As the Obama administration continues to push for the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, one of the main questions still looming is who will ultimately represent the Palestinian people. With Hamas' continuing political and military dominance in the Gaza Strip, it is unlikely that Israeli-Palestinian peace talks will ultimately succeed unless the organisation is brought into the political process in some capacity. The social and geopolitical reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is steeped in mutual distrust, meaning that any concessions made or breakthroughs achieved must come from parties representing the mandate of the people. There can be no lasting peaceful solution without recreating a single Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza, governed by a single administration representative of the majority of Palestinian electors. Future Palestinian governments must be elected democratically and Fatah, Hamas and other parties must be able to compete freely. This should be the premise on which to base any negotiations regarding the two state solution. Efforts to exclude any party from the political process - including Hamas - could severely undercut long-term prospects for peace.

Hamas' participation is essential not only because it is in control of Gaza, but because it is a disciplined grass-roots movement, with a substantial social, political and security apparatus, coupled with a charitable economic structure that provides for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. Whilst it is certainly a radical, violent, militant group, it wields too much influence over its followers to be discounted. If ignoring Hamas has not helped to marginalise it in the past, how do US President Barack Obama and the leaders of moderate Arab states bring about reform and inclusion of Hamas in the peace process? Thus far, Hamas' political participation has been conditional upon the organisation's acceptance of the Quartet's (UN, US, EU and Russia) three preconditions: recognising Israel, renouncing terrorism and accepting prior Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Hamas' leadership has refused to heed the Quartet's call and is unlikely to do so any time soon. Such a move would be seen as a major concession to Israel. From Hamas' perspective Israel is the aggressor and, so long as it continues its occupation of Palestinian land, which Hamas defines as everything from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan, it must be resisted by all means available. At the same time, there exists deep ideological disagreements and personal animosity between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) that continues to stifle any meaningful discourse between the two sides. This has prevented the Palestinian camp from entering into negotiations with a united front, something it will need to do to ensure any progress of the peace process.

That being said, it is important to note that the reduction in rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza on southern Israel that followed Operation Cast Lead, offers greater opportunities to move the peace process forward as compared to before the conflict. There were approximately 250 attacks in the nine months following the Israeli military operation in Gaza, significantly lower than the October 2001 to February 2009 average of 100 per month. Hamas has only taken responsibility for two of these 250 attacks, with most claimed by smaller extremist groups. In addition, recent economic and security progress in the West Bank has been notable, with an expected economic growth rate of seven percent for 2009, partially due to Israel's easing of checkpoints between the major West Bank towns. The international community should seek to exploit this comparative lack of violence in Gaza and progress in the West Bank to push for the resumption of peace process negotiations. But to take advantage of this situation and translate it into a real progress, the negotiating strategy must first be modified.

The Arab Peace Initiative (API), first adopted in Beirut, Lebanon in March of 2002 and reintroduced in March of 2007 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia could offer the vehicle for this modification. It provides a comprehensive formula for Arab-Israeli peace. More so, it provides cover for Hamas to commit to recognising Israel at the end, rather than the beginning, of the process. The initiative establishes the following principles: 1) Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, 2) Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, 3) The acceptance and the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with east Jerusalem as its capital, 4) The Arab-Israeli conflict ended, a peace agreement with Israel and security for all the states of the region and finally, 5) The establishment of normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace. Notably, there is a growing receptiveness to the API, particularly by Israeli President Shimon Peres and also by numerous officials in Obama's US administration.

The three preconditions placed on Hamas by the Quartet should be realistically assessed in light of the changing dynamics to prevent what may be obsolete requirements from seriously hindering the peace process. This is not to argue that the conditions are unnecessary, the issue is simply one of timing and at what point in the process Hamas is, rightly, expected to adhere to them. To that end, the API can be used to provide a common denominator for both Israel and Hamas. It offers Hamas a face saving way of avoiding dealing with Israel directly, whilst becoming part of a framework for negotiations acceptable to both the Israelis and the Quartet.

Hamas' refusal to recognise Israel in advance of any agreement is, in fact, in line with the 19 out of 21 Arab states that refuse to recognise Israel officially before all conflicting issues are settled. Israel should not feel that it needs the recognition of a group it deems a terrorist organisation; it should only need the full recognition of the Palestinian government once a Palestinian state has been negotiated and agreed upon. Moreover, Israel will never be expected to negotiate directly with Hamas or any other Palestinian group unless such a group both wins a general election and forms a representative government that seeks to reconcile its differences with Israel peacefully. For these reasons, establishing recognition of Israel as a precondition is premature. It complicates matters and prevents the process from moving forward. Because of the bitter split between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinians must first settle their differences by allowing the people to choose, through new elections, who they think can best serve their needs.

Unlike the question of recognition, Hamas' immediate renunciation of violence is an absolute requirement under any circumstances. Within or outside the Palestinian government, Hamas must accept the simple fact that violent resistance is unacceptable and its leadership must make that choice if it wishes to become a political partner in any future negotiations with Israel or other members of the international community. Acts of violence against Israelis obligate the Israeli authorities to respond violently, not only to ensure the safety of their citizens but also because attacks evoke a moral imperative on the part of the state to safeguard its sovereign rights, which cannot be violated with impunity. Hamas must resolve to forsake violence permanently and build on the current fragile ceasefire in preparation for Palestinian elections. This will pave the way for Hamas' future participation in negotiations with Israel as a representative of the Palestinian government, should it win an outright majority or become a partner in a coalition government. The fact that Hamas is adhering to the current ceasefire and has prevented other militant fringe groups from attacking Israel in the wake of Operation Cast Lead cannot be ignored. This gesture signals that Hamas-though still unofficially-is meeting the requirement of non-violence that Israel and the Quartet required of it, intimating the use of terror as a controlled political tactic that can be stopped and started as a means to an end, but not the end in and of itself. Just as the PLO, which was also labelled a terrorist organization, made the transformation to a political party, Hamas should not be excluded the option run as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people should it comply with the mandate of non-violence.

As for the condition that Hamas must accept all prior agreements, this issue can be resolved almost entirely on its own once Palestinian elections are held and a new government is installed. Any future Palestinian government must accept prior agreements or modify them with Israel by mutual agreement. Neither the Quartet nor Israel should treat Hamas as an independent state; Hamas is and must be seen as a Palestinian political party and if its leadership wants to be a part of the political process they can run on any political platform they desire except militant resistance to Israel. If Hamas sits in the opposition, their acceptance or refusal of prior agreements becomes irrelevant but as a government they must adhere to the norms of conduct between nations including prior agreements or obligations between national institutions that have been entered into.

The API is a means to unravel the current political conundrum between Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and the Quartet, providing a dignified way out for all players involved. Although the Netanyahu government has not yet formally endorsed the API, it would be a wise step forward as it provides a solid foundation for an Israeli-Arab comprehensive peace. The United States and the EU should formally endorse it and make every effort to persuade Israel to do likewise. The EU and US should also seek to take advantage of growing regional concern over the Iranian nuclear threat and the Iranian regime's support for militant extremist groups, to encourage Arab states to make a greater effort to promote their peace initiative. If developments in Iran are dangerously destabilising the region, moderate Arab states need to be convinced that the API, with its promise of normalised relations and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, offers them their best chance at countering Iran's regional ambitions.

There is nothing in the API that negates Israel's ultimate objective of establishing peace and normal relations with all of its neighbours. The initiative was never meant to be presented on an all or nothing basis. Within the general framework of the document everything is negotiable to achieve a secure and durable peace, including the definition of a ‘just' solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the leading Arab states who wish Israel to accept the API must now use all the leverage they have to persuade Hamas to adopt it as well. Since signing up to the API would be seen as joining the collective will of the Arab states, the initiative offers Hamas a way to achieve land and peace for the Palestinians without having to concede directly to Israel. However, for Hamas to go down this route, it must be genuinely prepared, as part of a future Palestinian government, to negotiate final status issues and recognise Israel at the end of the process.

On more than one occasion, Hamas leaders have suggested that they can see themselves accepting a solution to their conflict with Israel based on Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. In fact Hamas' political leader Khaled Meshaal told the New York Times on 4 May 2009 that, "We are with a state on the 1967 borders, based on a long-term truce. This includes East Jerusalem, the dismantling of settlements and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees." Although this exact formula will never be acceptable to Israel, especially in regards to the ‘right of return', Hamas may be beginning to move in a more constructive direction. That said, whilst Hamas' offer of a ceasefire demonstrates a recognition of the centrality of the 1967 Green Line to resolving this conflict, it does not demonstrate a willingness to enter into an indefinite peace with Israel. As stated above, if Hamas is to sign up to the API it will have to publicly state that it will recognise Israel in return for the conditions of the Initiative, as opposed to simply offering a ceasefire or merely accepting the fact of Israel's existence.

The social, security and economic progress achieved in the West Bank offers a glaring contrast to the continuing despondency in Gaza. This presents a serious challenge to Hamas' rule. If Hamas intends to represent the Palestinian people, it is in dire need of a new strategy to deliver goods and services to its constituents. Israel's incursion into Gaza in December 2008 left an ineradicable mark on Hamas militants that violent resistance will further diminish, rather than strengthen, their position vis-à-vis Israel. Polls have clearly indicated that continued military resistance has actually undermined its popular support.

As a significant Palestinian force, Hamas remains central to the two state solution. However, its leadership must accept that whilst the movement retains the capacity to violently disrupt the peace process, there is no viable option other than the two state solution to ensure its survival as an influential political organisation. Whilst we can surmise that the Hamas leadership is aware of this, this does not mean they have the will to change, or that Hamas' followers and more violent competitors will let Hamas change. The API provides Hamas with a way of reforming without undergoing public capitulation but, like the Quartet principles, it still requires Hamas to publicly demonstrate a desire for peace.