The ‘others’ who feel they are hit by the Israeli strikes on Gaza
Israel's operations in Gaza brought together all the variables in a complex equation, with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria on the one side and Israel and the Arab regimes on the other. This is the result of an increasingly evident division between the parties and Israel's operation will serve as a litmus test.
Although the target of the operation is Hamas, both Syria and Hezbollah feel like they are the ones being hit. We know that Hamas and Hezbollah have more than merely emotional ties with Iran. We cannot say that Al Fatah, Cairo, Riyadh and Amman share the same feelings. Besides, the naked truth is that Al Fatah supports Israel's current operation. Having said this, news that members of Al Fatah were responsible for revealing Hamas targets to the Israeli army during the initial stages of the conflict should come as no surprise Returning to Gaza on the flanks of Israeli tanks, after having lost it to Hamas during intense internal conflict: What a victory that would be for Al Fatah!
Palestinians in the West Bank are increasingly critical of what they see as the failure of Al Fatah and Abbas to react against the Gaza operations. Developments in Palestinian politics will be watched very carefully in the coming months. Any ceasefire plan, including the one attempted in Cairo, that sidelines Hamas and seeks to carry Al Fatah into Gaza on Israel's back will turn Al Fatah into nothing more than a sitting duck, making it difficult for it claim a legitimate support base and will raise new obstacles to a lasting ceasefire in the area.
The Middle East's major Sunni powers, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are concerned about Iranian influence. They each view Hamas as `Iran's Trojan horse in the Middle East', and as such, do not harbor any strong grievances about Hamas being under Israeli fire.
The Hamas-Israeli conflict has had tremors on the domestic politics of Arab states in an unprecedented way. The chasm between the ruling Arab regimes and the people deepens day-by-day. The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the deaths of thousands of Muslims, and more importantly, Islam increasingly being mentioned in conjunction with terrorism, has resulted in the radicalization of moderate Muslims. Hamas' electoral victory stands as an example of this.
Israel's cruel use of force in its latest operations has cost the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians, one out of three killed are children. What must be remembered in the future are the children, who while taking shelter in the UN, were murdered, not the rockets that Hamas fired. The atrocities in Gaza will only fuel the dangerous shift towards radicalization, not only among the Palestinians, but also within all Muslims. In other words, this means a rise in more recruits ready to become suicide bombers, and a future that is more insecure for everyone. The rise in radicalism will result in a serious crisis of legitimacy in the Arab regimes. This also applies to Al Fatah.
Demonstrations in support of Palestine take place nearly everyday now in Islamic states. States like Egypt have tried to control the streets by prohibiting demonstrations in strong support of Palestine. These demonstrations are not only against Israel and the United States, but also against the ruling governments at home. In the Arab world, Israel's operations are considered as ‘unproportional' and ‘cruel'. Moreover, political Islam does not mean anything to the majority of people attending these demonstrations. However, the trajectory of events are pushing the moderates under the sway of political Islam.
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and various Gulf States see the weakening of Hamas rule in Gaza in their favor. After all, the strengthening of Hamas is perceived as Iran's sword struck in the heart of the Arab region. The weakening of Hamas' military power is a positive development for those who share this view because both Hamas and Hezbollah are perceived as a threat to ‘moderate' states. Although every one of them receives military and financial aid from the U.S., none of the Arab regimes came to power democratically-this is very much what explains the public's anger against their governments positions As long as Israel's operation continues, Arab regimes, which cling to the ‘moderate' identity will be under more pressure as strengthening radicals will present more powerful alternatives to Western-prone regimes in the region. It would not be surprising to see those who want to keep their rule start giving concessions, either overt or covertly, to radical movements.
The international community is already fighting on two separate fronts and desperately need Arab support to break the cycle in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Israel's unproportional use of force will likely create more challenges to Arab regimes. Regimes that are under public pressure at home may tune down the cooperation with the West against terrorism, asking how they can be expected to cooperate, while fellow Muslims are being murdered by foreign troops.
Arab regimes, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are losing influence. Iran is the emerging counter-center in both Israel's operations against Hezbollah and Hamas. Under these circumstances, that Turkey, as a strong secular, Sunni Muslim country that has historical ties with the region as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire has made an appearance on the regional stage, has created serious expectations among the region's Muslim population. However, Ankara's attitude in meeting the expectations of the Arab states is important. How successful Turkey's tough stance against Israeli aggression will be, except for winning favor and applause on the streets of Arab countries, will become more clear during and after the ceasefire process and the role that Turkey will assume. However, the relations between Israel and Turkey could be damaged. The bill that is stubbornly put forward in the U.S. Congress that accuses Turkey of Armenian genocide in April of every year could receive more support this year. At this point, the Jewish lobby in the U.S. could question the future of their relations with Turkey. Just like was true during the days when Halid Mesal was invited to Turkey after Hamas won the elections.
Prime Minister Erdogan stressed that Turkey's Security Council membership could be used as a means to bring up Hamas' arguments at the United Nations. For obvious reasons, Israel does not like this proposal. However, the potential for success of any one-sided mediation that ignores Hamas, as well as one that dismisses dialogue with Israel, merits serious questioning. Moreover, it is important to take into consideration how Arab regimes, which are concerned about the strengthening of Hamas and who would not regret to see its ‘end', will position themselves if Turkey is perceived to be the actor that is closest to Hamas. However, both the Arabs and Israel may favor a proposal on Turkish soldiers taking a role in the peacekeeping force after the ceasefire is in place.
The security of the Egypt-Israel border is the main topic of the ceasefire. In other words, ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza depends on the Egyptian guarantee of control over the border. Cutting of the arms-supply tunnels from Egypt into Gaza is the sine qua non for Israel.
Syria, on the other hand, is both an ally of Iran and the country that Hamas leader Halid Mesal resides in at the moment. Syria was the only Arab state to support Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. However, that the Israeli operation was initiated soon after Besar Esad's announcement that Syria was ready to enter into direct negotiations with Israel, took the Turkish mediated peace process efforts to a different level. No matter how cautiously Damascus behaves, an Israel that wants to crush Hamas is not likely to hand the trump card to the big brother of pro-Hamas, Syria.
Hamas made a strategic error by firing missiles into Israel as the Egyptian brokered ceasefire ended. Thus, Hamas served the opportunity to Israel on a golden platter-and helped bolster Olmert and Livni before the Israeli election on February 10. Hamas, which started to hit Israeli cities as soon as the ceasefire ended, seems to be keen on joining the club in the Middle East for those who have lost their hold on democratically-earned power by resorting to eventual force. Israel, on the other hand, finds the short cut to getting rid of the ‘trouble in Gaza' by firing missiles on Hamas. Today, the responsibility for Gaza has been handed to Egypt. But how willing is Cairo to take on this responsibility and enter the minefield? We have to wait until the inauguration ceremony in the White House on January 20 to find out.
