Turkey is a signatory to the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, also known as The Mine Ban Treaty, effective since 5 October 1996. The General Assembly of the United Nations approved the Ottawa Agreement by its resolution no: 51/45 on 10 December 1996. The European Union states in their Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 approved an identical text of the Ottawa agreement. Signatories to the Ottawa Agreement are obliged to cease the use of land mines by 2014, with a ten-year grace period available to states unable to perform this function within the prescribed period.
In view of this obligation and the impending deadline, the Turkish government in May 2009 submitted for approval a draft law to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. This draft law called for clearing the mines along the 510 Km. long Turkish-Syrian border. This law contained clauses that would give exclusive rights to private corporations to clear the Turkish-Syrian border of the land mines implanted there in the 1950s. Qualified foreign firms were eligible to submit proposals for the task. The draft law provided a lucrative incentive to the winner of the de-mining competition: The Turkish government would lease the de-mined land for 44 long years to the corporation in lieu of de-mining costs.
There were heated discussions on this draft law both in the Grand National Assembly (parliament) and in public forums. Political parties, a large number of civilian groups, NGO's and organizations such as the Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of Agriculture opposed the draft law because it contained unacceptable conditions potentially harmful to Turkey's strategic interests.
Public opposition has been directed both to the technical aspect of the proposition and to the offers it contained for foreign companies. There was hardly any opposition to the de-mining effort itself. Nor was there any opposition to the cost of the de-mining project. Opposition, however, was vocal and articulate on why foreign firms would receive preferential treatment to do the job and for how long? Clauses pertaining to the use of the cleared land caused the most concern. People opposed the idea of leasing this area and its adjacent lands totaling 650,000 decars to foreigners for forty-four years as a compensation for the cost of mine clearing of a 350, 000 decars of land . (Roughly 175,000 acres of land)
There were impassioned discussions and even near fistfights over this issue in the Grand National Assembly. A significant number of members of parliament manifested their opposition to the draft law by abstaining from the session. The government was obliged to postpone voting on the draft law for a few days, while prompting the relevant commission to redraft the law with minor changes. Finally, after intense pressure on the AKP parliamentarians, the draft law was passed with yet a slim margin. The approved law was sent to the President's office to be examined and President Abdullah Gul signed it quickly before sending it for publication in the Official Gazette. Despite all these steps, the discomfort over the new law and its implementations has not subsided. Serious concerns about the context and usefulness of the law continue unabated and public opposition had not died down despite its formal approval. Already, opposition parties plan to challenge the law in the Constitutional court, with a view to have it annulled.
The central issue is not who clears the mines or at what cost. It is who will be granted the right to use the de-mined land and for what purpose for the next forty-four years. Closely related to this are questions among the Turkish public as to why the Turkish military, in partnership with NATO, who placed the mines in the region more than 50 years ago were excluded from performing the demining operation. After all, Turkish military personnel have successfully undertaken similar efforts during both war and times of peace without foreign assistance.
Decision parameters on the selection of methods and corporations
1- The military is the first resource to provide such services as demining since it constitutes part of core military activities. The Turkish military has the trained personnel and the technology to find and extricate mines and had to do so during the domestic conflict when it completed the anti-mining task in the South Eastern Anatolian mountain roads. A crucial question is why the Turkish government felt obliged to invite international bidding for a job that can be done by the Turkish military. The Turkish military are well versed with mining and de-mining activities. They have done so with successful results both domestically and abroad. Why was the Turkish military excluded from this critical national task now?
2- There are a number of reputable civilian companies present in Turkey involved in mine-clearing jobs internationally. Why were these companies not considered for the task of clearing the strategic Turkish territory along the Syrian border?
3- There is also NAMSA, a company that supplies spare parts to NATO and has a factory in Turkey at Kırıkkale, near Ankara. This organization is known to have kept location maps of the mines on the Syrian border. The Turkish military is reported to have shown preference for this private corporation to de-mine the border area.
4- Why was the offer made to lease for 44 years both the cleared and the adjacent lands set aside for farming instead of reimbursing the actual cost of clearing the mined land? Why not simply pay off the cost of clearing the mines and offer land to local farmers who are in dire need of viable agricultural land? A large corporation, local, foreign or a joint venture, stands to exploit the local labor force by offering minimum wages while accruing huge corporate profits. Is this an acceptable alternative? Folksy statements were reported by the media that attempted to reassure the public that the AKP leaders plan to have the farmer "learn how to fish" instead of offering fish to them! Where would the "well-trained" farmer fish after the so-called training? To improve its bottom line, any corporation will only treat local communities as a source of cheap farm labor at minimum wage. Is this an equitable solution?
These four questions remain unanswered. Tensions surrounding this issue have escalated progressively and reached a climax when the government forced its way through the immediate impasse and approved this law with complete disregard for all legitimate public concern.
The most critical issue relates to the use of the land after the mine clearing effort has been completed. The land to be cleared is 350,000 dekars, (a measure of 1000m2 to a dekar. Or 0.247 of an acre which makes it roughly 90,000 acres of land). According to the law, the company that clears the mines will be given the right to utilize the cleared land plus an additional parcel of state owned adjacent land for farming purposes. These additional parcels of land are very valuable State Agricultural Model Production farms, known as Ceylan Pinar. It also includes the additional parcel of land acquired for security reasons. These were confiscated and turned into state land for military security reasons during the placement of these mines. Since security on the Syrian border is no longer a high priority, these lands were added to the parcel of lands to be cleared of mines.
Unanswered questions and concerns
1- The process for selecting the clearing agent is not clear. The mine clearing job could best be performed by the Turkish military. NAMSA is also equipped to perform this task. The Turkish military has expressed its preference for NAMSA with which it has worked in close cooperation for years. Another option could be one of the civilian Turkish mine-clearing companies which are presently doing reputable de-mining jobs overseas.
The price of the clearing operation had been quoted between 2-10 million and 35-50 million US dollars if one of the above-mentioned sources undertakes it. Yet, some other civilian sources put the cost at up to 500 million dollars and up. In any case, the Turkish state is capable of meeting this expense easily. Even the public could raise such an amount if needed.
2- Why a barter trade payment style instead of a cash payment for the mine-clearing job was preferred is still not clear. According to the new law, the land cleared from the mines (350,000 dekar= about 90,000 acres) plus other state farms and state land amounts to 650,000 dekars or (roughly 162,000,000 acres of land). Additionally, land previously acquired for national security purposes will be added on to the parcel of total land to be de-mined, as it is no longer a high risk zone. This way the land offered for a long-term lease would be close to 950-1,000,000 dekars. This parcel of land is nearly as large as the Turkish province of Bolu; or twice the size of the arable land of Aydın province.
3- The profit margin of the huge parcel of land (650,000 dekars) to be leased for 44 years in return for the cost of clearing the mines (300,000 dekars), is such an exorbitant payment that it is difficult to understand the logic behind such a deal.
The land that will be de-mined has remained unused for over fifty years. Therefore, it has remained uncultivated and its soil was renewed, ready to yield substantial amounts of crops. Regional landless families work as sharecroppers. Therefore, instead of leasing out the cleared lands to a foreign corporation, or to a local corporation that will try to maximize it own profit, it would help the Turkish economy and national agricultural sector to allocate at least a portion of this land to landless farmers.
On the other hand, if national companies are assigned the mine clearing job, they would provide jobs to local people for the next 3 to 5 years. So, why not consider these options and implement them instead of using international bidding and inviting foreign companies to do the job? Under the circumstances, it is difficult to understand the logic of the newly enacted law.

Some possible concealed dangers in the process
1- The first of such threats lies in the possible repetition of a historical mistake. In the 19th century, the Ottoman authorities allowed the British navy to use Cyprus ports for rest and refurbishing naval needs during their stay to help the Ottomans in the Crimean War against the Russian empire. As time passed and the Ottoman Empire got weakened politically and militarily, the British stayed on and finally declared that Cyprus was a Crown colony. Up until today, Turkey is suffering from these consequences. A similar mistake in this strategically important Southern part of Turkey must not be repeated.
2- A second perceived threat relates to a policy recommendation suggested strongly by the European Union. "The EU Progress Report on Turkey for 2004" gave Turkey the chance to start membership negotiations with the EU. It is a 273 page report which contains only two noteworthy sections, namely the "Recommendations" and "the Issues" sections. The "Issues Part" contains references to Turkey's rich water sources, and mentions the dams and the irrigation system built on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the GAP (Southeastern Anatolia) region of Turkey. It strongly recommends that the whole irrigation system should be placed under an international (EU) management in the future, as the membership negotiations progress. The very same paragraph provides an explanation for such a recommendation by highlighting Israel's water needs and their wish to provide Israel and its neighbors with equal use of water resources. This is a highly provocative statement to be placed in the "Turkish progress report" for membership to the EU. With this recommendation in mind, one has to wonder which counties and companies would be most interested in clearing the mines and acquiring leased land that is part of the ancient Fertile Crescent and would border the rich water resources of Southern Turkey?
3. A third of such threats is rooted in the Middle East, from a well known theological claim about the "promised lands". As Israel's flag indicates, the borders of the "promised lands" are situated between the Nile and the Euphrates rives. These are the two lines on the flag itself (with their own admission). If that is the case, one has to think twice before leasing out such huge tracks of land for agricultural purposes. Secondly, one should be very careful about the ownership of companies before allowing them to work five years for clearing and 44 years for agriculture. The total of 49 years for the land to be in control of someone else is not conducive to Turkey's national and strategic interests. Recently, the Israeli envoy in Ankara claimed the ancient prophetic roots of Judaism to Turkey's Sanli Urfa region. Could such statements be a harbinger for claims for Turkish land based on divine will, just as has been the case for Palestine?
4- The forth perceived danger comes from a flurry of international reports. According to international studies by the FAO, WHO and some other organizations, the world may face a food and drinking water crises in the near future. The very area now under debate for demining and its adjacent lands are rich in farming soil, underground water sources and rivers. With the looming danger of destabilizing shortages, Turkey must take all necessary measures to put its own national interests first.
5- The sixth perceived concern comes from the presence of underground wealth. The very area that is to be cleared from mines is known to be rich in uranium ores and some other very important minerals, as well as a strong possibility of the presence of petroleum. This crucial strategic wealth should stay under the protection of the Turkish government and the army. This is not a matter to handle through commercial treaties or some vague laws and bi-laws. It is imperative for the Turkish national interest to keep these areas under strict protection and control.
The law no: 5903 passed and accepted by the parliament on 4 June 2009 about the clearance of the mines along the Turkish- Syrian border is flawed on several levels. It is a law enacted in a hurry and with a great deal of tension in parliament and strong opposition from non-AKP political parties. The draft law was not discussed sufficiently in Parliament and no public concerns were taken into account. This law needs a thorough revision that would protect the strategic, economic, and other long-term interests of the country. A better study of the situation, a better analysis of the options, and heightened respect for public concerns should be displayed in preparing an improved law in line with Turkey's needs.
The law no: 5903 is not aligned with the recommendations of the Ottawa international agreement in de-mining the national borders and territories. The Ottawa agreement recommends the removal of anti-personal mines only. Whereas the newly enacted Turkish law foresees the removal of anti-tank mines as well as anti-personal mines. The anti-tank mines do not cause harm to people and animals. It is only for tanks and armored vehicles. Even this aspect of the new law is proof in itself of how it was inadequately prepared without taking into consideration the long-term defense plans of the country. For this reason, the new law is in need of important amendments.
Clearing of the mines should be undertaken by the Turkish military or by domestic companies.
The cleared land should be made available for agricultural purposes for local communities, with administrative and financial controls remaining fully within Turkey's authority.
The cleared lands should be used to encourage new and scientific research and its underground wealth should be exploited for the national good.
The very valuable State Model Farms should continue to operate as model farms preparing healthier seeds for the Turkish agriculture and animal husbandry sectors. Turkey should refrain from using GDO's (Genetically Developed Organisms) and not be dependent on other countries for its basic agricultural needs.
Turkey should utilize its underground water and rich river waters wisely to protect and ensure the well being of its future generations.
A rash decision by today's party in power is bound to have adverse effects on Turkey's future relations with its neighbors. It behooves the AKP government to undertake political decisions that are sensitive to the needs of Turkey's future strategic interests. It must not leave a legacy of poor decisions made for the sake of popularity with foreign corporations and foreign powers. Decisions must be made with care, forward-looking assessment and through open discussions with the various sectors of public opinion.
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Ankara Ufuk University, Department of International Relations
• Member of Parliament, Ankara deputy in the 21st session.
•Member of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 1999-2002