Fortunately, there are some signs that 'change' and change for the better is on the way. But no one should expect a return to the Middle East as it was prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The cards in the region are being reshuffled, with implications likely to last for a considerable stretch. A complex nexus of interests, historical regional roles under scrutiny, converging and parting alliances-all within the overall regional political trajectory, will shape the Middle East in important ways to come. Israel's latest attacks on Gaza will force the Middle East into a new phase in which in which Egypt once more ascends to a reenergized prominence in the region; and Israel will step up its activities in northern Iraq.
Undoubtedly, developments in Iraq during 2009 will be determinant for the entire Middle East. With the signing of the SOFA agreement, Iraq is entering into a new and, in most likelihood, a more dangerous period. This will especially be true following complete U.S. troop withdrawal, planned for end-2011, should the foundations for a post-U.S. Iraq still be shaky at that time. The near future will bring an escalation of internal political struggle between competing groups in Iraq; of which the first such signal was the attack in Kirkuk on December 11, 2008. That the President of Iraq, Celal Talabani and other high-ranking officials of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party (PUK), of which Talabani is founding leader, and one of the two largest Kurdish parties dominant in northern Iraq, were targeted; as well as the location of the attack stands as an especially disturbing omen. Talabani heads the five-member Presidential Council, and it is composed of Vice President Tarik Hasimi (Sunni), Prime Minister Nuri El Maliki (Shiite), Vice-President Adil Abdulmehdi (Shiite) and the head of northern local administration Mesud Barzani (Kurdish) .
Despite obvious effort to strike a balance in the composition of the council, this has not prevented members from demonstrating different expectations and concerns about one another. Hasimi has accused Prime Minister Nuri El Maliki of mimicking the autocratic line reminiscent of Ba'ath party rule during meetings behind closed doors. Maliki, on the other hand, is locked in a cold war with the local Kurdish administration in the north on several critical and thorny issues, top among them the hydrocarbon law and security concerns. In a recent show of how tense the political debate in Iraq can be, the Parliament speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, a Sunni, resigned following an especially rowdy session of parliament where a vote on the presence of non-American troops in Iraq was expected. Accused of hurling insults during the session, Parliament overwhelmingly accepted Mashhadani's resignation, already pressed for by Shiite and Kurdish lawmakers.
Hasimi was in Turkey during this chaos. Three days later, Maliki was at Ankara's doorstep. While one was seeking Turkey's support for a change in government in Iraq, the other is trying to empower his own camp with the help of neighbouring countries against the growing opposition that his mounting against him. Apparently, the life span of Maliki administration may be nearing its expiration date.
For Ankara, Maliki's attitude towards PKK terrorism based in northern Iraq and the future of Kirkuk is as significant as Maliki's position towards the U.S. is for Iran. However, Ankara was disappointed when Maliki was not accompanied by any counter-terrorism officials during his recent visit.
The biggest disappointment for Turkey has been that the administration in the north of Iraq has yet to take any decisive and concrete steps against PKK terrorism. Lately, Turkey normalized its relations with the Kurdish administration in the north; it would not be farfetched to say that bilateral relations have reached a more constructive level than they have been in the last 6 years. Despite this change in the tone of relations, the Barzani administration has not yet taken any concrete steps against the PKK to the satisfaction of Turkey. Moreover, aided by the U.S., the northern administration has started to take dangerous steps towards enlarging the federal borders of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
During September and October of 2008, the KRG's peshmerga forces moved to Mosul and Hanekin in an apparent move to expand KRG's area of control towards Mosul-Kirkuk-Hanekin. KRG justified its action arguing that the objective was to ensure the security of the Kurdish population in the expanded territory. During November, when the PKK sabotaged the Iraqi section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Turkish ports in the Mediterranean) pipeline, the KRG pushed to expand its area of control again by sending peshmerga forces further south, claiming it was in the interest of securing the pipeline. These events caused a hike in tensions between the Shiite dominated government in Baghdad and the Kurdish administration. Prime Minister Maliki declared that if peshmerga forces were not withdrawn, the Iraqi Army would intervene. With Maliki's order, the relatively better trained and equipped Iraqi Army moved towards the Kurdish peshmergas. However, the U.S. warned Maliki and asked the Iraqi Army, "not to go further". The Kurdish administration partially backed down, contingent on the requirement that the Iraqi Army would not enter the regions from which the peshmerga withdrew.
Arms Build-up on the Iranian Border
The political encouragement granted by the U.S. is not the only factor that encouraged the KRG to initiate this expansionist-minded maneuver. Lately, the KRG has increased its armament efforts against the possibility of an armed conflict with Iraqi Shiites. According to information confirmed by various intelligence agencies, significant supplies of small arms and ammunitions were shipped from Bulgaria to Northern Iraq between August and September, 2008. One of the questions that emerged in the aftermath of news of this arms deal was how the cargo planes carrying the weapons reached northern Iraq and through which countries' airspace? According to some reports, the U.S. shipped 50 thousand AK-47 rifles delivered via C-130 cargo planes to the city of Erbil, which is under the control of the KRG. The sum of the shipments have been reported to be around 40 million U.S. dollars. The shipments, intended for the peshmerga and Kurdish police forces, caused further tension between the regional administration and the Shiite-led central government in Baghdad. Kurdish arms build-up is increasing the possibility of a Shiite-Kurdish conflict after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.
The identity of those who are supplying arms to the Peshmerga Army in northern Iraq offers proof for how interwoven and complex problems in the Middle East are. The owner of the Kurdistan Development Organization (KoDo), Shlomi Michaels, is supplying arms to the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. KoDo was established in Switzerland, but its operational headquarters are located in Israel. Michaels, who has been doing business in Iraq since the U.S. occupation, holds both American and Israel citizenship. Interestingly, before becoming a ‘businessman', Michaels worked with Israel's counter-terrorism unit, YASAM.
The other individual who coordinates the arms shipment with Michaels, is former MOSSAD chief Dany Yatom. Yatom, at the same time, is a former politician, who was an MP in the Knesset from the Labor Party. Erbil airport, where arms shipment are delivered, has undergone considerable modernization and expansion. Israel is supporting this process of modernization. Erbil airport is now utilized mostly for receipt of arms shipments. Another organization that is helping the arms shipment to the Kurds is TADIRAN, an organization in the United States.
The most important factor behind the power struggle and armament is the control of oil. Despite sharp reactions from Baghdad, the KRG continues to sign its own oil agreements. KRG continues to make secret or open agreements with international corporations for the management of oil basins.
Local Elections
Local elections to be held at the end of January will serve as a litmus paper test for Iraq. As the pre-election frenzy heats up, as it is likely to, the process of sending away of non-Kurdish ethnic groups residing in the regions close to the KRG borders, like Kirkuk, will continue until January. The Maliki administration considers such actions as unconstitutional. In the long run, such actions could result in the division of Iraq. Moreover, in the aftermath of U.S. troop withdrawal, it is very likely that the KRG will maneuver to take Kirkuk under its own territorial rule, unless an acceptable solution that takes into account the special status of the city and the implications of a Kurdish takeover is reached until then. If the KRG should gain Kirkuk, this would mean a Kurdish play to place pressure on Turkey via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. At this point, a Shiite-Kurd war would run the risk of combining rather quickly with an Arab-Kurd war..

Looking ahead, Washington's support for the Kurds against a Maliki that is increasingly seen as uncomfortably close to Iran, would increase. As an indication, the U.S. has provided some assurance to the Kurds regarding a military base in northern Iraq after U.S. troop withdrawal. Washington's support for the Kurds potentially will be used as a means to limit Turkey's regional role.
Surely, Shiites will push to protect their position in Iraq. Sunni Arabs will return to the political scene, empowered after having been weakly represented in the Iraqi administration after boycotting the previous elections. Given these factors, the Kurdish position stands to be weakened. The U.S. administration's fear of absolute Shiite domination in Iraq stems from interplay of these possibilities and the results of the upcoming election, providing important indications for what will come in Iraq.
However, there must be another reason for arming the regional administration in northern Iraq. The regional administration neighbors the soft belly of Iran: Kurdistan province. Iran, just like Turkey, continues to fight with the Kurdish separatist group, PJAK, who are supported from northern Iraq. From time to time, Iranian security forces suffer serious casualties as a result of PJAK terrorist attacks. The armament of northern Iraq by the former chief of Israel secret services, Dany Yatom, and former member of Israel counter-terror unit YASAM, Shlomi Michaels, is targeted against both Iraqi Shiites, who have strong ties with Iran and sway to Shia influence, and Iran itself. A weapons build-up by an Israeli firm cannot be explained in any other credible way. A number of questions emerge: is this the groundwork for secret sabotage efforts towards Iran's nuclear program via Iraq? Or will northern Iraq, which is "the most democratic region in Iraq" according to U.S. President Bush, be used as a base for the "democratization of Iran"?
Answers to these questions are necessary for states that do not want more wars in the region and are struggling for the unity, territorial integrity, and stability of Iraq. Any operation via northern Iraq against Iran could lead to the opening of a united front represented by Turkey, Russia and Iran, who are each struggling for the unity of Iraq.