Iran will hold its 10th presidential elections on June 12, 2009, four years after the neo-conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office. Under his presidency, the Islamic Republic of Iran had undergone significant changes related to the internal political scene and its foreign policy performance. Ahmadinejad, despite the fact that he does not have the final say on government policy, has influenced both the dynamics of domestic politics as well as Iran's foreign relations, including with the Arab world.

The upcoming elections are best discussed within the context of the recent history of Iran-Arab ties after the Islamic revolution of 1979, which marked the beginning of an increasingly anxious period of relations. An analysis of the major events marking Iran's relations with the Arab world, as well as the possible impact of the Iranian presidential elections on the future of relations is both relevant and timely.

Arab states and the Iranian Revolution

Despite slight adjustments, the main elements of the Arab world's concerns towards Iran have remained unchanged. Some of the major areas of unease include the Iranian regime's revolutionary character; Tehran's attitude towards non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas; support for Shiite minorities in some Arab countries; Iran's opposition to the peace process with Israel; the alliance of certain Arab countries with the United States and their biggest fear of encroaching Iranian (Persian) Shiite expansion.

The ideology of the Iranian Revolution revolved around popularism, nationalism and most of all, Shiaism. Iranian nationalism is starkly different from Arab nationalism; created by Reza Shah, it essentially emphasized the racial difference between the Iranians on the one hand, and the Arabs on the other. The tension in Arab-Iranian relations started with the 1979 Iranian Revolution which turned Iranian society up-side-down and changed the ruling system from a constitutional monarchy to an Islamic Republic. Since then, some Arab countries have felt threatened by Iran, especially by its active domestic political environment and the likelihood of its influence spilling over onto their own restricted societies.

The Iraq-Iran war during the 1980s saw Iran-Arab relations deteriorate more than ever before. Naturally, Arab countries stood by Iraq and the former enemies of Saddam Hussein became his best allies. Ironically, this enhanced Iran's leverage, as the only official Shiite country in the region, to maximize its powers and to stand by itself to win the war. Iraq is the Eastern gate of the Arab world and it played a great role in shaping the course of Arab-Iranian relations. Iran sensed that the war was launched to weaken the purposes and principles of the 1979 revolution, so it increased its efforts to bring the Iraqi Shiites, a majority there, to its side.

After the Iranian revolution, Iranian-Arab relations took a dramatic turn. While hosting the Shah of Iran, Egypt adopted a hostile stance in its relations with the young Islamic republic. Relations between the two countries deteriorated even further when Egypt recognized Israel in 1979, only two months after the Iranian revolution. Anwar Sadat became one of Iran's first enemies in the Arab world and his assassination would be celebrated loudly in Iran. Khalid Al-Islambouli, who carried out Sadat's assassination, became a heroic symbol in Iran. A street in downtown Tehran was named after him, adding oil to the fire in damaged mutual relations. Many Arab countries were afraid that the ideals enshrined in the Iranian revolution of liberating Islamic nations from the bounds of regimes that were resistant to change could drive their people to revolt. This fear was further inflamed by the activities of Shiite populations in some Arab countries, in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as much as in Lebanon and Bahrain. This state of dissatisfaction revealed itself during the 8 year war between Iraq and Iran.

During these years, Iran-Arab relations remained tense and continued in this direction during the Persian Gulf War. Although Iran remained impartial during the second Persian Gulf War, it was dissatisfied with the decision of Arab countries to permit American forces to station military bases in their countries, while the U.S. was considered the ‘Great Satan' in Iran. In fact, it was only years after the war that both sides began to re-establish mutual relations, with a marked caution on the Arab side. Although reluctant, they seemed to recognize the existence of an Islamic republic in the region. It was only during the last years of Rafsanjani's second term of presidency that certain steps were taken to pacify the relationship between Iran and major Arab countries. He was the first president of Iran to visit Saudi Arabia after the revolution.

Relations between Iran and Arab countries began to thaw after Seyyed Mohammad Khatami came to power after a landslide victory in the 1997 presidential elections . When reformist president Khatami came into office in May 1997, a milestone in relations occurred when President Khatami became the first head of state of Revolutionary Iran to make an official tour of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. In addition, there were two important factors in Khatami's personality that paved the way for good relations with the Arabs. First of all, Arabs were impressed with Khatami's fluency in Arabic, which he used to communicate with his hosts. From the Arab perspective, this was a break from the past since previous Iranian leaders had conducted their communication in Persian or English. Secondly, Khatami charmed his hosts with accommodating speeches which promoted regional cooperation and portrayed Arab-Iran ties as special.

Khatami's major policy was to reduce tensions in Iran's foreign policy, focusing on mutual negotiations with neighboring countries and Arab nations. This shift in Iranian foreign policy towards the international community and the Arab world in particular, did not continue however. The advantages that Iran and the Arab world had gained ended by summer 2005, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as the sixth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Ahmadinejad began his presidency with the decision to continue the enrichment of uranium, which the former president had suspended as a sign of goodwill. Ahmadinejad made the decision to continue with the nuclear program believing that Iran was making concessions to Europe and the U.S. without any gains. He also continued to voice his support for attacking Israel and has garnered negative media attention from around the world by repeatedly suggesting that Israel "be wiped off the map." Continued uranium enrichment and Iran's saber-rattling with Israel have been Ahmadinejad's two most influential policies, but also mark a fundamental misunderstanding of the internal political function of Iran.

The election of Ahmadinejad as president caused more suspicion and conjured up negative images about the Iranian political system. A president with a military, conservative and fundamental background, he was perceived as a major threat to the world, especially to Iran's neighboring Arab countries. His views that the West, especially the U.S,, was Iran's biggest enemy and a threat to its rise to regional power status caused these suspicions to grow.

Relations between some Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, and the Iranian government have deteriorated during Ahmadinejad's term. He never hesitated to announce his support to Arab governments and non-state actors who oppose the existence of Israel. Arab governments such as Syria and non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas have strong political common grounds with Iran, beyond a religious basis alone. On February 17, 2007, Presidents Ahmadinejad and Assad met in Tehran. Ahmadinejad afterwards declared that they would form an alliance to combat the U.S. and Israeli conspiracies against the Islamic world. Before this visit, in June 2006, the defense ministers of Iran and Syria signed an agreement for military cooperation against what they called the "common threats" presented by Israel and the U.S.

Iran has supported Hamas in Gaza because Iranians have always rejected the peace process between Arabs and the Israelis. From the first moment Israel bombed Gaza in its last war, hundreds of thousands of Iranians signed up to volunteer to fight against Israel. Later on, after the war had ended, celebrations filled Iranian streets. In the past, Iranian support to the Palestinians was given to the Palestinian Libration Organization (PLO) in the early 1980s; this support shifted to Hamas after the first intifada "shaking off" that took place between 1987 and 1993. The political support that Hamas received from Iran reached its peak after the Palestinian parliamentarian elections in 2006. Hamas won the majority of seats in The Palestinian Legislative Council and formed the government. The international community, led by the U.S. has refused to deal with a government led by Hamas until it recognizes Israel's right to exist. Hamas resisted doing so, and sanctions were imposed on the Palestinians by the U.S. and the European Union. At that stage, Iran, Qatar and Syria had announced their rejection of these sanctions. Iran had funded the Hamas-led government, and offered that government political support. Iran had also used international attitudes towards the Hamas-led government to question the whole issue of democratization promoted by the U.S. and Europe.

The Iranian position towards the recent war in Gaza was reminiscent of its attitude towards Hezbollah during the 34 day war in the summer of 2006. Iranian support of Hezbollah and Hamas has been criticized by some Arab governments, and in realty this led to further deterioration of Arab-Iranian Relations. Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki has said, "Arab countries, instead of being afraid of us, should be careful about the invaders who have come from thousands of miles away to Islamic territories and not from Iran". A response to Mottaki's statement came recently from the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal in March 2009, who remarked that "Iran's support to the Arabs must be through the gateway of legitimacy". This demonstrates the level of tension between some Arab governments and Iran.

Tension has extended over the situation in Iraq where Iranian intervention has played an important role in the attitude of the international community and some Arab countries against Tehran. This has only added to their already deep running unease regarding Iran's nuclear program. These concerns grow larger each day owing to the instability of the region and the inability to bring about any constructive changes that could help in calming the uneasy situation. What makes this difficult to implement is the use of transactional purpose in conversations. Essentially, this means that different actors discuss their own beliefs without making any effort to agree on a bottom line. In such discussions the usual result is a breakdown in communication where each actor is unwilling to disclose their beliefs or suspend their judgments of the other's point of view. This is exactly what is happening between Iran and the outside world; making it seem like changing the Iranian political, economical or even nuclear system is beyond reach.

The latest crisis between Iran and Morocco has again proved the level of skepticism between the Arab states and Iran. Intimate diplomatic relations between Iran and Morocco have been cut off. Iran appears as a threat to the Moroccan monarchy as well as Bahrain's, because of the possible alliance of the Moroccan and Bahraini Shiites with the Islamic Republic.

As one of the world's largest oil and gas producers and a historically persistent and powerful "threat" to the whole world, including the Arabs, the results of the upcoming Iranian elections are unpredictable. The 10th presidential election comes at a time where the world is suffering from a tense international political environment and the consequences of the global economic crisis. However, both Iran's allies and enemies are cooling their heels to the outcome where either a reformist or a neo-conservative will emerge victorious. There is no doubt that the Iranian elections have captured the world's attention. For the most part, concerns over emboldening the principles of the Islamic Revolution and triggering a reaction that would strengthen Ahmadinejad's bid for the presidency is dissuading global policymakers from moving forward at this juncture to take any major steps in relations.

Although the president is not the only one who decides the country's foreign policy, he is a chain in the decision making circle -the Iranian National Security Council- where the planning and the implementation of foreign policy is discussed and decisions are made. The withdrawal of former president Mohammaed Khatami from the race has led to disappointment. Countries in the region and those who want to see a change in the Iranian government's behavior will be less optimistic regarding the future of their relations with Iran should Ahmadinejad remain in power.

There is an awkward misunderstanding in how Iran-Arab relations are defined. The problems in relations stem from the variety of Arab positions towards Iran, and Iran's view of certain Arab states as proxies for American foreign policy in the Middle East. Each Arab country has different attitudes and different fears toward Iran. The result of the upcoming elections may not lead to fundamental changes in the climate dominating the relations between Arabs and Iranians. However, it may lead to a reduction of tension, at least for the first period of the new presidency. A major shift in Iran-Arab relations is not possible without a breakthrough in Iran's relations with the U.S. and EU.

Specialist in Middle East Politics & Iran at the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.
m.zweiri@css-jordan.org