The Georgian presidential election held on 5th January 2008 Saturday was won by the incumbent Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili crossed the 50% electoral threshold necessary to be elected in the first round. The Chief of the Central Electoral Commission, Levan Tarkhnishvili, announced that voter turnout was 56.18% and Saakashvili received 53.47% of the votes whereas Levan Gachechiladze, his most powerful rival and the official candidate of the united opposition formed by nine parties, received 25.69%. The other candidates, businessman and media boss Badri Patarkatsishvili received 7.10% of the votes, Labour Party leader Shalva Natelashvili 6.49%, New Conservative Party leader Davit Gamkrelidze 4.02%, the Party of Future leader Giorgi Maisashvili 0.77% and the leader of the Party of Hope Irina Sarishvili 0.16%. During the presidential election the Georgian people not only elected a new president but also voted in referenda where 72.5% endorsed Georgia's accession to NATO and 69.80% voted in favour of holding the parliamentary elections in the spring. The Saakashvili administration wanted to hold the elections in Autumn 2008. Saakashvili garnered the largest number of votes in all but three of the 76 constituencies. In Kazbegi, in the north of the country, he received 44.37% of the votes whereas Gachechiladze got 42.42%. In Dusheti Saakashvili got 26.43% and Natelashvili, 46.50%. However, Saakashvili suffered his biggest defeat in the capital Tbilisi where the population of more than a million constitute one third of the whole country. In Tbilisi Saakashvili received a lower percentage of the votes in comparison with his countrywide average while all his rivals doubled their votes. Whereas Saakashvili received 32.56% in Tbilisi, Gachechiladze got 40.43%, Patarkatsishvili 7.60%, Natelashvili 7.27%, Gamkrelidze 5.36%, Maisashvili 1.44% and Sarishvili 0.24%. In Vake, Tbilisi's richest and most intellectual neighbourhood, Saakashvili received 24% while Gachechiladze got 52%. In other neighbourhoods of Tbilisi percentages were as follows: In Gdani Saakashvili 32% and Gachechiladze 34%; in Didube Saakashvili 27 % and Gachechiladze 45%; in Saburtalo Saakashvili 25% and Gachechiladze 47%. Saakashvili's votes sur-passed Gachechiladze's only in two of the Tbilisi neighbourhoods: Ksanisi and Chuureti. In Ksanisi, also home to the former president Eduard Shevardnadze, Saakashvili received 48 % and Gachechiladze, 29% and in Chuureti, known as old Tbilisi, Saakashvili got 40% and Gachechiladze, 37%. There are several reasons attributed to Saakashvili's defeat in the capital. Among them are policies that offended the intellectuals, such as police violence during the opposition demonstration on 7th November, pressures put by the Saakashvili administration on intellectuals, reduced subsidies for the arts and the expropriation of buildings owned by intellectuals. However, in other constituencies Saakashvili's victory was definitive. For example, he received 44.37% of the votes in the Ajarian countryside (Khelvachauri) and 36% in Batumi. His rival, Gachechiladze, on the other hand, received 38.63% in Batumi. In Upper Kodor (Zemo Apkhazeti), in the northwest of the country, Saakashvili got 86.42% and in Manuel, an area south of Tbilisi inhabited by Georgian citizens of Azeri descent, 88.43%. In polling stations outside of Georgia Saakashvili was the winner with 74.11%. Out of 68 Georgian citizens who attended polls at the Georgian Embassy in Ankara, 46 voted for Saakashvili, 9 for Gamkrelidze and 6 for Gachechiladze. International observers stated that Georgian presidential election was to a large extent democratic despite certain shortcomings. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observed the election and announced that polling conformed to international standards and was conducted in a free and fair environment. OSCE observers also stated that although the election conformed to international standards, it was dominated by distrust towards the system on the part of the candidates and the electorate. The Russian Federation criticised the support given by international observers to the election in Georgia. It called the report by OSCE observers superficial and claimed that a string of complaints had been received about irregularities. Meanwhile, Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh said that the presidential election offered nothing new for Abkhazia.
Continued unrest among opposition
The first presidential election in Georgia in 1991 was won by Zviad Gamsakhurdia with 86.50% of the votes. Eduard Shevardnadze won the elections in 1995 with 70% and in 2000 with 80%. In 2004 Saakashvili became the president having won 96% of the votes following the Rose Revolution. Experts note that Saakashvili came out of the 2008 elections weaker in comparison with his polling success in 2004 and support for him was halved. However, it must be conceded that crossing the 50% threshold and getting elected in the first round is a considerable success for Saakashvili given that support over 90% for an incumbent would only be possible in a totalitarian system. Despite the positive outlook for Saakashvili, it is a fact that support for him has waned. Furthermore, half of the electorate did not bother to turn up at the polls due to Christmas, harsh winter conditions, heavy snow and absence of hope for the future. Especially from the point of view of intellectuals, Saakashvili is a leader whose powers should be curbed. For this reason, the election results are a warning to Saakashvili to be cautious despite his victory. In fact, elections have not been instrumental in diminishing political tensions despite the acute need for stability in Georgia. The election results were expected to assuage tensions but the opposition remained dissatisfied. Announcing that they would not recognise the results, the opposition leaders claimed that the elections had been fraudulent and candidates had not been given equal chances during the pre-election campaigning period. Saakashvili denied these allegations. The majority of the opposition leaders were involved in the Rose Revolution of 2003 together with Saakashvili. These former revolutionary leaders, who are the new chiefs of opposition, accuse Saakashvili of having authoritarian tendencies and perceiving himself as the sole guarantor of democracy in Georgia. However, the opposition leaders should too prove that they too respect democratic principles. In actual fact, the opposition is still carrying on the protest despite having announced previously that they would recognise the results, if international observers found the election democratic and transparent. The Georgian opposition looks divided and devoid of a charismatic leader. However, in the last few weeks it has also proven its vitality. If an agreement with the opposition is not reached, it is not hard to predict that a harsh winter may await Georgia.
Saakashvili from 2000 to 2010
When news of widespread irregularities surfaced during the 2nd November 2003 elections in Georgia, Saakashvili organised mass protests. After the opposition stormed the parliament on 22nd November 2003 and Eduard Shevardnadze resigned on 23rd November 2003, the young leader of the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili won the presidential election of 4th January 2004 defeating his rivals by a wide margin. Parliamentary elections were held on 28th March 2004 to repeat the elections of 2nd November 2003 that were cancelled following the coup. Saakashvili emerged from the fresh elections with strong parliamentary support which facilitated the reforms proposed by his administration. The transfer of government to a new and young generation presented Georgia with opportunities but also brought about potential risks. Extensive personal and political experience is necessary for a politician to maintain the complex geostrategic balance in the Southern Caucasus and to assess all the factors of influence. In the absence of a veteran politician such as Eduard Shevardnadze, instability and uncertainty is ever more probable in Georgia. According to the opposition, Saakashvili is a populist demagogue so ambitious that he can easily outdo his old mentor, Eduard Shevardnadze when it comes to exerting power.

When Saakashvili led the Rose Revolution four years ago, he took over a poor, divided, unstable country, hopeless about the future. He promised to prevent huge income disparities, increase welfare levels, fight against poverty and corruption, bring stability, unite Georgia with the Euro-Atlantic structures, end the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and get rid of the Aslan Abashidze administration in Ajaria. During his four years in government, Saakashvili could fulfil only some of his promises. For example, bribery was to a large extent eradicated and stability was achieved. Abashidze was deposed and Ajarian autonomy was curbed despite Turkey's role as a guarantor. Positive steps have been taken towards Georgia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic world. Nevertheless, these steps did not satisfy the Georgian people. The government's plan for tackling unemployment was not considered to be satisfactory. The widening gap in income between the rich and the poor and low welfare levels have fuelled popular reaction. Steps taken for integrating with the West were also perceived to be inadequate. The public grew weary of uncertainty and the frozen regional conflicts that have mortgaged the future of Georgia. Saakashvili's authoritarian tendencies, nepotistic and opaque policies and his disregard for the opposition's demands were criticised, especially by intellectuals. Furthermore, when Saakashvili ousted his former revolutionary allies from government, the latter joined the opposition bolstering its strength. During his early years in government, Saakashvili had been putting the blame on the Shevardnadze administration, claiming that he had inherited a wreck. However, faced with mass demonstrations in November 2007 -the largest since the Rose Revolution-, he began to accuse his former revolutionary allies and the Russian Federation of provoking the unrest. He claimed that there was a connection between the demonstrations and the Russian elections of 2nd December 2007 for the lower chamber (Duma) as well as the Georgian presidential election scheduled for 2nd March 2008. Saakashvili declared a state of emergency first in the capital and then nationwide, and forcefully suppressed the demonstrations. The dispersal of the opposition protest in Tbilisi on 7th November was especially brutal. As a consequence, Saakashvili's reputation as a courageous democratic reformer was tarnished and he even drew reaction from his most trusted allies in the West. With political protests turning violent, he was unable to withstand the pressure and announced that the presidential election would take place on 5th January 2008 instead of Autumn. In accordance with the law Saakashvili resigned on 26th November 2007 in order to campaign for re-election. Opting to hold the presidential election before the parliamentary elections, he aimed to bolster the confidence of voters and continue his government. Actually, there has indeed been some irregularities in the electoral process as the opposition claimed. For instance, the campaign period was too short and state media did not give any coverage to the opposition. In addition, the anti-government television channel (Imedi) came under pressure. How Saakashvili will interpret the election results in his second term in office will prove to be crucial for Georgia's stability and its feeble democracy. Saakashvili's fate will be determined by his attitude towards dissent and also by what he can offer his people beyond nationalist and religious rhetoric. In that sense, it is predicted that he will not be as radical as he was during his first term and the privatisation process, which had been carried out against the wishes of the people and the intellectuals, will slow down.
Conclusion
This election is considered to be a test of democracy in post-Soviet Georgia in the aftermath of the violent suppression of the Autumn 2007 protests. Even though Georgia lacks rule of law and a mature political culture, the Saakashvili administration saw to it that the elections were as fair as possible. The Georgian people voted in favour of stability and integration with the EuroAtlantic world. Majority of voters supported Georgia's accession to NATO and supported Saakashvili for a second term in approval of his policies of reordering the state and his promise to increase welfare. However, support for Saakashvili remained below 60%. Having voted in favour of scheduling the elections for Spring 2008 (instead of Autumn 2008 as Saakashvili wanted), the Georgian people demonstrated their opposition to the institutionalisation of a Western-backed one man rule. The people confirmed that they wanted a Western-style democracy. At the same time, the Georgian intellectuals made it clear at the polls that they were unhappy with the Saakashvili administration. With the Independence of Kosovo, the Caucuses have now become an important a region as the Balkans. It now looks inevitable that the Kosovo model will be adopted by the de-facto independent states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. In retaliation to the Independence of Kosovo, there is a high probability that Russia will reply to the West through the Caucuses. In fact we can now see the first signs of this with the removal by Moscow of Embargoes imposed on Abkhazia by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); this is the first warning shot fired by Russia to the West. This was followed with military exercises by Abkhazia on Georgia's border. Russia's invitation to Abkhazia to participate in the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi shows that Abkhazia will be the first to come out of the ‘Pandora's Box' that was opened with the Independence of Kosovo.
The Georgian model can be summed up as the removal of Soviet educated administrators by a Western-backed civilian putsch; seizure of power by pro-Western young executives without blood ties to the President; beginning of the democratisation process; acceleration of integration with the West and establishment of a Western style democracy in an ex-Soviet republic. However, the fate of this model largely depends on whether the Saakashvili government will now opt for a Western-style democracy or a Western-backed one man rule. And if a one man rule is consolidated, its success will depend on whether Turkey, the US and the EU will endorse such an administration or not. If there is a lesson for the West, it is that the West will have to support Saakashvili less and the democratic institutions of Georgia more. It seems that the elections of 5th January will go down in history as the first step in Georgia's transformation from a Soviet style system with a strong president to a Western style parliamentary democracy with a strong prime minister. In conclusion, the Georgian elections of 5th January may signal the dawning of a new era in the Southern Caucasus.

* Hasan Kanbolat, Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM), Senior Researcher.

Endnotes
1) Elections.ge, Civil.ge website,
http://www.civil.ge/eng_/category.phpid=32&result=presidental&view=total
15th January 2007.
2) Elections.ge, Civil.ge website,
http://www.civil.ge/eng_/category.php?id=32&result=plebiscite&by=2
14th January 2007.
3) Elections.ge, Civil.ge website,
http://www.civil.ge/eng_/category.php?id=32
14thJanuary 2007.
4) In Georgia a total of 3,352,448 voters took part in the presidential election and referenda at 3,506 polling stations in 76 electoral districts. There were also 73 polling stations for military units including those for Georgian soldiers in Kosovo and Iraq and 40 at Georgia's consulates and embassies abroad. See Key Facts and Figures, Civil. ge website,
http://www.civil.ge/eng_/article.php?id=16681
26th December 2007.
5) The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, praised the successful conduct of elections in Georgia but called for allegations of electoral fraud to be investigated. While the US President Bush congratulated Saakashvili on his electoral victory, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Caucasus, Matthew Bryza, called on the sides to remain calm. The OSCE observers said that they "witnessed the triumph of democracy in Georgia" and reported that the elections complied with democratic norms. Speaking in Tbilisi on behalf of OSCE observers, Alcee Hastings said "The poll has been consistent with most international democratic standards but significant challenges need to be addressed." The Head of OSCE, Terry Davis, called on Georgian leaders to show political maturity and to respect the democratic process in the aftermath of the elections. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation criticised OSCE's conclusions about the elections and pointed out that there were irregularities. In reply, Terry Davis said that the Russian authorities had to submit them the evidence, if they had any.
6) The Russian pronunciation of Saakashvili's name, i.e. Mikhail, does not go down very well in Georgia. The Georgian pronunciation, Mikheil, is preferred. Saakashvili, whose supporters call him by the nickname of Misha, studied law in the US. He worked for some time at a New York law firm. His command of English is excellent. He has also lived in France and can speak French, Russian and Ukrainian. His wife is Dutch. After he returned to Georgia he was appointed as Justice Minister in October 2000 by Shevardnadze. The young lawyer remained Shevardnadze's protégé for a long time. He caused uproar at a council of ministers meeting by producing documents which showed that fellow ministers had acquired expensive villas from the proceeds of corrupt deals. In 2002 he resigned, saying that he considered it immoral to remain a member of the government. He then formed an opposition party called the "National Movement" and was elected mayor of Tbilisi - home to one third of Georgia's residents. His party became a magnet for those who were discontent with the government. According to public opinion polls Saakashvili had been the most popular leader for two years before the Rose Revolution. A major reason for this was his focus on the importance of tackling corruption and poverty.
7) After attending the congress of his party on 24th November, Saakashvili resigned from his post on 26th November, declared his candidacy for president and started campaign work. The parliament approved with 148 votes to 1 a proposal to hold presidential elections on 5th January 2008. In accordance with the constitution Nino Burjanadze, the Parliamentary Chairperson, became an acting president until a new president was elected. Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mikheil Machavariani, assumed the duties of parliamentary speaker until the elections. In a statement the Chief of the Central Electoral Commission, Levan Tarkhnishvili, said that the head of state had to resign by 26th November and a new president would be elected in 45 days from that date. In order to enter their names into the electoral bulletin, presidential candidates had to submit the signatures of 50,000 voters within 10 days.