The McChrystal strategy for Afghanistan proposes to secure the bulk of the Afghan population by protecting key cities and towns in south and eastern Afghanistan. By securing population centres, the strategy aims to foster responsible governance within the secured areas and, wherever possible, to persuade the Taliban fighters through pressure and incentive to lay down arms.
The strategy of securing the population centres must not be confused with an "urban" strategy. It is a population-centric strategy which requires deploying soldiers to where there is a concentration of people. As a large number of Afghans live along the Helmand River in Helmand Province, so the focus is on the agricultural communities in the green zone there. Most of the population of Kandahar province lives in Kandahar city, so logically the strategy urges the concentration of forces and effort in and around Kandahar to secure Kandahar city. The underlying rationale being that the Taliban can only remain an existential threat to Afghanistan when they have influence over the population and economic centres. Once they are cut off from support and funding and driven into the barren countryside, they would become irrelevant and easier to be neutralized later.
Although the strategy aims to focus on all large concentrations of populations such as the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Herat in the west, there is a prioritizing of effort in the insurgency-hit areas in the south and southeast. Most of the 30,000 additional troops approved by President Obama are likely to be despatched to the dangerous insurgency-hit areas in Regional Command or RC (South) and in the Greater Paktia area of RC (East).
Regional Command (South)
In RC South, critical population concentrations lie mainly in the two Pushtun-dominated southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. In the Helmand province, critical population concentrations lie along the Helmand River Valley, mainly around the towns of Sangin in the north to Garmsir in the south. The estimated population of this area is around 650,000-700,000. Coalition and ANSF Forces on the ground in Helmand as of January 2010 include 13,000 U.S. Marines. Out of the 9,500 British soldiers who are serving in Afghanistan, 6,200 are deployed in Helmand province. The coalition troops there also include 700 Danish soldiers and 1,800 Afghan National Army soldiers. All in all, there are already more than 20,000 coalition troops and trainers in Helmand as of January 2010. By March 2010, a further addition of two Marine Brigades is likely to boost the U.S. marine contingent in Helmand to roughly 20,000-plus. With the deployment of a new Afghan Army Corps in Helmand in support of the coalition forces, the troop levels in the province would approach the 25:1,000 ratio of forces to locals that the McChrystal strategy specifies is required to win a counterinsurgency campaign.
The other vital province in RC South, Kandahar, is also likely to see a deployment of 15,500 additional U.S. troops (roughly 4.5 brigades) by August 2010. The additional troops are likely to target the concentration of population in the Kandahar province around Kandahar City of approximately 1 million. This combined population of around 1,650,000 concentrated in an area of approximately 450 square miles in and around Kandahar and approximately 800 square miles in Helmand province, is likely to be the main target and focus of counterinsurgency operations and greater force induction as outlined in the McChrystal assessment. The planned troop surge is also likely to provide security cover to the city and environs of Tarin Khowt, the provincial capital of Uruzgan which forms the northern tip of the axis of the RC South. Tarin Khowt has an estimated population of around 95 thousand, along with an additional 750 thousand people widely dispersed along small villages and hamlets that often serve as Taliban sanctuaries and support zones.
Regional Command (East)
COIN efforts are also likely to be reinforced in RC (East) as greater number of troops becomes available in 2010. The RC East spans 14 provinces in central and eastern Afghanistan with a combined U.S. and coalition troop strength of 24,000. However the new military strategy focuses on the contested population centres in greater Paktia region (Loya Paktia) which include the three eastern provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika or the P2K region.
These three eastern provinces which border the restive FATA region of Pakistan are likely to see an increase in the number of U.S. and coalition forces. The combined population of these three eastern provinces is around 650 thousand which is dispersed over an area of 3,500 square miles. This area abuts Pakistan's North and South Waziristan agencies and provides a number of infiltration points for Afghan Taliban aligned primarily with the Haqqani network, which operates bases on both sides of the border. Many villages and mountainside hamlets provide support and sanctuaries to the Taliban.
Currently, there are around 4,000 U.S. troops in the P2K area along with 4,200 Afghan National Army soldiers. The U.S. troops in this sector are spread around Camp Salerno in the area around the city of Khost and Camp Hariman in the south Paktika region. In the RC East also lies the important province of Nangarhar which abuts the vital transportation route through the famed Khyber Pass and the Khyber Agency in Pakistan's FATA region. Nangarhar, due to an early and enduring pact between the pro-Karzai influential Arsalai family and the local warlord, Commander Hazrat Ali, had been relatively peaceful with limited Taliban presence, until at least 2008. The past two years have however seen a steady encroachment of Taliban influence, especially in areas controlled by the Khogiani tribes.
The recent announcement by the powerful Shinwari tribal elders vowing to keep the Taliban out of their areas in Nangarhar is an indication that promises of aid (in the Shinwari tribes case it is $1 million in development aid to be directly channelled through the tribal elders) and exploiting local conflicts with the Taliban, can be successful.
The situation in the northern part of the RC East which spans the border provinces of Kunar and Nuristan is far more complex. The United States has withdrawn its troops from its four key bases in Nuristan, which lies close to the border with Pakistan, leaving the north-eastern province as a safe haven for the Taliban-led insurgents.
The U.S. has retained some forces in Nuristan's capital, Parun, to provide security for the governor and government facilities. The U.S. position concerning the withdrawal is that due to winter conditions, supply arteries are choked, making it difficult to keep forces in remote areas. The U.S. has pulled out from some areas in the past, but never from all four main bases.

The move by the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, followed the death on October 3, 2009, of eight American soldiers as well as a number of Afghan National Army forces, when their outpost in Kamdesh was attacked by more than 300 militants. Earlier, on July 13, 2008, nine American soldiers were killed when their outpost in Wanat was attacked by local Taliban. The province is now under the effective control of the network belonging to Qari Ziaur Rahman, a Taliban commander with strong ties to Bin Laden. This makes Nuristan the first Afghan province to be controlled by a network inspired by al-Qaeda. While the U.S. is still maintaining its forward operating bases in the Kunar province which borders the troubled Bajaur Agency in Pakistan, it is unlikely that it would add more troops in this sector of the RC East.
Training of Afghan security forces
A central part of McChrystal's strategic assessment is the acceleration of the training of Afghan security forces so that the coalition troops can effectively partner with them and eventually hand security over to the Afghan forces. The priorities here include training of the Afghan National Security Force which includes the police and the army.
a) Afghan National Army (ANA)
As of June 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Defence had 103,475 authorized personnel, with 89,521 actually assigned. The Afghan National Army operational units had 66,406 soldiers authorized, with 53,417 assigned to around 80 kandaks or battalions. The remaining personnel are assigned to civilian posts in the Ministry of Defence and serve in the headquarters, infrastructure, ministerial and general staff positions, training and transfer accounts.
There have been claims by various independent sources questioning the reliability of the official figures regarding the turnover rate in the Afghan Army. According to the U.S. Department of Defense reports to the U.S. Congress on Afghanistan in January and June 2009, the AWOL (Absent without leave) rate is running at around nine per cent. However, this figure is contested within the Department of Defense itself. Published data by the U.S. Defense Department and the Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan reveals that one in every four combat soldiers quit the Afghan National Army (ANA) during the year ending in September 2009. With the total strength of ANA in 2009 estimated to be 103,475, according to this calculation, the turnover rate among Afghan soldiers is as high as 25 per cent. However, both the turnover and the recruitment rates are likely to improve with the improved pay package announced in December 2009.
Still, doubts remain regarding about the level of training imparted to the hurriedly expanded Afghan Army as also the duration of such training. Also, scepticism has risen that the new targets set by President Karzai during the London conference would ever be met. In the final communiqué issued after the London Conference, the participants also committed to providing the necessary support to the phased growth and expansion of the ANA in order to reach the figure of 171,600 personnel by October 2011, as approved by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board on January 20, 2010.
b) Afghan National Police (ANP)
"The Afghanistan National Police is Afghanistan's frontline of defence against insurgency and organized crime. Yet, despite early $10 billion in international police assistance, the Afghan police are riddled with corruption and incompetence and are far from the professional law enforcement organization needed to ensure stability and development."
These words mark the opening paragraph of the 2009 report published by the United States Institute of Peace. While detailing the past failures and current challenges facing the international police assistance programme in Afghanistan, the report draws the conclusion (shared by other stakeholders) that the police have been ineffective and often act to encourage the greater spread of insurgency through their corruption and penetration by militias and insurgents. Despite the impressive growth in numbers, the expenditure of $10 billion on international police assistance, and the involvement of the United States, the European Union, and multiple donors, the ANP is riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgency.
The European Union has replaced Germany as the lead partner for police reform, but the United States has the largest police programme which is directed by the U.S. military. Putting soldiers in charge of police training has led to militarization of the ANP and its use as a counterinsurgency force.
Using improperly trained, ill-equipped, and insufficiently supported ANP patrol men as "little soldiers" has resulted in the police suffering three times as many casualties as the Afghan National Army. The police are assigned in small numbers to isolated posts without backup and are targeted by the insurgents. Beyond funding the Taliban, the explosion in Afghan narcotics production has fuelled widespread corruption in the Afghan government and police. Drug abuse by police officers has become increasingly common as have other forms of criminal behaviour.
As outlined in General McChrystal's assessment, the new strategy aims to radically improve the training and effectiveness of the ANP with more resource inputs, partnering with mentors and better equipment and salaries. The London Conference communiqué also focused on the need for the qualitative and quantitative improvement in the ANP and committed the Afghan government to the expansion of the police force to the strength of 134,000 personnel by Oct. 2011.
Community Defence Initiative (CDI)
Militias have been formed and have begun taking up arms against the Taliban in several places, including the provinces of Nangarhar and Paktia. However, different approaches are being followed by U.S., British and Afghan forces that are training these militias:
• The U.S. has been working with the Shinwari tribes in Achin district in Nangarhar, to form militias to resist the Taliban. A recent feud between the Taliban and the Shinwari elders caught the attention of American officers who sent a team of Special Forces soldiers to the valley. The first phase was carried out by U.S. special operations group that had been helicopter-dropped in areas where locals had indicated willingness to set up these militias. Initially, the U.S. provided assistance in food, training, and equipment. The second phase involved the provision of communication equipment to the militia to enable them to coordinate with the Afghan Police and the military. According to reports, since December 2009, the U.S. has initiated plans to set up a military base in this Shinwar district of the Nangarhar province. In January 2010, the tribal jirga which represents the 400,000-strong Shinwari tribe formally announced the formation of the tribal lashkar to resist the Taliban activities in their area.
Also in the Paktia province of eastern Afghanistan, Chief Ajmal Zazai, an Afghan Canadian, announced the formation of a tribal police force by uniting the 11 Zazi tribes that owe him allegiance. Recently, Ajmal Zazai spent a month's fellowship at Johns Hopkins enrolled at the Central Asian-Caucasus Institute's Silk Road Studies Program. During his visit to the U.S., he met a number of important personalities including former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. After a tour of Washington discussing the need for a tribal role in bringing peace and stability, Zazai formed the tribal police force in June 2009.
Both south-eastern Nangarhar and the P2K area in the RC East have recently seen a strong resurgence of the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Encouraging the formation of militias through these community defiance initiatives is an integral part of the new McChrystal strategy to undercut the rising force of insurgency through informal militias until the expansion of the regular Afghan national security forces. However, it remains doubtful how enduring and meaningful this militia-building exercise would prove to be in time. The Shinwari territory in the Nangarhar province spans the important transport lifeline that makes its way through the fabled Khyber Pass in Pakistan. The trucking and transit trade on both sides of the border is directly and indirectly managed by pro-Taliban networks. It is not altogether clear how these anti-Taliban militias are going to uproot such enduring common financial interests which bind power brokers on both side of the border in complex economic and political relationships.
• The British have largely endorsed the Arbaki model. Arbakai, the Pashto word for militias, has been an idea which has met with a lot of criticism and scrutiny and has been controversial. In Helmand, the British have been training local youth from the communities who are being offered the opportunity to train in the new Police Training Academy in Nad Ali district of the province. Here, local youth are being given the opportunity to train alongside the British and the ANA personnel. Concerns revolve around these forces as they may create new warlords out of their leaders as also that tribal Pashtun rivalries could be reignited. There are hundreds of Pashtun tribes, so there is also the question of who to arm and how to control these militias.
• The Afghan government has used a different approach. They are channelling assistance to large armed groups, especially those around Kunduz. These groups are not formed around tribal structures but are based around Uzbek or Pushtun commanders who are ready to raise militias against the Taliban. In Kunduz, there have been reports that these militias, after evicting the Taliban from some villages, imposed there own taxation on the people. That is raising concerns in all relevant quarters.
Targeting development projects to key population centres
This ‘militarization' of humanitarian aid in Afghanistan has also been widely criticised by the United Nations officials in Afghanistan. With reference to the latest military operation, officials have stated that the U.N. agencies would not participate in the military's reconstruction strategy in Marjah as part of its current offensive there. General McCrystal's post-operational plan for providing quick governance to Marjah, referred to by some detractors as "government in a box", has been criticised and not endorsed by U.N. officials.
However, at this stage, it is not clear whether the arrests signify an attempt at applying controlled pressure against the Taliban leadership to moderate their negotiating position, nudging them in line with the McChrystal strategy timelines, or a strategic turnaround for Pakistan. If the arrests signify the former, the changes desired in the Taliban position by the Pakistan security establishment are likely to include:
1) Their giving up the demand for the re-establishment of an emirate in Afghanistan;
2) More flexibility on the withdrawal of foreign troops as a pre-condition for dialogue;
3) More willingness to negotiate with the Karzai government; and
4) A shift away from Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban.
More importantly, the Pakistani State would like to remain relevant to the peace negotiations with the Taliban as the Karzai government is engaged in a multitude of secret peace talks in the region. After suffering the brunt of the fallout of the Afghan war, Pakistan does not want to be marginalized at this critical juncture when the shape of post-war Afghanistan is being decided.
The second element of the strategy, that is causing serious concern in Pakistan, is the expected increase of around 30,000 troops, to be amassed largely along the southern borders of Afghanistan which are contiguous to Pakistan's troubled Balochistan Province and southern FATA region. While the U.S. military has recently abandoned a few of their forward operating bases, effectively ceding the north-eastern province of Nuristan to Taliban forces; elsewhere, especially in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, a base-building boom has been underway. Although originally built for 12,000 people, the Kandahar military base and airfield now house between 30,000 and 40,000 - and is growing by the day.
Both China and Iran remain critical to Pakistan's regional security environment. At the same time, Pakistan is also intensifying its strategic military relationship with the major extra-regional player, the U.S., which is currently expanding its military infrastructure in Afghanistan. It is of critical importance for Pakistan's security to understand the full implications of its different strategic partnerships with different regional actors and how they are likely to be affected in any future military conflagration in the region.
Conclusion
The re-invigoration of the U.S. policy focus on Afghanistan led by the Obama administration has provided a frenzied momentum to developments in Afghanistan. The year 2010 promises to be eventful, and there is a broad sense of anticipation that by the end of the year the stage would have been set for a new era to begin in the war-torn country. However, the multiplicity of actors involved; both State and non-State, both regional and extra-regional; implies that the endgame would involve a very complex process of balancing various and often competing interests. Much of this process is likely to unfold in secrecy, shielded away from public scrutiny. However, the McCrystal strategic assessment for Afghanistan is likely to provide the broad guidelines and the accepted script, guiding much of the action that is likely to unfold in Afghanistan in the current year. The challenge for Pakistan will remain to find space for its own interests within the confines of a strategy whose objectives lie far beyond just ensuring Pakistan's stability.