In the months before Afghanistan's Presidential elections, the approaching polls were portrayed in the international media, and by the international community in general, as a test of the country's new democracy. They were billed as being the chance to show that Afghanistan and Afghan institutions were committed to promoting a democratic politics. This expectation, however, was fundamentally flawed: amidst escalating violence, the elections were not only based on a highly fraudulent voter registration process but also took place after a five-year gap in funding and interest for Afghanistan's democratic development. Given this reality, how was it that donors and commentators were able to sustain such high hopes for the outcome of the presidential polls? In this context, are they truly surprised at the low turnout, the levels of fraud reported and the apparently questionable legitimacy of the whole affair? They shouldn't be. But they should also not treat these elections as the failure of democracy in Afghanistan. There are four key reasons why not.

First, low turnout on election day does not mean that Afghans are hostile towards or uninterested in a democratic system of choosing government. In a context in which voting was often a life-threatening endeavour - and in which the past thirty years of conflict have directly affected most citizens - it is hardly surprising that potential voters in some provinces prioritized security over and above the opportunity to participate in an election. Research conducted for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) prior to and during the elections suggests that there is a considerable demand for the opportunity to select a government through democratic means, if in a secure environment. The idea of public participation in politics is still widely welcomed.

Second, there was a widespread perception among Afghans that the outcome of these elections had been pre-determined by ‘outside' influence, whether defined as US foreign policy or the intervention of neighbouring countries. This is not a new phenomenon: in 2004, a considerable number of Afghans thought that Karzai's success was the result of US favouritism, and nothing whatsoever to do with their votes on polling day. A survey conducted in 1962 before municipal elections in Kabul brought up the same result: people may have voted, but many felt that the result would be determined by cabinet members, and not popular participation. This demonstrates a deep-seated skepticism of the authority of democratic institutions, but then - none of these institutions have existed in Afghanistan for more than 10 years. Only two national electoral cycles took place during Zahir Shah's ‘new democracy' (1964-1973), and only two have taken place since 2001. It will take time to build people's trust in the mechanisms that facilitate democratic politics.

Third, even though these elections were fraught with difficulties, in many respects they were not in fact a failure. In spite of the fact that insecurity and the mistrust of institutions prevented many from voting, almost a third of registered voters did come to the polls. Too much emphasis is being placed on fraud in 2009, when many complaints were also filed concerning corruption in 2004. It appears that a grasp of the bigger picture is lacking in the commentaries of many who would write off these elections as a complete disaster. Furthermore, evidence collected by AREU demonstrates that candidates, political brokers and voters were more aware of the electoral system and how to manipulate it to their own ends in 2009 than in 2004/05. While the strategic amalgamation of local politics with the newly introduced representative democratic institutions may not be the system many international actors envisaged for Afghanistan, it is a system which has worked for a number of key political players in shifting the balance of power.

Finally, these elections cannot be considered a test of democracy when there is no agreement on what democracy and democratisation should constitute in Afghanistan. For Afghans, even the word ‘democracy' is problematic given negative connotations of Western liberal values and contentious associations with the Soviet regime under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in the 1980s. According to AREU research, many Afghan citizens are concerned that democracy will bring with it western values, and pose a challenge to the country's religious and cultural identity. While as stated above, there is widespread support for the system of choosing government by popular vote, there is also a general concern that this be implemented within an ‘Islamic framework' - a concern which is not acknowledged in the (international) assumption that ‘democracy' is unquestionably good for Afghanistan. Essentially, if a democratic system of selecting government is going to be sustainable in Afghanistan -then it needs to be defined on Afghan terms. While there is no one Afghan perspective on what democracy should be, there needs to be more, inclusive dialogue on the subject if the system as a whole is to be truly accepted by citizens. If there is not, there is a risk that democracy will become increasingly labeled an imported western construct and rejected as such. Furthermore, the international community needs to re-adjust its expectations of what democracy should be in Afghanistan, and re-evaluate the both timeframe in which it envisages democratic development occurring and the benchmarks of ‘progress' toward this goal. Elections alone, no matter how free or fair, do not constitute the establishment of democracy.

Anna Larson is a Researcher with the Kabul-based Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).