The months ahead in the lead-up to Iraq's parliamentary elections, now scheduled for January 2010, promise to be a cautionary ebb and flow process marked simultaneously by the forming and disbanding of new alliances and old loyalties among Iraqi political parties and groups. The outcome of the election and the emerging political configuration will have telling consequences for how Iraq stands to fare in addressing the volatile and deadly ethno-sectarian divisions currently strangling the country's fate. On a broader scale, the months ahead and the post-election political settlement will have a ripple effect on the Middle East along the Shiite-Sunni fault line. Evidence of this is already underway, with the formal announcement on August 24, 2009 that the recently deceased Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) joined forces with Muqtada al-Sadr's followers and elements of the Sunni factions to form the Iraqi National Alliance (Al-I'tilaf Al-Watani Al-'Iraqi, or INA)-with the notable absence of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki's Daawa party. The new coalition is largely founded on the ruins of the United Iraqi Alliance or UIA, the leading Shiite bloc in parliament after Iraq's 2005 elections and consists of its two previous largest blocs - ISCI and the Sadrists - plus the Badr Organization; the Fadila Party; the National Reform movement headed by former prime minister Ibrahim Al-Ja'fari; and the Iraqi National Congress headed by Dr. Ahmad Chalabi. Significant components from outside the old UIA are Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes of the Anbar Salvation Council, a breakaway group of the Anbar awakening and Khalid Abd al-Wahhab al-Mulla from Basra.

Despite outward appearances of a grand unity cross-sectarian alliance, at once reaching out to Sunni elements and leaving out some of the original members of the UIA, skeptics of the newly formed Shiite-dominated bloc insist that it will achieve little more than pay lip service to nationalist rhetoric since the INA carries deep running strains of sectarian allegiances. Instead of moving beyond status quoist formulas, the new alliance promises to re-classify them under a new party banner motivated largely by hopes to solidify Islamist Shiite influence over the future of Iraq.

Confident following his success in past January's provincial elections in which Al-Maliki's State of Law (Dawlat Al-Qanun) ran on a non-sectarian, ‘Iraq-first' nationalist list, and fared relatively well, particularly in two of Iraq's pivotal provinces, Baghdad and Basra, Al-Maliki's odds may be lower come early next year. Recent setbacks in security gains and a deadly surge in violence in parallel to the US troop withdrawal from Iraqi cities, may ultimately deal a blow to the Al-Maliki premiership. But what is at stake may be more than the political destiny of this strong handed Shiite prime minister, and lie with what is more fundamental in the long run-whether the new Iraq will be able to determine its future course on its own terms and make tough decisions regarding national reconciliation or fall prey to the torrent of sectarian violence competing for political hegemony.

The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq fared poorly in this year's provincial elections, coming behind Al-Maliki's nationalist secular platform, although it is still too early to tell whether the results reflect a sustainable decline in the appeal of Islamic parties. It is not likely that this will be the case. The death of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim in August, the former head of the United Iraqi Alliance and ISCI leader, after receiving cancer treatment in Tehran came at a time when the organization faced internal power struggles over succession. But in what can be construed as an attempt to ward off such suspicions, ISCI announced early on that the groomed heir and Abd al-Aziz's son, Ammar Al-Hakim would assume leadership of the party. Questions over whether he will rise to the challenge, as well as the younger Al-Hakim's credibility in representing and consolidating Shiite interests remain to be seen. In-fighting between Sadr and Al-Hakim stands as a possible cause of future deadlock in the alliance. There have been some reports that the INA is considering a rotating coalition presidency amidst INA's member blocs, perhaps in a bid to diffuse existing tension and draw new partners at the same time. Internal rifts notwithstanding, the emergence of the new alliance will likely have important consequences for the networks of alliances and political maneuvering in Iraq and among its neighbors.

Firstly, despite inclusion of Sunni elements in the INA, its establishment with a still predominantly Shiite sectarian majority identity has already been construed by many observers as a blow to efforts by those both in Iraq and among its regional neighbors to mediate a more matured, cross-sectarian Iraqi structure that transcends ethno-sectarian based politics. Second, the INA's presence may re-ignite debates within the Shiite political leadership around Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim's vision for a federalist system in central and southern Iraq. Third, the move may raise broader intra-Shiite questions over leadership between Iraqi and Iranian Shiites and the power centers of Najaf and Qum. The Shiite marja'iya (the center of Shiite religious scholarship in Najaf) and Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani do not favor the active involvement of religious clergy in politics as much as the religious establishment in Iran does-although the divergence in their positions on the subject is often overemphasized.

While INA may be seeking to mount a serious electoral challenge to Al-Maliki in the upcoming elections, any remaining questions as to whether Al-Maliki would be convinced to backtrack from his decision to remain outside the new alliance seem to be fading. His announcement on September 24 that his State of Law coalition would run separately was the most clear-cut signal to date that he does not plan to join the INA.

With increasing urgency, especially in the aftermath of the announcement of INA's formation, a speculation frenzy surrounded Al-Maliki's own coalition-building prospects. There were predictions early on that elements of the Sunni Al-Sahwat (of the Anbar awakening movement) would join Al-Maliki; as well as Mahmud al-Mashhadani, former parliament speaker. It had also been reported that the minister of interior, Jawad Al-Bulani, who heads the more secular Iraqi Constitutional Party, would likely join Al-Maliki's alliance. In September the leader of the Awakening Councils in Anbar province that led the Sunni uprising against al-Qaida in Iraq, Ahmed Abu Risha, announced the formation of a new coalition called "Iraq Unity", with the inclusion of Bulani's Constitutional Party. Most observers agree that the odds that the new coalition will later join with Al-Maliki are high. But if the inclusion of these names in Al-Maliki's list were intended to be an early indication of its success, then the October 1 announcement of the State of Law list was a let down. Despite forecasts to the contrary, Al-Mashhadani, Al-Bulani and Abu Risha are not on the list. But according to a statement by MP Hassan al-Sanied, from the Daawa party, there are still more than 30 parties that the State of Law coalition is negotiating with to possibly join in the future.

With the press conference in Baghdad where Al-Maliki revealed what has been termed the first core of the alliance, much of the immediate uncertainty has died down. What is clear is Al-Maliki's ambition to overcome sectarian-based politics, perhaps betting on a little US help, as well as the growing fatigue among Iraqi voters with sectarian Shiite-Sunni resentment playing out on the streets of Baghdad and elsewhere with fatal consequences.

Al-Maliki's broad alliance comprising 40 parties and movements confirmed that the State of Law list would draw in Sunni parties and clans, including some members of the Abu Risha tribe and the al-Dulaimi clan. It was also reported that the al-Mustaqeloon (independents) bloc, the Nasiri Socialist Movement, the National Democratic Alliance, al-Sabak bloc, al-Intifada (Uprising) al-Shaabaniya bloc, the independent Arab bloc and Feyli Kurds bloc have signed up to the new coalition. Among close political allies who have joined Al-Maliki are Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani and government spokesman Ali Al-Dabbagh.

Although members of the INA sought to get Al-Maliki on board-with their sights on winning more votes no doubt-keeping the Shiites unified at any cost has not emerged so far as a sufficient cause to encourage Al-Maliki to join the alliance. That Al-Maliki turned the offer down may ultimately bode well for plans down the road to form a functioning non-sectarian Iraqi political structure in the long term. Disagreement over his insistence that he lead the coalition, the number of seats to be allocated to Daawa as well as failure to guarantee Al-Maliki's premiership and key ministries have been cited for the rift. INA will likely be entangled in internal power brokering between ISCI and the Sadrist bloc, and the young Al-Hakim may face increasing pressure to hold the movement together. Al-Maliki's bid for consolidation of his position will be contingent on developments in the Iraqi political landscape in the coming months. But what will ultimately determine where Al-Maliki will stand come January, or even before then, is the fragile security situation in the country, already showing signs of rapid deterioration. Furthermore, if Al-Maliki should decide to join the INA late in the game, this may be taken by the Iraqi public as a disheartening sign of the resurgence of sectarian politics. Sadr is a wild card in the INA, and his political leaning towards a stronger centralist Iraq over the possibility of a federal system in the past in some ways makes him a closer, if unlikely, match for Al-Maliki.

Al-Maliki needs to reach out and establish broader alliances if he is to succeed in his bid for electoral victory, and his best bet is to continue to build upon the course of a nationalist, non-sectarian platform that granted him success in the 2009 provincial elections. He may still have a chance of accomplishing this and presenting a viable nationalist solution. To do this, Al-Maliki stands to benefit by entering into a cooperative arrangement with one of the influential secularist parties. There have also been reports that the INA is negotiating with former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi--leader of the Wifaq movement and the secular Iraqiyya coalition-in an attempt to strengthen its identity as a broad-based party and draw votes away from Al-Maliki's supporters. Although the direction of these talks is not yet clear, such a move on Allawi's part may constitute a blow to Iraqi secularists.

Inclusion of the new Kurdish Al-Taghyir (Change) party, which had a significant showing by winning 25 of the 111 seats in the last regional election to the Kurdish parliament would strengthen Al-Maliki's political force. An interesting development meriting closer attention in the coming days are internal processes within Sunni political groups that point to the more visible emergence of a cross-sectarian trend as well, perhaps with the potential to inspire and mobilize, although cautiously, a more convincing degree of Sunni-Shiite cooperation under the banner of Iraqi nationalism.

Should Al-Maliki insist on his bid to go it alone in the long-run and in the face of sectarian pressure, this would create two Shiite centers of gravity in Iraq and may force Iran's hand to favor ISCI. This in turn may bring about a souring in relation between Al-Maliki's Daawa party and its Iranian backers, but this will not bring about a permanent break in the relationship. Although there are signs that Iraqi nationalism is on the rise and may eventually undercut ethno-sectarian currents breeding extremist violence in Iraq, speculation that Al-Maliki's rejection of INA and his strides towards a nationalist course signal the loosening of Iran's grip over Iraq are premature. Iran-Iraq ties are not a fleeting fancy, but a permanent fixture of regional political reality. Nonetheless, this does not preclude the possibility that the terms of the relationship may be redefined in the coming years and Iranian influence subject to change with Iraq assuming a greater say. A non-violent form of Iraqi nationalism may build bridges between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq. But in all the fanfare over Al-Maliki's nationalist and non-sectarian credentials, it must not be forgotten that support for Al-Maliki's list in non-Shiite dominated areas is not a sure bet unless coalition-buildings efforts pay off.

In building an axis of power dually based on centralism and nationalism, the fate of the Kurds and minority groups must not be jeopardized at the hands of an exclusionist Arab-only ideology. One way forward may emerge if Al-Maliki's non-sectarian agenda adopts a more inclusive approach, bringing into its folds with greater depth secular Shia, Kurds, Christians and other groups-and most importantly notable Sunni elements. How alliances with Kurdish political parties play out will be closely watched and hinges on whether Arab nationalism trumps Kurdish inclusion or whether closer relations will be forged given that the Kurds may well represent the second largest power bloc in the new parliament come January.

Aside from the intra-Shiite confrontation now playing out largely in Iraq, how Iran emerges from its still lingering post-election turmoil will be a determining factor in how the sectarian card is played in the broader Middle East. In the long run, if the US is able to build and maintain working relations with the region's Shiites, it may convincingly claim to exert a more credible say over the political map of the region and find new opportunities to pursue its regional interests. Easing US-Iranian tensions will benefit the whole region and especially Iraq Constructively engaging Iran must necessarily form part of any such bid to build bridges with the Shiites. Iran is still faithfully stirring sectarian grievances in Iraq, and not only mobilizing the core Islamist Shiite core but Sunni and Kurdish groups as well, which is in line with Iran's overarching strategy of keeping ethno-sectarian divides alive, and stifling the emergence of a viable Iraqi nationalism.

Despite Al-Maliki's compelling powers of mobilization, especially potent if is he is able to garner voter support in Sunni-strong areas, the odds may be in favor of the INA, as Iraqi Shiite parties attract voters by tapping into political and social service networks across southern Iraq that, in many cases, are sourced with Iranian funding. The Iraqi nationalism that has been touted as a remedy to adversarial sectarian politics may prove more difficult to harness than anticipated-and even this may be an overly optimistic assessment. The Iraqi nationalism project may be undercut by Shiite identity politics that has persistently proven capable of finding inroads into Iraq's political processes. Even if a guarded step beyond sectarian politics is achieved, what ultimately emerges may be a tougher stance against the forces of secularism. The future may hold a greater degree of Islamization of Iraqi society.

The adoption of the election system that will govern next year's parliamentary elections is expected to be settled in mid-October, but there are several broader questions that demand answers and will likely require Iraq to make difficult choices beyond the date of the election. The fate of the Kurdish region, possible confrontation over territorial claims and escalated tensions around Mosul, questions over Kirkuk and the course of the coalition deal-making prior to the elections will likely feature prominently in Baghdad. If the INA coalition is successful against Al-Maliki's State of Law ballot, what will be the consequences for the Iraqi public's security? For US and Western interests in Iraq? Importantly, what repercussions will the Shiite-Sunni sectarian battle and how it plays out in the region have on the identity and preservation of the modern state and its institutions in Iraq and the Middle East?

i Aswat-al Iraq, "Maliki's Dawlat al-Qanoon list announced," October 1, 2009.