention regulates the status of warships. The Montreux Convention regulates both merchant and war-ships' passage in accordance with three categories: peacetime, wartime and -exclusively to Montreux Convention - imminent danger of war. Different from the international common law, the 1936 Montreux Convention imposed restrictions such as administrative and diplomatic processes; volume-tonnage, number and duration of stay on foreign flagged ships for their passage from Turkish Straits and stay in the Black Sea. The Main restrictions imposed by the Montreux Convention on foreign flagged warships can be stated as follows:

Compulsory pre-notice to Turkey before the passage[6]
Aggregate tonnage limitation[7]
Type of warships[8]
Necessity for the Submarines to pass during the daylight and above surface[9]
Restrictions on duration of stay for warships of the non-neighboring states and particular limitations on aggregate tonnage [10]

In case of war and if Turkey is a warring state, it can act as it pleases and shut down the Straits to all foreign warshipsi. This right can be exercised if Turkey perceives that there is an "imminent danger of war" but Turkey should send a communiqué to Secretary-General of the League of Nations regarding the matteri[11]
The Montreux Convention is the only convention in the world that regulates both passage regime of foreign flagged warships from the Turkish Straits and legal status of warships that would like to enter and stay in the Black Sea.

Regarding Annulment of the Montreux Convention

The Montreux Convention was expected to remain in force for 20 years, not for 70 years[12]. According to the current articles, if, two years prior to the expiry of twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have given notice of denunciation to the French Government, the present Convention shall continue in force until two years after such notice shall have been given. At the expiry of each period of five years from the date of entry into force of the Convention, each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions of the Conventioni[13]
In case of annulment of the Convention because of denunciation by one of the High Contracting Parties, according to Article 28, freedom of passage and navigation principle, which is quoted in Article 1, shall continue to remain in force without an expiry date. At this point, the question of what would be the meaning and the scope of the mentioned principle arises. Does it mean "transit passage" regime as in the 1982 CLS or another type of regime? Moreover, would Article 1 be applicable to both commercial ships and warships? Turkey should be legally and politically prepared to answer questions such as it may encounter in the future.

Accidents at Turkish Straits

Turkey restructured maritime traffic in the Turkish Straits according to internationally agreed rules of collision prevention in order to increase navigation security and life, property and environmental safety, and to solve problems that are causing accidents; thus in 1994, it prepared regulation relating to traffic regime of the Straits and Marmara Region. The distinctive feature of this regulation is that it was prepared in accordance with the contemporary international rules that do not contradict the passage regime of the Montreux Convention.
The size and the number of ships passing from the Bosphorus have increased in recent years due to technological advancements and increase in trade. The increased number of ships that are carrying dangerous goods, especially oil, posed a threat to navigation, life and environmental security of the Bosphorus. Many sea accidents have happened at the Bosphorus to date. These accidents threatened environmental security and caused air pollution.
More than 10 million people living in Istanbul and surrounding area are gravely endangered because of the risk of accidents at sea. Possible accidents at Bosphorus, which is the route of tanker traffic, could result in serious consequences for Istanbul and the region. The closure of Bosphorus because of an accident could negatively affect all states that are using Bosphorus, particularly the Black Sea states.
According to Article 2 of the Montreux Convention "Pilotage and towage remain optional", in order words, pilotage is not compulsory. On the other hand, according to a research analyzing accidents at sea from 1982-2003, only 7.2 % of ships that had accidents were using maritime pilot.
In recent years, the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) concept and the problem of its declaration for maritime traffic regulation has entered the global maritime agenda. In the declared PSSA navigation regulations, traffic separation lanes, ship reporting, one or double way passage regulation etc. is applied. Some of the new regulations brought compulsory pilotage for ships that are using declared PSSA. The applicability of this kind of regulation, although it is debatable on the international level, has entered the Turkish agenda.
As seen above, innocent passage is a limited right as far as life, property and environmental security of the coastal state is concerned. Turkey's establishment of rules forestalling possible accidents that could harm human health and environment while ensuring minimum delay in international navigation is compatible with the aim and scope of both the Montreux Convention and international rules. Because of this, in order to provide innocent passage from the Turkish Straits, and to prevent accidents at sea, necessary precautions should be taken at the earliest. Necessary precaution should be initiated regarding the following issues: improvement of navigation aides; reporting system; pilotage and towing services; decreasing human errors; establishment of alternative dangerous cargo routes; control of maritime traffic; ensuring environmental security; preparation and investigation of communication tools and reports of accidents at sea; auditing after accidents at sea; initiation of scientific and legal debates on declaration of Bosphorus as PSSA; establishment of necessary regulation regarding accident at sea areas and provisions for risk management.
Necessary funds for investment in essential precautions (like maritime fire-brigade) to increase navigation security in the Bosphorus can be made available by finding ways to increase taxes and charges on the usage of agreed services, "Lighthouses, Light and Channel Buoys" and "Life Saving Services", of the Montreux Convention. Low standard ships that pass directly through Bosphorus, and ships that do not pay fees before the passage for lighthouse, life services or health control, should be investigated. Necessary measures should be taken regarding these. Consequently, compulsory insurance for big ships and ships that are carrying dangerous cargo can be added to 1998 Straits Regulation.

Turkish Straits: Transportation and Energy Corridor of 21st Century

As the second busiest waterway after the Straits of Malaka, the Turkish Straits experience four times more traffic than the Panama and the Suez Canal and twice as much as the Kiel Channel. Traffic from Main-Danube, Volga-Baltic and Don-Volga channels resulted in the expansion of Straits' hinterland, thus increasing the burden on the region. In 1936, when the Montreux Convention was signed, approximately 4,500 ships passed from Bosphorus every year. In 2007, according to the Under Secretariat of Maritime Affairs statistics, approximately 57,000 ships and 10,000 tankers passed from Bosphorus, carrying 144 million dangerous cargos. Moreover, the size of ships passing from the Straits continues to increase because of (1) developments in technology, (2) increasing significance of the Black Sea as an important transit corridor between east and west for oil and natural gas transportation and (3) pressures from economies of scale, which find a broad range of application to merchant shipping. The weight of freight business is shifting towards tankers as the oil from the Caspian region is transported to the world market.
Turkish Straits have experienced an increase in tanker traffic in recent years. Since 1892, Black Sea is used as an energy corridor and for petrol products that were loaded at Batumi port and transported to Far East via the Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal. 1% (17-44 billion barrels) of world's proven oil reserves lies in the Caspian region and its transportation to European and other markets via the Straits makes the Straits an energy bridge, thus increasing the traffic density as well as the economic and strategic significance of the Bosphorus.

Conclusion: The Future of the Turkish Straits

Since its ratification, for 72 years the Montreux Convention has significantly helped to maintain regional and international peace. Even at the most dangerous times during the Cold War, there were no armed clashes in the Black Sea. Considerable credit for this goes to the Montreux Convention.
At the time when the Montreux Conventions was ratified, the aggregate displacement tonnage of the biggest warship that could enter the Black Sea was 30,000 tons. This weight represented the biggest warship at that time, the Dreadnought.
The United States is not a party to either the Lausanne Treaty or the 1936 Montreux Convention. However, the Montreux Convention binds the United States because of its objective legal status. However, it is well known that the United States wants to deploy warships in the Black Sea. Today, the US deploys aircraft carriers at the strategic points of international maritime trade and world seas. While the aircraft carriers have strong defenses against air attacks, these are weak against warships and submarines. Consequently, aircraft carriers need other defensive platforms. Therefore, an aircraft carrier needs a minimum of 100.000 displacement tons of protection in case it has to be deployed in the Black Sea.
The United States' desire to deploy an aircraft carrier to the Black Sea in order to control both east-west and north-south corridors is apparent. That means there is a motive for the United States to seek changes to the Montreux Convention articles related to warships, even if it is not a party to the convention. Consequently, Turkey should start devising new strategies and seeking new alliances to protect the status quo against the United States' bid to change the Montreux Convention. We cannot say that academic works, conferences on the significance of the Montreux Convention and on the transformation of the Black Sea geopolitics as well as the anniversary celebrations etc. will be adequate to counter the U.S efforts.

Prof. Dr. Necmettin AKTEN- Istanbul University Faculty of Engineering Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering nakten@istanbul.edu.tr
Dr. Nur Jale ECE- Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs Head Office of Maritime Trade jaleece2004@yahoo.com
Nilüfer ORAL, J.D.- Istanbul Bilgi University Faculty of Lawnoral@bilgi.edu.tr
Hasan KANBOLAT- ASAM Caucasia Expert hkanbolat@asam.org.tr
[1]Convention on Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone, Continental Shelf Convention, High Seas Convention, Convention on Fishery and Protection of High Seas Life Sources, See: A. Gündüz, Milletlerarası Hukuk Temel Belgeler Örnek Kararlar, 5th Edition, İstanbul, Yetkin, 2004.
[2]Corfu Straits Case was between Great Briatin and Albania. It is about the disagreement on the passage of British warships from Corfu Straits.
[3]A significant translation difference arouse between French official text and its English translation of the Montreux Convention. In the French text, although "liberté de passage" was written in the Article 2, it was translated to mean "liberté de transit". This difference became more important after 1982 CLS's transit passage regime. See, G. Aybay, Türk Boğazları, İstanbul, Aybay Hukuk Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1998, pp. 52-54.
[4] Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Article 32: Supplementary Means of Interpretation
[5]Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Article 31 (c section).
[6]According to Article 13 of the Montreux Convention, Black Sea powers should notify Turkey through diplomatic channels 8 days before the passage. This period increase to 15 days for non-Black Sea powers. Moreover, passage should take place in 5 dyas after the notificantion.
[7]According to Article 14 of Montreux Convention, the maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in course of transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons except in the cases provided for in Article 2 and in Annex 3. However, according to Article 11, Black Sea powers may send through the Straits capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid down in the first paragraf of Article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers
[8]For example, air defence ships are not permitted to pass from Turkish Straits.
[9]Montreux Convention Article 12. Black Sea Powers were granted limited rigths on the passage of submarines from the Straits
[10]According to Article 18 of Montreux Convention, the aggegate tonnage of ships of non-Black Sea powers during the peacetime cannot exceed 30.000 tons, but under any circumstances it cannot exceed 45.000 tons
[11]Montreux Convention Article 20.
[12]Montreux Convention Article 21.
[13]Montreux Convention Article 28.
[14]Montreux Convention Articles 29 and 28.