Before the visit of the Saudi monarch Abdallah Bin Abdulaziz to Ankara in August 2006, his foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal described the relations between Turkey and the Kingdom as strategic cooperation. In this description, Saud Al-Faisal tried to push up the level of the relations between the two countries from lassitude, which marked them for years in the past, to the peak of cooperation. This level of cooperation cannot, however, be achieved without important pillars on which it could stand; such as common interests or objectives, a common enemy or danger, a common understanding or a major economic or political collaboration.
If this was not the case between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, why then did Al-Faisal have to exaggerate about the depth of the relations between the two countries; why was Turkey reserved about describing the relations as such and what do these relations mean from the Saudi's point of view?
The answer to these questions are what Saudi Arabia and perhaps other Arab countries see in Turkey, being equal to Iran in terms of military power, population and economy, a possible ally. The Arabs believe that Iran, after the occupation of Iraq and the fall of its regime, has become a danger, threatening again the interests of the Gulf States and other Arab countries known as moderates such as Jordan and Egypt.
These countries think it could be possible to engage Turkey in one common stance against Iran, where they would stand united against the Iranian threat they all face. The Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul, in his description of the relations between the two countries avoided using the phrase "strategic cooperation" in an interview with the Saudi paper Al-Hayat undertaken during his visit. He said the two countries were willing to strategically develop their relations on all economic and political levels, avoiding commenting on the meaning of the ‘strategic cooperation' Al-Faisal referred to. He said in reference to Iran that the two countries should work together to stop the dangers that threaten both of them, ad ding that Turkey is against the policies of axis and polarization among the followers of the same religion, especially those policies that are based on a sectarian basis. He also said that dialogue should be the only way to solve differences in the region and disagreed that Turkey should assume the role played by Iraq in the past as a protective power to balance the Iranian influence in the Gulf, whose efforts to export its Khomeini's Shia ideology and to control the strait of Hormuz and the Gulf as a whole, caused Iraq tofight a war with them that lasted for eight years. Turkey has arranged for unprecedented dialogue between Iranians and Saudis that resulted in the visit of Bandar Bin Sultan, the former Saudi mbassador to Washington and head of Saudi National Security, to Tehran. Now, does the Turkish standpoint in relation to; Iran's ambitions in the region to acquire nuclear weapons; its willingness to fill the void in Iraq after the mericans pull out; its neutral standing behind all the hot spots in the area, from Yemen to Lebanon to Palestine and Iraq, mean that Ankara is not worried as much as its Arab neighbours? The answer is no. Turkey, like its Arab neighbours, feels that Iran is a threat, but it deals with it or faces it differently, knowing that Iran has a long history and experience in striking discreetly through supporting armed groups, whether terrorist or patriotic esistance groups, to protect its interests in the region and to put pressure on its neighbours. Tehran had for more than a decade supported the Kurdish PKK organization, which has bloodied Turkey and depleted its economy; it was also linked to the assassination of a number of Turkish secular intellectuals during the eighties and nineties.
Iran has used these covert weapons against the Turkish secular regime that was allied with America the "Great Satan" and against Turkey's Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil transport plan which, had it began earlier, would have linked Turkey economically with the Turkic republics of Central Asia and would have made the Turkish oil transport to international markets free from the monopoly of Iran and Russia.
The relationship between Turkey and Iran in regard to shaping up the future of the region is undoubtedly a competitive one. The two nations are rivals, due to having completely different points of view regarding the main issues of the region. The Iranian president calls for Israel to be wiped off the world map and for Tehran to get involved in supporting many of the armed Islamic organizations that are dubbed as radical or even terrorist, whilst;
Turkey maintains good relations with Israel. Turkey believes that peace between Israel and the Arabs could be achieved according to the American road map and supports the Great Middle East project and encourages democracy in the Islamic world. The rivalry of the two countries developed after the occupation of Iraq, and especially after the retreat of the Arabic role in the region, this was because Egypt was preoccupied with the issue of hereditary rule; the Syrian role, due to the Lebanese crisis and American pressure, was absent; the collapse of the Iraqi state with its army and economy; the division of the Arabs into radicals and moderates, as portrayed by the Americans, and the break up of the Saudi - Egyptian - Syrian alliance, which had carried the main issues of the Arab world on its shoulders; all these factors made the area of the Middle East open to foreign interventions. In view of the American dilemma in Iraq the role of Iran and Turkey must be taken into consideration, should the new American administration want to reach any possible settlement with Iraq's neighbouring countries, in order to pull its forces out of Iraq.
The Arabs are ready to accept a Turkish leading role in the region for two reasons. The first is the emergence of a more independent Turkish policy that does not follow the Ameri- can decision and is getting closer to the Arabs and more understanding of their issues and situations. The second reason is that the Arabs welcome the model of moderate policies of Turkey more than the Shia model of the Iranian regime, which is based on Vilayet Alfaqih (Shia theocratic government) and harbours animosity towards the west and support radical and extremist groups.
As proof, Turkey has succeeded in overcoming the immunity of the Arab League and signed with it an agreement of economic, political, and cultural cooperation, while Iran's request to join the League as an observer in its meetings have so far been rejected. Another indicator of Turkey's success with the Arabs was when Turkey signed an agreement on a political counselling mechanism between Turkey and Egypt that would pave the way for changing competition into cooperation in which the two countries would become integral to each other, thereby overcoming the sensitivity of the Egyptian stance that look at it as a regional rival. At the same time the flirting between Egypt and Iran to restore official relations, seemed late and without much enthusiasm, although they have now been restored. All the Arab- Iranian attempts to have a mutual approach; represented by President Ahmedi Nejad's visit to the Gulf summit in Doha, and the flirting between Cairo and Tehran, have not been promising.

These attempts are nothing more than indications of the American consent to lessen pressure on Iran, especially after the release of the American military intelligence report that had been leaked deliberately to the media in 2003, despite its confidentiality, which stated that Iran had stopped its effort to get nuclear weapons. In other words, this Arabic attempt to have a mutual approach with Iran does not mean the Arabs sincerely believe Iran is a good neighbour. They are doing it, however, following instructions from Washington, who wish to arrange the Iraqi homeland before the rule of President Bush comes to an end even if it has to hold discussions with Damascus and Tehran in accordance with the proposals of Baker Hamilton's report. Despite this, Turkey refused to participate in imposing economic sanctions on Tehran and is still maintaining its joint energy projects with Iran. This stance made many believe that Turkey stands side by side with Tehran, or that Turkey, Iran and Syria have a joint cooperation or alliance, especially that these three countries share a common worry which is the future of the Kurds who are distributed among these countries. But this conception is not accurate, as Turkey's stance with Iran could be viewed within the framework of regional competition which does not prevent bilateral joint ooperation between the two countries who are trying to avoid clash or confrontation. In its invitation to Hamas, after it won the Palestinian legislative elections, Ankara was aiming at giving it an opportunity to be open to the rest of the international community and to prevent Iran from dealing with them alone. At the meeting of Annapolis one of the reasons why Iran had been isolated regionally and politically was Turkey's wish that Syria and Saudi Arabia could attend. And Turkey did not conceal its ambition in holding secret negotiations between Damascus and Tel Aviv, to increase the gap between Syria and Iran once the desired peace between Syria and Israel was achieved. Internally, the Turkish National Security Council had agreed, after reviewing Turkish military reports, that Iran obtaining nuclear weapons could be a cause for war between them. The rmy submitted other reports that confirmed the necessity of stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons at any cost. Despite the American ejection, Ankara insists on continuing its cooperation with Tehran in the dealing of oil and gas. This cooperation
does not constitute any challenge to the American administration, on the contrary, it is considered to be a part of Turkey's policy that favours its national interests over the dictation of its American ally, who failed in finding a substitute source of energy that Turkey much needs. It wants to establish a more balanced relationship with Washington based on dialogue and mutual understanding and not on domination of one party overthe other without discussion. Turkey needs Iranian gas to meet its energy needs and to support its strategic plan of becoming an important energy transportation area between central Asia and Europe and thus finds that its decision to continue its cooperation with Iran in the field of energy has objective reasons. It believes that close economic cooperation with Iran may help the two countries overcome any political tensions that might arise in the future, as a result of their political rivalry in the region. This cooperation, consequently, could work as a safety valve to stop the two countries from straying off the path of positive and peaceful competition. Turkey has warned a number of Gulf states about rushing to form a front or an Arab axis against Iran, that would depend upon an American military strike against Iran, because Ankara saw that a possible deal or settlement between Washington and Iran could be done on account of the Gulf states. Turkey insisted, therefore, that the Gulf States should open the door wide for dialogue with Iran to dissipate its security concerns. Despite all the recent political closeness between Turkey and Iran, Turkey realizes that the Iranians can not trust Turkey due to its close ties with Israel and Ankara may find it difficult to persuade the Iranian officials that Turkish-American relations have been reconstructed and that Turkey is no longer America's and NATO's military arm in the area. Nothing could intercede for Ankara with Tehran, despite Turkey's denial to join the war beside America in Iraq and its call to transform the meetings of Iraq's neighbouring countries into a Regional Council that would undertake the security and stability of the region and prevent foreign interventions in it. It is a relationship between Persians and Turks in which mutual trust has not crept in for 250 years. We could point out here the different methods of dealings between the two countries. Turkey had insisted on completion of the energy projects that linked her with Iran in spite of American objection, but this stance did not stop Iran who, in breach of all contracts and treaties, cut the gas supply from Ankara at the first cold wave that hit the area. With the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the American interests in the Gulf the two countries will continue dealing differently with regional issues. More importantly is the different vision with which the two countries see the future of the area. Turkey is characterized by a strong economy, developing industry, and a keen popular wish to develop its democratic experience to join the European Union, which make her more adaptive to the new world order that stands on globalization and the mechanisms of free economy . The political stability of the area would, consequently, pave the way for Turkey to play a bigger economic role in the region and would give her a chance to have more benefits from her economic relations with her neighbours, making her a major investment centre and a power of industrial export. The Iranian economy, despite the country's rich oil reserves and good industry, is suffering a lot, because her economy is isolated and she adheres to a special democratic structure controlled by theocrats. The stability of the region and the absence of external threats towards Iran would motivate the Iranians to turn to bringing into account the regime and its supporters. It is difficult, therefore, to say that Ankara and Tehran are maintaining exceptional political relations, while each one of them is aiming at a different strategic goal. These relations, in view of the fact that Turkey has succeeded in gathering international support in the war against the Kurdish PK Korganization and managed with American help to bomb their camps in northern Iraq, would soon witness perhaps the most important test of their credibility. Since America and Europe have turned their backs on the PKK, after the political reforms that took place in Turkey, Turkey seems today closer than ever to solving her chronic problems. The Iraqi Kurds, hoping to have better relations with Turkey, due to American pressure, have stopped their support to the KK. Syria has completely let them down since 1999 through the Adana agreement with Turkey, and Iran is standing away from them due to its concerns that Washington has a relation with the PEJAK organization that follows the PKK and fights inside Iran. While Turkey seemed ready to destroy the military wing of the PKK that was cornered in northern Iraq or to make its members surrender or give up their arms, Iran, to the surprise of all, made a secret agreement with the PKK to give refuge to its members who fled northern Iraq to Iran, in return for stopping PEJAK from fighting in Iranian territories and cutting its relations with the Americans.

From Tehran's point of view, this agreement might seem justified, as Iran does not wish for Turkey to solve its Kurdish problem on its own account. Iran mistrusts the recent American- Turkish agreement, which made Washington change dramatically and quickly its stance with PKK, because it fears that after getting rid of the PKK Washington would have more cooperation with PEJAK, especially if the latter inherited some of the former party's weapons and leadership. This secret agreement gave the PKK breathing space that allowed it to slip from the grip of the Turkish fist.
What would happen, then, if Russia and Iran wanted to express their resentment over the Turkish role in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and over the Turkish gas transport plans that would break the Russian monopoly of transporting gas to Europe?
After the land incursion carried out by the Turkish army, Tehran's fears and doubts have been doubled. The incursion was a swift and sudden operation that ended with an equally abrupt withdrawal. This led to an intense debate where some claimed that the withdrawal was a result of American pressure whereas the military and government insist that the surprise withdrawal was part of the original plan and self determinant. But within this sequence of events two important realities escaped attention.
1. The Land incursion was very precise and focused only on PKK bases with great care taken to avoid civilian casualties.
2. The incursion proved to be a great success in a very short time.
This two-fold success has resulted in Turkey taking a new political position according to the new conjuncture in the area. Turkey no longer seeks to set an embargo against the Kurdish autonomy and their dreams of freedom. Ankara's new political policy involves cooperation with Iraqi Kurds. A distinct separation of the PKK from Northern Iraqi Kurds has become apparent within Turkey's new politics. The number of Iraqi Kurds, Turkmen and Sunni Arabs that support this type of policy is rapidly multiplying. In the near future it is also highly possible that a significant part of the Iraqi Shiite Arabs will support Turkey's politics in the area and therefore give Turkey major influence within Iraq. This in turn will reduce the influence that Iran has there and dependent on what steps Turkey takes in the region.
In this case, there would be nothing better for Russia than to use the PKK against Turkey. Moreover Iran clearly opposes any Turkish ambitions in the energy sector. The PKK received most of its support from Russia and Iran in the first part of the nineteen nineties, who used the PKK then to stop or delay progress on Turkey's Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline plans.

*Representative for Al Jazeera TV, Turkey